diversity and weaken a minority group’s political power would arguably be a morally
blameworthy action.
However, McMahan (2005) also posits that if it is immoral to prevent a disabled
foetus from making it to term, we cannot argue that it is morally permissible to make a
foetus disabled by, for example, harming it in utero in the same argument. However,
McMahan (2005) does appear to claim that it is perfectly moral to ensure a disability
at conception, provided the foetus has not yet begun development- the argument
appears to be that there is a difference between ensuring disability from conception
and creating or allowing disability via harm to the foetus, as the latter implies a victim.
Thus, arguably, this claim would apply in the reverse scenario. Suppose a foetus were
to have its disability removed in utero or it was aborted to prevent disability- in that
case, there is a victim in the sense that its potential future identity as a disabled person
has been taken from it just as with an injured abled foetus. In both situations where
there is a potentiality to create a victim, there is arguably a moral duty to avoid this-
therefore, a person would be morally blameworthy for injuring a foetus to create
disability and for aborting a foetus to prevent disability.
Therefore, after considering the arguments for why genetic conditions should or
should not be prevented, we can argue that it is not our moral duty to prevent
disability, and we may, in fact, be morally blameworthy in trying to do so. As such,
parents arguably do not have a moral duty to genetically enhance their children
regarding genetic disabilities and are morally blameworthy should they try to do so.
Overall, we could argue that parents have a moral duty to do the best for their
children and that they are morally blameworthy should they choose not to when it is
within their capabilities. However, the potential negative implications surrounding
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