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(1952), Bellak and Brewster Smith (1956), among others. He proposed discarding the quantitative and, in his view, mechanistic methods inherent within the natural sciences. Instead, he considered psychoanalysis a ‘science of dialogue’ in the frame of a ‘bi-personal psychology’ that can find its own principles of objectivity and validation. To this point, he wrote: “Psychoanalysis must, on the basis of its practice, discover its own principles of objectivity and accept its role as a science—in many ways privileged—of humanity. It must accept its character as a science of dialogue—that is, of bi-personal psychology—its character as an interpretive science… with essentially original laws and techniques of validation different from those that rule the natural sciences. The first task of epistemological investigation is to formulate conditions that ensure the validity of our interpretations” (Baranger W. 1959, p. 27). However, specifying that his was not a subjectivist or interpretive position considering the analyst’s purpose as creating interpretation, Baranger wrote: “The systematic examination of what occurs in the bi-personal analytic situation is the only means of accessing an ideal of validation of knowledge that truly pertains to psychoanalysis. This ideal, as we now conceive it, is achieved—although not formulated—in various papers in recent years that provide a very exhaustive description of the analytic situation with the interpretations and modifications occurring in limited ‘time ensembles’” (Baranger W, 1959, p. 29). In the opinion of de Leon de Bernardi (2008), this perspective is based on the conceptual frame of Merleau Ponty’s (1945/2005) phenomenology of perception and Heinrich Racker’s notion of the analyst as a participating observer, both of whom depict the dialectic interrelation between subject and object while emphasizing the functions of observation and perception, and the perspectives on external reality. Racker emphasized the analyst’s need of self-observation of the different aspects of his or her participation. In Willy Baranger’s view (1961-1962), Racker’s ideas led to a broadening of the analyst’s perceptive and reflective capacity regarding the interpersonal situation of analysis. With respect to Racker’s work on the knowledge of countertransference, Willy Baranger points out that the analyst’s ego must be positioned “by means of a process of relative division, as an observer of the interpersonal situation” (Baranger W, 1961-62, p. 168). Consequently, “Since observation by the analyst is both observation of the patient and a correlative self-observation, it can only be defined as observation of this field” (Baranger M and Baranger W, 1961-62/2008, p.796). Later, the Barangers developed the notion of ‘bastion’, and proposed that the analyst should establish a ‘second look’ at the analytic field, especially regarding obstacles to the process involving both participants: “This has led us to propose the introduction of several terms: ‘field’, ‘bastion’, ‘second look’. When the process stumbles or halts, the analyst can only question himself about the obstacle, by encircling himself and his analysand, Oedipus and the Sphinx, in a second look, in a total view: this is the field” (Baranger M, Baranger W and Mom, 1979, p. 1). The work of 1961-62, in the meantime, was to provide a detailed observation and description of the essential aspects of the psychoanalytic situation, conceived as a dynamic field. This in turn opened up new issues, such as the importance of the analyst’s participation and of countertransference as a technical instrument; the relevance of body language and
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