McMahan (2005), which could arguably lead into eugenics despite Brecher’s (2011)
arguments.
As touched upon above, what we need to know about such prevention of genetic
conditions, is why they are so much more controversial than arguing for preventing
non-genetic conditions. Brecher (2011) acknowledges that one such difference is that
when talking about genetic conditions, it is the intrinsic link to identity claimed by
disabled people that morally differentiates the two- he, for example, points to the fight
by the deaf community to protect the right to bring deaf children into the world as a
way of asserting deafness as an important identity. Brecher (2011), however, does not
consider this a convincing argument, nor does he consider the social model of
disability entirely convincing as rebukes to preventing disabled births, as he concludes
that if a disability cannot be changed by adapting social norms to accommodate that
disability, then it devalues no one to eliminate said disability.
Bostom and Savulescu (2009) similarly suggest that arguing against enhancement
for the reason it would send the message that those who are unenhanced are
intrinsically worth less, in this essay’s case, those who are allowed to be born disabled,
is distinct from the message that some properties are not as good as other properties
for people to have, again in this discussion’s case, that the property of being disabled
is not as good to have as the property of being abled. Bostom and Savulescu (2009),
similarly to Brecher (2011), argue that this latter message is not immoral to send if it is
true. Thus, genetic enhancement is not an immoral practice to encourage. Thus, if it is
not an immoral practice, is it the moral option? Does this then insinuate that parents
who do not enhance their children are not making the moral choice and are morally
blameworthy should they refuse to enhance their children ‘against’ disability
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