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The Global Advisor
Terrorism, War and Civil Unrest November 2024
The Global Advisor Terrorism, War and Civil Unrest | November 2024
Celebrating 30 years in partnership
The essential report written by Control Risks , for the exclusive readership of Hiscox brokers and policy holders.
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Terrorism, war and civil unrest trends
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Global outlook
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Focus on: Sabotage risk in Europe
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Focus on: Middle East conflict spillover
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About Us
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The Global Advisor Terrorism, War and Civil Unrest | November 2024
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Terrorism, war and civil unrest trends July–September 2024 (Q3)
Top 8 commercial sectors for Terrorism, war and civil unrest incidents
War incidents rose by approximately 15% globally, driven mostly by the Middle East and Ukraine conflicts. The escalation between Israel and Lebanese Shia movement Hizbullah was reflected by war incidents in Lebanon more than doubling. Ukraine continued to increase its drone and missile attacks against strategic assets in Russia, and the number of incidents rose by a quarter. The number of unrest incidents remained broadly unchanged between Q2 and Q3 2024. Asia recorded an uptick of approximately 15% quarter-on-quarter, driven by anti-government unrest in Bangladesh, and protests in India and Indonesia. Europe recorded a decline of about 25% in unrest events, reflecting a broad reduction in pro-Palestinian demonstrations and the end of election-related protests in France and Austria. An increase of 19% in global terrorism incidents in Q3 was driven by the significant escalation in attacks by Hizbullah on Israel – the number of these attacks increased by almost 75%. To a lesser extent, Islamist extremists in Pakistan increased activity in the quarter – doubling incident numbers quarter-on-quarter. 24,064 7.9% increase on Q2 2024
Top 10 countries by incident category
Source: Seerist
Terrorism
22% Education 14% Healthcare 14% Aviation 11% Power 8% Retail 8% Oil and Gas
Israel Pakistan Palestinian Terr. Syria Colombia Nigeria India Cameroon Somalia Congo (DRC)
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War
Ukraine Russia Lebanon Palestinian Terr.
Syria Israel Sudan Myanmar Afghanistan Iraq
6% 3%
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Agriculture
Unrest
India Bangladesh US Iraq Yemen Morocco Nigeria Pakistan France UK
Construction
Source: Seerist
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The Global Advisor Terrorism, War and Civil Unrest | November 2024
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Global outlook - December 2024 to February 2025
US: The threat of protests will be elevated after Republican candidate Donald Trump won the 5 November presidential election. It will likely be particularly elevated around the presidential inauguration on 20 January 2025. Ecuador: Political violence is likely to increase around the general elections on 9 February 2025. Some National Assembly candidates in Esmeraldas, Guayas, El Oro and Manabí provinces will likely receive death threats or be attacked by organised criminal groups. Mexico: Organised criminal attacks on municipal officials increased in the previous quarter amid administration changes. Political violence will persist the remaining political transitions, especially in Guerrero, Chiapas and Veracruz states. Mozambique: Large protests and accompanying bouts of violent unrest are highly likely in the capital Maputo and other cities as the opposition continues to contest the results of the 9 October elections. Congo (DRC): A fragile ceasefire between the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group and the government will likely continue to hold in North Kivu province while mediation between DRC and Rwanda is ongoing. Chad: Renewed military operations against Islamist militant groups in the Lake Chad area are highly likely, potentially including operations in border areas of Cameroon and Nigeria.
Pakistan: Increased demand for heating will cause gas shortages in the coming months. This, coupled with continued power outages will drive localised protests, particularly in urban centres such as Karachi (Sindh province). Yemen: The Houthi rebel movement will likely continue to stage sporadic attacks on Israeli territory and maintain its campaign of attacks primarily targeting commercial vessels linked to the US, UK and Israel. Bangladesh: The security situation has improved since the resignation and exile of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina in August. However, the threat of violence against businesses owned by associates of Hasina or the Awami League will persist in the coming months. New Caledonia: France’s decision to suspend controversial voting reforms has stabilised the security environment. However, businesses in and around the capital Nouméa will remain exposed to the threat of retaliatory attacks by pro-independence groups. Philippines: Ahead of the May 2025 polls, election-related incidents (including attacks on candidates) are likely to increase, particularly at the local level where political rivalry is intense. Nevertheless, the security environment overall will remain stable.
France: Tense deliberations around the 2025 austerity budget highlight the difficulties that the new government will face in passing legislation, and its reliance on the far-right. This, alongside austerity plans and cost of living concerns, will drive civil unrest. Germany: There will likely be snap elections in February 2025. Meanwhile, the foiling of a sophisticated far-right extremist coup d’etat plot, the fourth in several years, highlights the sustained threat from far-right extremism.
