Volume 2, Issue 2
Summer 2024
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This journal is published by the students and staff from the Department of Politics, Philosophy and International Relations at Swansea University.
Please visit our website where you can find an online version of this publication and all of our previous editions:
https://myuni.swansea.ac.uk/faculties/fhss/socsci/populo/
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© Swansea University
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Chief Editor
Florence Wade
Politics
Deputy Chief Editor
Imogen Williams
Politics
Editors
Saskia Culbert
Ancient History and Politics
Andrés Soler Aldama
Politics and International Relations
Louis Carpenter
Politics
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Contents Chief Editors Introduction ................................................................................. 5
Not Any Doctrine: Challenging Mill’s Case for Unrestricted Speech. – HUP-
133- Charlotte Williams ........................................................................................ 6
To what extent is territorial integrity states’ main security concern in the 21 st
century. – PO-248- Christos Vlastaris ................................................................ 15
Country Report: Pakistan. – PO-209- Sarah Taylor .......................................... 26
To what extent are contemporary global conflicts influenced by race? – PO-
253- Megan Salter ............................................................................................... 43
Submission to the inquiry of: Energy Bills for Domestic Customers. – PO-
1321- Jenny Nunn ............................................................................................... 53
Assess the impact of the Sputnik programme on nuclear relations between the
USA and USSR from 1957 to 1961. – PO-3334- Luke Williams ...................... 65
Endnote ............................................................................................................... 81
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Chief Editors Introduction
Dear readers,
Welcome to the second and final issue of Populo for the 2023/24 academic year!
In this issue we have strived to have a variety of styles of work and therefore you
will see standard essays as well as a country report and an evidence submission
to a select committee inquiry. We hope this broadens your knowledge of what
types of assessments you may undertake as a part of your degree.
As in the first issue, I must thank my team of editors for their hard work in helping
to choose submissions and edit all the work. I’d also like to thank Dr Mathhew
Wall and Pete Griffiths for their continued support of Populo.
On behalf of all the editors and I, I’d like to thank everyone who submitted work
for consideration, it was a privilege to see what you had all produced. Also, a
huge congratulations to those of you whose work was chosen to be published.
I hope support for Populo by students and the department continues to grow next
year and I’m looking forward to handing over to the next Chief Editor.
Happy reading!
Florence Wade
Chief Editor
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Not Any Doctrine: Challenging Mill’s Case for Unrestricted Speech. – HUP-133- Charlotte Williams
Free speech is a topic of currency, controversy, and ultimately, complexity
with even influential freedom thinkers’ theories such as Mill’s, while generally
in favour, having caveats. While the multitudinous views on speech restriction
cannot be understated, I argue the state should regulate speech, including hate
speech and denialism. In what follows, I compare current UK restrictions of
speech or lack thereof, discuss Mill’s arguments, and apply them to
contemporary debates before expressing and defending my views. I consider
opposing arguments, but overall conclude the power speech wields is too great
not to be checked.
Abel et al. (2021) define ‘hate speech’ as expression that singles out some
“ socially salient characteristic”, attributes one a “ repugnant quality ”, or casts
one as “ unwelcome ” (p.30). As of March 2024, the ‘Public Order Act 1986’
restricts hate speech in Britain, including hateful expression towards race and
sex that causes “ harassment, alarm or distress ” (Legislation.gov.uk, 2001). The
‘Human Rights Act 1998’ reinforces this, stating freedom of expression is
“ subject to... restrictions... by law ” (Legislation.gov.uk, 2000), including fines
and imprisonment. Britain’s hate speech stance is recently reflected in the case
of Luton Football Club who were fined £120,000 in 2023 after fans chanted
homophobic remarks (Latham-Coyle, 2023). While Feinberg (1984) argues the
restriction of profoundly offensive speech promotes liberties, the ‘Offence
Principle’ (p.13) - adding a normative sense to Mill’s ‘Harm Principle’ - there
remains considerable debate. For example, in Unsafe Space , Slater (2016)
argues against restricting potentially ‘hateful’ speech in universities, asserting
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that unrestricted free speech is how “ we... understand the world... and work out
how… to change it ” (p.2).
