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Assuming the general agreement that internal objects are not exact replicas or representations of external objects, but rather an amalgam of outer figures and of projections of parts of the self; equally, that the self is made up of an amalgam of an inner core blended with layer after layer of identification and of internalized responses, still, the theoretical and technical distinction among the ingredients is nevertheless necessary. Under certain circumstances, the clinical decision to go for the object-ness of the figure or the self-ness may matter greatly to the patient. The author exemplifies (Bach, Mayes, Alvarez, Fonagy, 2000) such clinical decisions via working with series of dreams, where at first, critical and rejecting authority figures seem filled with obvious otherness, and although one might find later that the figures contained some aspects of the patient’s self, she would wonder first about the nature of the internal maternal object. Alvarez explains that her preference for seeing the authority figure first as an internal object (rather than an aspect of self) would depend on the degree of otherness the figure contained. Later on, when the authority figure evolves and gains more benign characteristics, it could be also seen and explored as a part of the self, but if it at first seemed full of otherness (criticism, rejection), the author would start from exploration of the figure’s motivations. Alvarez follows the Kleinian picture of the mind as containing an inner world of (more or less integrated) aspects of the self and of various internal objects (Alvarez 1999). Pertinent are examples of children with apparent learning difficulties due to omnipotence or shame or despair is motivated by an internal object which they see as stupid, or otherwise impeded, so the children play stupid to ‘keep the object company’, as it were. As the internal object begins to become more robust, viable and more intelligent, the children may begin to reveal and to use their intelligence. In this author’s view (Alvarez, 2010; Alvarez and Lee, 2004), no feeling or function can ever be seen in purely one-person psychology terms. It is toward what kind of object various feelings are directed, and this depends on – and in turn affects – various processes of introjection, internalization and identification. As the patient gets older, such figures may get to be accepted as ego-syntonic, and more a part of the patient’s self. However, the author holds firm to the criterion of otherness, which may apply even in the most integrated of personalities. VI. Dd. The Self in the Psychoanalysis of the Adolescent Explorations related to the function of the Self, as a distinct entity with respect to the ego, derive from the influence of Peter Blos’ (1967) model on some of the authors who have dealt with adolescent psychoanalysis. According to Blos, adolescence can be modeled as a “second process of individuation” with reference to the first process of separation and individuation, described by Margaret Mahler; as the child detaches from the mother through a process of internalization of the image of her, similarly the adolescent must detach himself from his own internalized objects of his infancy to be able to turn to objects outside the family. Blos considers adolescent change as a transformation that leads to the definition of the structure of the character. This process is based
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