an individual can unintentionally perform illocutionary acts and therefore is subject to
the criticism made above which leads me to conclude with McDonald (2020) that it is
the weaker theory of uptake.
A closer look into Langton’s (1993, pp.315) illocutionary disablement finds that she
is suggesting that individuals can unintentionally perform illocutionary acts. Despite
the illocutionary force of the utterance “no” being the refusal of sex, the way in w hich
Langton (1993, pp. 315) sets out illocutionary disablement, through the constitutional
theory, allows the hearer to decide that the illocutionary act be different from the
illocutionary force. This leaves the hearer able to constitute the speaker’s at tempt at
refusing sex as consent/ not refusal. The individual has performed an unintentional
illocutionary act, and thus unintentionally exercised normative power, something
which McDonald (1993, pp.4) has just proved to be impossible.
Finally, the constitutional theory of uptake can be rejected due to its negative
political implication (McDonald, 2020, pp. 18). Specifically, due to its suggestion that
individuals do not have negative speaker autonomy. Negative speaker autonomy
involves making sure that an individual does not perform an illocutionary act that was
not their desired intention (McDonald, 2020, pp. 19). This contrasts with positive
speaker autonomy which is the ability “to ensure that one is performing the
illocutionary act o ne intends to perform” (McDonald, 2020, pp. 19). Although positive
speaker autonomy lacks in both the constitutional and ratification theory this does not
weaken them as it is this lack of existence of positive speaker autonomy which is able
to explain how marginalised groups become marginalised (McDonald, 2020, pp. 19).
Without reduced positive speaker autonomy it would be hard to argue that groups such
as women are in fact marginalised, which would have consequences regarding
providing them with support.
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