Compared with hate speech, ‘false-claims’ / ‘denialism’, are, as Specter
(2016) puts it, when individuals “ turn away from reality in favour of a more
comfortable lie ” (p.10). Contrary to hate speech, as of March 2024, Britain has
no explicit denialism restrictions, despite, for example, Holocaust denial
restrictions existing across Europe. Thus, denialism appears protected under the
‘Human Rights Act 1998’, namely the freedom “ to hold opinions and... impart
information ” (Legislation.gov.uk, 2000). Nevertheless, legal caveats remain,
such as ‘judicial notice’, allowing judges to accept ‘well-known facts’ as
‘evidence’, previously used in Britain for the occurrence of the Holocaust
(Mortimer, 2019). The ‘Human Rights Act’ reinforces this, specifying that free
expression is subject to conditions in “ public safety ” interests
(Legislation.gov.uk, 2000), similar to hate speech. These factors make false-
claim regulation more ambiguous than hate speech. For example, surgeon
Muhammad Adil was legally struck-off in 2023, likely in “ public safety ”
interests, for spouting COVID-19 denialism (Burnell, 2023). Nevertheless,
COVID-19 conspiracy social-media groups that disseminate misinformation
online, in a consciousness-raising-style approach, are protected in doing so
(Nuki, 2020). Like hate speech, denialism remains controversial, with
opponents of explicit restrictions citing Millian-style arguments: “ Knowledge...
advances through... dialectic that allows even the wackiest theses to be tested
against... historical evidence ” (Leonard, 2021).
With speech so contentious, one may wonder how historical thinkers would
respond. John Stuart Mill’s ‘On Liberty’ was a defining work on freedom. Mill’s
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(1859) ‘Harm Principle’ was notable: “ Power can [only] be rightfully
exercised... to prevent harm to others ” (p.18). His attitude towards epistemic
freedom reinforces this, as a vehement defender of speech’s instrumental value,
professing there should be the “ liberty of... discussing... any doctrine ” even if
“ immoral ” (unpopular) (p.22). While Rawls justified free speech as enabling
justice, for Mill free speech permits falsities to be rectified through “ discussion ”
(p.35), or, for partial correctness, enables truth to emerge (p.8). Mill asserts
denying opinions is assuming “ infallibility ” (p.30). While he attests there is “ no
absolute certainty ” (p.33), in relative correctness, he argues, without discussion,
an opinion’s “ grounds ” are forgotten (p.66), becoming a “ dead dogma ” (p.59).
Truth, by Mill, maximises happiness, contributing to his utilitarian stance
(p.20).
Regarding contemporary speech, Mill’s arguments make likely his defence of
one’s right to express oneself as one pleases, even if in-factual or offensive,
positing no speech regulation. Offending (through hateful/false rhetoric), in
Mill’s opinion, is not ‘harm’ (p.142), therefore the ‘Harm Principle’ does not
apply. Nevertheless, Mill recognises potential implications. He analogises
offensive speech’s potential to harm in certain contexts, for example, spouting
hateful corn-dealer rhetoric “ to a... mob... before the house of a corn-dealer ”
(p.94). In a suberogatory sense, while he believes all speech deserves
protection, there are circumstances where potential incitement to harm, or even
customary morality, should prevail. In my preceding examples, Mill would
likely support Muhammad Adil’s COVID-19 denial, to give “ all sides of the
truth ” (p.81). Similarly, Mill would challenge Luton’s homophobia fine, unless,
perhaps, such chants were sung before a mob.
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Regarding hate speech, I disagree with Mill and believe restriction is
justified. Mill (1859) professes, “ There is no parity between the feeling of a
person for his own opinion, and... another who is offended at... it ” (p.142),
implying offence and harm are dichotomous. I argue hateful/offensive speech
reinforces marginalisation, constituting ‘harm’. Feinberg (1985) disagrees that
offence is ‘harm’ but asserts “ profound offence ” ‘disrupts social-order’ (p.50).
Similarly to Dworkin (1994) arguing pornography ‘suggests’ women desire
negative treatment (p.152); hate speech, like slurs and singling-out, ‘disrupts
social-order’ by ‘suggesting’ victims are lesser/inferior, which Wilkerson (2020)
terms a ‘pillar’ of a caste-like system (p.159), normalising harmful attitudes that
perpetuate discrimination. Perez (2021) reinforces this, “ men... do not suddenly
kill women, they work up to killing women ” through, presumably,
hateful/misogynistic speech, arguably ‘direct-cognitive discrimination’ (Abel et.
al., 2021, p.64). For example, gender-based violence victim Sarah Everard’s
killer’s private messages teemed with misogynistic hate speech before murder
(Thompson, 2023). This is certainly no coincidence, contradicting Mill’s ‘corn-
dealer’ analogy, as even private speech generates ‘harm’ through normalising
marginalisation. Defining harm as ‘damage to interests’ (Wolff, 2022, p.127),
combined with Young (1990) categorising marginalisation a ‘face of
oppression’ (p.9) - the unjust treatment of interests – marginalisation clearly
constitutes ‘harm’. Therefore, under Mill’s ‘Harm Principle’, warrants
regulation.
