without accountability. 42 Most genocides occur under the cover of war and revolution,
not only because it is much easier to hide genocidal violence when other violence is
occurring, but also because war makes political systems much more fragile, and subsequently damaging institutions of accountability that exist to prevent violence. 43
Brehm (2017) noted that attempted regime change via undemocratic methods, such as
coups, civil wars, and revolutions, makes it significantly more likely that a state will
pursue some form of genocide, regardless of whether the regime change was or was not successful. 44 Thus, the combination of a fragile, weakened political framework, and an exclusivist group willing to take advantage of it, acts as a terrifyingly important circumstance in the facilitation of genocide. 45 This exists in all three case studies to
similarly prominent extents. In Rwanda, one-party rule had existed for decades. The
attempt to end this resulted in the rise of several minority parties and rebel groups,
many comprising of or representing the Tutsi minority which lacked real representation. 46 Three years of civil war and violent multiparty politics meant the political system was incredibly fragile, and those in power began to develop even more radical nationalist ideas about protecting their positions from the Tutsis. 47
Unsurprisingly then, the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana in 1994 acted
as a final straw in destabilising the political system and triggered a wave of violence that killed 75% of Rwanda’s Tutsi population in three months. 48 Similarly, the political
instability in the Ottoman Empire caused by growing independence movements and a
loss of influence which came with the breakaway of land in the Balkan peninsula and North Africa facilitated the rise of the Young Turks and the three Pashas. 49 This saw
42 Rudolph J. Rummel, Death by Government (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Publishers, 1994), p. 1. 43 Rummel, p. 22. 44 Hollie Brehm, ‘Re-examining Risk Factors of Genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research , 19. 1 (2017), 61-87. (p. 77.) 45 Ernesto Verdeja, ‘On Genocide: Five Contributing Factors’, Contemporary Politics , 8. 1 (2002), 37-54. (p. 37.) 46 Scott Strauss, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 24. 47 Strauss, Order of Genocide, pp. 30-31 48 Scott Strauss, Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), p. 274. 49 Saadet Ozen, ‘The Heroes of Hurriyet: The Images in Struggle’, in The Young Turk revolution and the Ottoman Empire: the aftermath of 1908 , ed. By Georgeon, Fracois and Noemi Levy (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), pp. 15-39. (p. 15.)
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