Ukraine/Russia: Fighting will likely continue at high intensity in the coming months as Russia will likely seek to press its tactical advantage. Moreover, Moscow will likely bank on reduced Western support for Ukraine after Donald Trump won the US presidential election. Israel/Palestinian Territories: As the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist militant group Hamas continues, the intent of self-radicalised individuals to launch unsophisticated attacks in and around Israel’s large urban centres will intensify.
Outlook
Romania
Ghana
Chad
US
Belarus
Ecuador
Germany
Global
1 December Legislative elections
7 December General elections
29 December Parliamentary and local elections
20 January Presidential inauguration
26 January Presidential elections
9 February General elections
23 February Federal elections
28 February – 30 March Muslim holy month of Ramadan
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The Global Advisor Terrorism, War and Civil Unrest | November 2024
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Focus on: Sabotage risk in Europe
The war in Ukraine has driven an escalation in Russian hybrid tactics aimed at undermining the political resolve of Ukraine’s backers in Europe . Such tactics – including disinformation, sabotage or cyber attacks – deliberately stay below the threshold of conventional warfare but have a profound impact on the security environment in Europe. Prior to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia had been demonstrating less regard for whether its espionage activities are detected and identified or whether they trigger international responses. Russia’s lack of concern regarding attribution or retaliation has accelerated, lessening constraints on its actions. A further escalation in sabotage is plausible as tensions between Europe and Russia mount further. Since February 2022, there has been a significant escalation in acts of sabotage targeting critical infrastructure in Europe that bear the hallmarks of a state actor. These incidents often demonstrate significant technical knowledge; are followed by no claim of responsibility; employ fairly easy-to-acquire methods, such as arson or cable cutters; and cause significant – but temporary – disruption. These acts have occurred in parallel with an increase in hostile surveillance, cyber activity and disinformation, and have targeted critical infrastructure but remained limited in impact, potentially to avoid escalation. Railways and internet cables have been the most common targets so far, particularly in Western Europe. Energy assets, especially offshore, have been subject to significant surveillance, both from drones and vessels.
Key takeaways
Suspected arson attacks attributed to Russia, 2024
Map & Source: Control Risks
The threat to critical infrastructure in Europe from sabotage by or linked to Russia is heightened and this threat will likely increase in the coming months, at least. The most common targets so far have been railways, internet cables and defence assets and companies, but energy assets and logistics companies are increasingly plausible targets. In Eastern Europe, the range of targets has been broader and has included the retail sector. Russia in 2024 has demonstrated a greater willingness to carry out sabotage actions that could also cause injury and this trend appears set to continue. Russia also appears to be increasingly using proxies who employ unsophisticated tactics, widening both Russia’s capabilities and the threat posed by sabotage.
Riga
Vilnius
London
Berlin
Warsaw
Prague
Attempted Successful
*Boundaries and country names shown on this map do not imply endorsement or acceptance by Control Risks or Seerist
Successful acts of sabotage so far have mostly been conducted to avoid causing death or injury. However, a shift in approach over 2024 indicates that concern over causing civilian casualties is reducing. The Financial Times in May reported that European intelligence agencies had warned their governments that Russia is intending to carry out covert bombings and arson attacks in European countries, along with attacks on infrastructure. Media in November reported that Western intelligence services believed that devices that exploded in July at DHL logistics facilities in the UK and Germany were part of a Russian plot to attempt to place explosives onto a cargo plane. Some officials reportedly believed that the DHL plot may not have been directly sanctioned by the Kremlin.
Alongside more sophisticated acts of sabotage, untrained individuals recruited locally are likely to carry out less sophisticated, Russia-sanctioned attacks against non-critical targets, particularly in eastern Europe. Targets of such attacks have included a large shopping mall in Warsaw (Poland), an IKEA warehouse in Vilnius (Lithuania), a museum in Riga (Latvia) and a bus depot in Prague (Czechia). In Western Europe, such attacks have remained confined to defence or defence-adjacent Ukrainian targets. A warehouse in London (UK) containing aid shipments to Ukraine was destroyed in March in a fire started by British nationals who were allegedly recruited by Russia.
