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work on resultant shame (Lombardi, 2008) are examples of contemporary directions in this area. 4. Development, motivation, emergent function: Originally opposed to what he termed a ‘developmental tilt’ in the classical Freudian theory, Mitchell, in his turn to Loewald’s notion of human subjectivity as emergent within the relational matrix, one characterized “from the earliest moments as a site of primal density from which object states and subjectivity emerge” (Harris, 2011, p.714), became increasingly developmentally oriented. An example of the two person account of emergent sexuality, making use of Laplanche’s “implantation” and “excess of the other” concepts, was presented by Stein in her conceptualization of ‘sexuality as excess’, arising out of the interaction between the adult and the child (Stein, 2008). 5. Clinical process marked by the emphasis on the ubiquity of countertransference: Following the early footprints of Ferenczi (1911, 1932), Heimann (1960)’s ideas of countertransference, and Bion’s (1959) developmental work on Projective Identification, the Relational clinical theory “operates as a …radical systems theory” (Harris, 2011); it places emphasis on the bi-directional influences between the analytic pair. Authenticity, honesty, possibly disclosure (Davies, 1994; Renik, 2007) of analyst’s missteps and errors may be put into practice in a variety of ways but they are the grounding of relational clinical practice, just as are the ‘analyst’s vulnerability’ and ‘impasse’ (Aaron, 2006; Harris and Sinsheimer, 2008). Among the many contributions of the Relational thought and clinical approaches listed above, the contemporary controversy involves the degree to which the analytic dyad is viewed as an a-historical co-construction, and at the same time a replica of a mother—infant unit. (See also entries CONFLICT, INTERSUBJECTIVITY) V. Bd. Self Psychology: Self Object Self Psychologists caution that one must be a bit wary of the concept of “internalization” inasmuch as it is a figure of speech which need not, nor should not, be taken too literally. Thus when it is said that “Object Relations Theory” refers to a gradual construction “of dyadic or bipolar representations (self- and object-images) as reflections of the original infant-mother relationship” (Kernberg, 1976, p 57) it should not necessarily be seen as indicative of transposition of activity in the world to a stage of theatre inside of the head where miniature replicas or “representations” or “images” are re-enacting the world outside. “Internalization” is best seen as applicable to concepts that need not have a physical or geographic meaning. Arnold Goldberg (1992), the editor of the annual series “Progress in Self Psychology” and a major contributor to the expansion of Heinz Kohut’s theory, exemplifies (2015a, oral communication with Eva Papiasvili): “We put money in the bank, we are in love or in trouble without attributing the dollars being stored physically in the building where the transaction took place or imagining that ‘love’ and ‘trouble’ are places. These are figures of speech that too easily become concretized. This lack of clarity has often been replicated in our assuming that the mind is somehow situated within the brain which in turn is situated within
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