rules and norms embedded within pornography, deduces that a yes could be the
alternate meeting for “no”. This stems from how some pornography portrays women
as saying “no” but meaning yes. This explains how the claim that there is no uptake in
scenario 1 comes about. It also provides us with an explanation of how uptake is
present even in scenario 1 as initially “no” is understood as refusal meaning uptake
has occurred . Accepting that uptake is present in scenario 1 is important and I think it
is necessary for Langton (1993) to accept if she wants her claim to remain justified.
Not only does the model of non-literal speech help to combat Bird’s (2020, pp.3)
criticism but it also protects the women who are victims of rape as it demonstrates and
supports their refusal.
Hesni (2018, 971) has identified that the scenarios are similar in three ways. First,
as shown by the example of non-literal speech, “no” should be considered a refusal in
both cases. Second, there is a cognitive element in which the hearer cannot understand
that the woman has refused. The final similarity regards the way in which the hearer
would act. The hearer would act in the same way in both scenarios as he would if the
speaker did not refuse sex. Hesni (2018) does understand that the reason for this action
is different in both scenarios yet maintains that they should be treated the same as they
are indistinguishable at face value. It is this indistinguishability based on the grounds
that refusal is present which warrants a different name other than illocutionary
silencing to explain the illocutionary harm at play. This is where Hesni (2018, pp.959)
presents illocutionary frustration as the term to describe the linguistic harm
pornography has on women.
The term illocutionary frustration is built on the recognition that in both scenarios
the hearer is acting as though the speaker “does not have standing to refuse” (Hesni,
2018, pp.959). Hesni (2018, pp. 959) presents two ways in which illocutionary
frustration can be understood. The first is that “The hearer denies the speaker the
standing to perform the speech act” (Hesni, 2018, pp.959). For example, the hearer
might believe that speaker has in some way revoked her ability to refuse by “her being
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