Therefore, parents arguably have a moral duty to enhance their children’s immunity
genetically, and should they have the means to do so, they are morally blameworthy
should they refuse to do so. Indeed, Bostrom and Savulescu (2009) would agree that it
is the duty of parents to promote the excellence of their children and ensuring the
health of a child is certainly in the realm of promoting their child’s ‘quality’, so to
speak. Thus, if a parent’s moral duty is to make certain their child excels, and genetic
enhancement promotes this, we could argue they are morally blameworthy should they
choose not to enhance their children genetically.
What we must consider, however, is where we should, as a society, draw the line on
genetic enhancement. Arguing that children have a right to immunity to disease is
hardly controversial, nor is the idea that parents must ensure the health of their
children; thus, arguing for genetic immunisation or for parents to protect their
children’s health are perhaps not difficult positions to defend, but the moral duty of
parents to genetically enhance their children becomes much more controversial when
we extend this argument into areas such as disability. To explore the ethics of this, we
must look at similar arguments regarding the moral standing of ensuring a child is
born without disability.
Some philosophers argue that ensuring disabled children are not born is not as
controversial as it may seem (Brecher, 2011). Brecher (2011) claims that not only is it
morally acceptable to prevent people from being born with genetic conditions that
would cause them great suffering, but it is perhaps even a moral requirement- he does,
however, question what such preventions tell those who already exist with such
genetic conditions. Though Brecher (2011) argues against claims that by arguing for
the prevention of disabled births, we are not then automatically arguing for the
elimination of disabled people- as some critics argue- he claims that the practice of
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