The Global Advisor Terrorism, War and Civil Unrest | November 2024
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Focus on: Middle East conflict spillover
On 26 October, Israel launched airstrikes targeting Iran’s military sites in retaliation for a 1 October Iranian missile attack against its territory. In reaction, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, cautioned against underestimating or exaggerating Israel’s actions, suggesting that Iran would undertake a calibrated response, potentially favouring smaller-scale attacks in the medium term. Iran will seek to avoid an uncontrolled escalation with Israel and minimise the risk of wider confrontation. Accordingly, the ongoing cycle of calibrated, tit-for-tat cross-border strikes between Israel and Iran is expected to persist in the coming months. Only if Iran perceives an existential threat to its strategic assets or leadership will it reassess this strategic stance to actively escalate tensions with Israel into a full-blown confrontation. Iran has increasingly relied on Iran-backed paramilitary groups (IBPGs) in Iraq to target Israel in recent months, a tactic that minimises Tehran’s direct exposure while keeping pressure on Israel. Iran is likely to continue to turn to IBPGs to increase their involvement in the confrontation with Israel in a bid to asymmetrically compete with Israel’s conventional military dominance. Since July, IBPGs have ramped up drone attacks from Iraq, surging from six incidents in August to 111 in October. Should Israel retaliate against these Iraqi launch sites, IBPGs may escalate attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria. Meanwhile, Israel and Hizbullah on 26 November accepted a US-brokered agreement for a temporary ceasefire from 27 November. This includes a 60-day ceasefire during which Hizbullah would withdraw its forces and heavy weapons
Key takeaways
Terrorism incidents in the MENA region
Source: Seerist
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The direct, retaliatory and cross-border attack cycle opposing Israel and Iran since April is likely to continue in the coming months. Tehran will continue to use Iran-backed proxy groups (IBPGs) in Iraq to target Israel, reducing Iran’s direct exposure while maintaining pressure on Israel. The threat of a resumption of hostilities between Israel and Lebanese Shia movement Hizbullah will likely remain
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high over the coming months. The election of Donald Trump
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2024
Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Lebanon
Libya
Oman
Palestinian Territories
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
as US president is likely to give more latitude to Israel’s operations in the region, particularly regarding the Palestinian Territories.
Period: 1 October 2023–31 October 2024
military, diplomatic and economic measures aimed at curtailing Iran’s regional influence. Concurrently, the likelihood of a robust Israeli response extensively damaging Iranian oil infrastructure and/or nuclear programme, in the event of a future potential attack by Iran, will rise significantly. In parallel, Trump’s election and picks for future state officials will put the issue of annexation of part of the Palestinian Territories by Israel – particularly area C (under Israeli governance and security control) of the West Bank – back on the agenda of the government from early 2025. This decision is likely to lead to an increase in global scrutiny of Israel’s policies and an uptick in protests in Western capitals.
from areas in Lebanon south of the Litani River. The Lebanese military will expand its presence across southern Lebanon, replacing Israeli troops gradually. Nevertheless, the threat of a resumption of hostilities will likely remain high over the coming months. In Gaza (Palestinian Territories) , Israel’s primary focus will remain on fully degrading the capabilities and infrastructure of Palestinian Islamist militant movement Hamas in the coming months, while laying infrastructural foundations for rapid security interventions in the future. The election in the US of Trump will impact the calculations of conflict actors in the region. Drawing on his previous administration’s “maximum pressure” policy, the US will very likely renew
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