One response to this is that whilst it is accepted that this is the result of demanding
that uptake is necessary for the success of an illocutionary act, this is not a reason to
refuse that uptake, in general, is required for the success of the act. There has still been
obvious wrongdoing, a woman has been unable to successfully refuse sex despite this
being her initial intent because she is marginalised and silenced. To say there has not
been wrongdoing is simply absurd as it overlooks the reality that a woman has been
raped and that the man should have recognised the refusal. As McDonald (2002, pp.4)
puts it “Lack of refusal is not the same as consent”. It is from identifying this criticism
of Langton’s (1993) argument that Bird (2002) builds his theory of uptake, one which
argues that uptake of any kind is not required for successful illocution or refusal.
Bird (2002, pp.10) uses the following example in an attempt to prove his claim that
uptake is not needed for successful illocution. He (Brid, 2002, pp.10) asks us to
imagine a burglar entering a house in which he wishes to burgle. The burglar sees a
sign s tating “Warning: dogs on guard” yet does not believe this sign to be real. The
burglar then enters the property only to find that the sign was genuine, and he is now
being attacked by dogs. Bird (2002, pp.4) claims that this case shows that the
illocutionary act, which in this case was the act of warning , does not require uptake as
the burglar was warned of the dogs via the sign yet uptake wasn’t present. In relation
to Langton’s (1993) thoughts on refusal, that uptake is needed for refusal to be
successful, Bird (2002, pp.4) would suggest that as his example shows that warning
does not require uptake, it would be wrong to say that refusal does.
Initially, this example looks plausible. However, a deeper look into Bird’s (2002)
understanding of the nature of uptake reveals the opposite. McGowan et al (2011,
pp.139) point to Bird’s (2002) confusion of sincerity intention from illocutionary
intention. Sincerity intention is how much the person believes the intention of
something. The illocutionary intention is the intention of the illocution. McGowan et
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