Conversely, similar to Mill’s (1859) argument that freedom allows the pursuit
of “our own good in our own way” (p.24), Scanlon (1972) asserts self-
sovereignty’s importance in “ deciding” beliefs (p.215). Put differently,
censorship limits autonomy (Abel et al., 2021, pp.34-35). However, Feinberg
(1985) argues that offence/hate speech , in fact, infringes autonomy by forcing
negative emotional experiences (p.23) and perpetuating marginalisation, as has
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been agreeably posited. This is more compelling than Scanlon and Mill, as, in
this respect, reinforced by Berlin’s (1969) liberty concept, hate speech restricts
‘negative freedoms’ by interfering with self-determination through forcing such
experiences and damaging Cohen’s (2009) bourgeois notion of equal
opportunity (p.15). Perhaps, it is indeed more ‘freeing’ to restrict hate speech,
improving marginalised persons’ autonomy/welfare, similar to Rawls’ ‘Maximin
Principle’. Fundamentally, I diverge from Mill in arguing hate speech is, in
normative-ethical terms, harmful, and deserves curtailing to enforce negative
duties.
Furthermore, I maintain that speech has a similarly potent power manifested
in denialism, leading to my argument for explicit UK false-claim restriction (to
include social-media groups), through warnings and fines, thus further
disagreeing with Mill. Mill (1859) argues free speech rectifies fallibility through
diverse “opinion ” (p.73), allowing truth to emerge, even if “ extinguished...
many times ” (p.49). While this compels, it represents a dangerous rhetoric for
what may prevail. A frank empirical example here is Donald Trump’s 2020
election-denial, which, arguably, incited the US Capitol Attack (Bash et al.,
2022). This challenges Mill’s (1859) notion: “ all silencing... is an assumption of
infallibility ” (p.30), as speech suppression, here, would not equivocate certainty
of opinion, but promote public safety.
Conversely, building on Mill’s ‘infallibility’ argument, Gray (2021) contests
denialism censorship, in this example, of Trump’s social-media election-denial:
“ If... powerful corporations... can proscribe the far right without... democratic
accountability, who.. [is] next? ” Regarding denialism, he implies suppression is
a ‘slippery slope’. I contest Mill and Gray’s insinuation: restricting a false claim
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is not, and will not become, a blanket restriction of a side of the political social
cleavage, perhaps attested by resurgences of mass Trump support despite media
bans (Seisdedos, 2024). I normatively posit that selective state intervention
promotes public interests by achieving, for example, Sen and Nussbaum’s
‘Capability Approach’: fostering the environment for ‘Bodily Integrity’ and,
particularly, ‘Affiliation’ capabilities (Wolff, 2019, p.125). Contrary to Mill,
Haworth (1998) reinforces this: “ There are contexts... [where] expression... is
inappropriate,... therefore justification for suppress[ion]” (p.45), for example,
how Holocaust denial “ fosters a nascent enthusiasm for fascism ” (p.47). For
Trump, election-denial perhaps ‘fostered enthusiasm’ for violent anarchism
beyond civil disobedience, overturning democratic norms which, while a
normative debate in itself, proved to be vastly dangerous. Ultimately, I contest
Mill in that denialism’s consequences deserve more consideration than giving
“ a chance... to all sides of the truth ” (Mill, 1859, p.81).
To conclude, free speech is an incredibly nuanced topic, particularly with the
contemplation of UK regulations and Millian arguments. However, considering
the potential impact hate speech and denialism rhetoric may have, and has had,
on socially-salient groups, public interests and the perpetuation of
marginalisation, it is undoubtable that some speech deserves curtailing, contrary
to Mill’s stance. Nevertheless, such interpretations of Mill’s arguments, while
likely, are still theoretical, and one can never know how Mill would truly
respond to such contemporary issues, were he alive today.
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Bibliography:
Abel, W., Kahn, E., Parr, T. & Walton, A. (2021). Hate Speech and Freedom of
Expression. In Introducing Political Philosophy. Oxford University Press,
30-64.