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The Global Advisor Terrorism, War and Civil Unrest | November 2024
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Focus on: Middle East conflict spillover
On 26 October, Israel launched airstrikes targeting Iran’s military sites in retaliation for a 1 October Iranian missile attack against its territory. In reaction, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, cautioned against underestimating or exaggerating Israel’s actions, suggesting that Iran would undertake a calibrated response, potentially favouring smaller-scale attacks in the medium term. Iran will seek to avoid an uncontrolled escalation with Israel and minimise the risk of wider confrontation. Accordingly, the ongoing cycle of calibrated, tit-for-tat cross-border strikes between Israel and Iran is expected to persist in the coming months. Only if Iran perceives an existential threat to its strategic assets or leadership will it reassess this strategic stance to actively escalate tensions with Israel into a full-blown confrontation. Iran has increasingly relied on Iran-backed paramilitary groups (IBPGs) in Iraq to target Israel in recent months, a tactic that minimises Tehran’s direct exposure while keeping pressure on Israel. Iran is likely to continue to turn to IBPGs to increase their involvement in the confrontation with Israel in a bid to asymmetrically compete with Israel’s conventional military dominance. Since July, IBPGs have ramped up drone attacks from Iraq, surging from six incidents in August to 111 in October. Should Israel retaliate against these Iraqi launch sites, IBPGs may escalate attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria. Meanwhile, Israel and Hizbullah on 26 November accepted a US-brokered agreement for a temporary ceasefire from 27 November. This includes a 60-day ceasefire during which Hizbullah would withdraw its forces and heavy weapons
Key takeaways
Terrorism incidents in the MENA region
Source: Seerist
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The direct, retaliatory and cross-border attack cycle opposing Israel and Iran since April is likely to continue in the coming months. Tehran will continue to use Iran-backed proxy groups (IBPGs) in Iraq to target Israel, reducing Iran’s direct exposure while maintaining pressure on Israel. The threat of a resumption of hostilities between Israel and Lebanese Shia movement Hizbullah will likely remain
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high over the coming months. The election of Donald Trump
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Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel
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Libya
Oman
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as US president is likely to give more latitude to Israel’s operations in the region, particularly regarding the Palestinian Territories.
Period: 1 October 2023–31 October 2024
from areas in Lebanon south of the Litani River. The Lebanese military will expand its presence across southern Lebanon, replacing Israeli troops gradually. Nevertheless, the threat of a resumption of hostilities will likely remain high over the coming months. In Gaza (Palestinian Territories) , Israel’s primary focus will remain on fully degrading the capabilities and infrastructure of Palestinian Islamist militant movement Hamas in the coming months, while laying infrastructural foundations for rapid security interventions in the future. The election in the US of Trump will impact the calculations of conflict actors in the region. Drawing on his previous administration’s “maximum pressure” policy, the US will very likely renew
military, diplomatic and economic measures aimed at curtailing Iran’s regional influence. Concurrently, the likelihood of a robust Israeli response extensively damaging Iranian oil infrastructure and/or nuclear programme, in the event of a future potential attack by Iran, will rise significantly. In parallel, Trump’s election and picks for future state officials will put the issue of annexation of part of the Palestinian Territories by Israel – particularly area C (under Israeli governance and security control) of the West Bank – back on the agenda of the government from early 2025. This decision is likely to lead to an increase in global scrutiny of Israel’s policies and an uptick in protests in Western capitals.
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The Global Advisor Terrorism, War and Civil Unrest | November 2024 About Us The Hiscox Crisis Management division serves both corporate and private clients. Our exclusive partnership with Control Risks allows us to combine renowned insurance expertise with unparalleled security risk and crisis management capability to protect what matters most to our clients. We are the global leaders in this sector. Celebrating 30 years in partnership, Hiscox and Control Risks have helped policyholders manage thousands of crisis events, including complex security and integrity issues. Together, we combine our insurance expertise with Control Risks’ capabilities across security risk and crisis management, protecting what matters most to our clients.
Celebrating 30 years in partnership
Control Risks is a global specialist risk consultancy. We are committed to helping our clients build organisations that are secure, compliant and resilient in an age of ever-changing risk. We believe that responsible risk-taking is at the core of our clients’ success. We have unparalleled experience in helping clients ready themselves for, respond to and recover from challenges and crises that arise in any ambitious organisation seeking to convert risk into opportunity globally. Terrorism Hiscox has established itself as the market-leading provider of war, terrorism and political violence insurance for the last 25 years, offering financial protection and world-class response services to our clients all around the world. We offer a diverse portfolio of options within our terrorism suite of products to ensure our clients are adequately protected against and prepared to respond to the latest global threats. We insure some of the biggest organisations in the world, across 130 different countries including some of the most volatile regions. We have the ability to write every major coverage type in the market, and also have a selection of unique products designed and developed by our in-house team.
In business since 1901, Hiscox is one of the most trusted and influential Lloyd’s of London syndicates. Whether it’s protecting family homes from a storm surge or hail damage, helping to safeguard blue-chip companies from the crippling financial and reputational costs of a cyber-attack, or working to keep employees safe and businesses operational following a terrorist incident, we continue to innovate to respond to some of the most complex, volatile and emerging risks.
Key coverages include:
Terrorism physical damage Terrorism business interruption Riots, strikes, civil commotion and malicious damage Terrorism liability Contingent cover Broad political violence including or excluding war/civil war Malicious attack Confiscation, expropriation, nationalisation and deprivation (CEND) Lenders’ interests Nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological (NCBR) Threat
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