Bash, D., Tapper, J. & Herb, J. (2022, June 10). January 6 Vice Chair Cheney
said Trump had a ‘seven-part plan’ to overturn the election. Here’s what
she meant. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/06/09/politics/jan-6-
hearing-cheney-trump-overturn-election-plan/index.html
Berlin, I. (1969). Two Concepts of Liberty. Oxford University Press.
Burnell, P. (2023, October 4). Manchester surgeon who claimed Covid-19 was a
hoax struck-off. BBC. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
manchester-67005464
Cohen, G. A. (2009). Why Not Socialism? Princeton University Press, 15.
Dworkin, A. (1994). Why Pornography Matters to Feminists. Routledge, 152.
Feinberg, J. (1984). Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law.
Oxford University Press, 13-50.
Gray, J. (Host). (2021, January 15). Whose free speech? In A Point of View.
BBC Sounds. https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m000r5pm
Haworth, A. (1998). Free Speech. Taylor & Francis Group, 45-47.
Latham-Coyle, H. (2023, November 23). Luton fined after homophobic
chanting from fans. The Independent.
https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/luton-fined-chanting-fans-
brighton-b2452562.html
Legislation.gov.uk. (2000). Human Rights Act 1998.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/schedule/1/part/I/chapter/9
/2000-10-02
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Legilsation.gov.uk. (2001). Public Order Act 1986.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/contents/2001-12-14
Leonard, R. (2021, May 21). Why Free Speech Should Include Holocaust
Denial. Areo. https://areomagazine.com/2021/05/21/51264/
Mill, J. S. (1859). On Liberty. Floating Press, 8-142.
Mortimer, C. (2019, February 13). London court upholds Holocaust denial
conviction against singer. Euronews.
https://www.euronews.com/2019/02/13/london-court-upholds-holocaust-
denial-conviction-against-singer
Nuki, P. (2020, March 26). Covid Deniers: How shadowy social media groups
are spreading myths and conspiracy about coronavirus. Telegraph.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/covid-
deniers-shadowy-social-media-groups-spreading-myths-conspiracy1/
Perez, C. C. (2021). Misogyny Fuels Violence Against Women. Should It Be a
Hate Crime? The New York Times.
Scanlon, T. (1972). A Theory of Freedom of Expression. Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 1(2), 215 . https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264971?seq=12
Seisdedos, I. (2024, March 3). The fall and rise of Trump: How the former
president regained control of the Republican Party. El País.
https://english.elpais.com/usa/elections/2024-03-03/the-fall-and-rise-of-
trump-how-the-former-president-regained-control-of-the-republican-
party.html#
Slater, T. (2016). Unsafe Space: The Crisis of Free Speech on Campus.
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2.
Specter, M. (2009). Denialism: How Irrational Thinking Hinders Scientific
Progress, Harms the Planet and Threatens Our Lives. Penguin Group, 10.
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Thompson, M. [Sky News] (2023, March 6). Wayne Couzens joked about sexual
assault in newly released WhatsApp messages [Video]. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Z_stvmToCQ
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Wolff, J. (2019). Equality and social justice. In McKinnon, C., Jubb, R. & Tomlin, P. (Eds.), Issues in Political Theory (4 th ed., pp.112-131). Oxford
University Press, 125.
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Press, 127.
Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton University
Press, 9.
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To what extent is territorial integrity states’ main security concern in the 21 st century. – PO-248- Christos Vlastaris
The territorial integrity of the state is the foremost matter of national security.
It is an issue of military security since, as Barry Buzan has argued, ‘a state and
its society can be, in their own terms, secure in the political, economic, societal
and environmental dimensions, and yet all of these accomplishments can be undone by military failure’. 1 This essay argues that, regardless of the recent
developments in Ukraine, the majority of states in the twenty-first century, apart
from limited unresolved territorial and maritime issues between state dyads, do
not need to be concerned about their territorial integrity on account of the deep
internalization of the territorial integrity norm, which remains strong and widely
accepted although it has been somewhat eroded due to interest based
interventions. States that do face threats usually do so from internal
separationist movements, which regarding them international law remains
nuanced, rather than from an external invader. Peaceful separationist
movements such as the case of Scotland are not discussed.
Historically, territorial ambitions and disputes constitute the main source of conflict. 2 However, wars over territory have been incrementally and
substantially reduced to the point that when such conflicts occur, such as the
war in Ukraine, are considered anachronistic. This is due to the advent and
consolidation of the territorial integrity norm. According to Finnemore and
Sikkink a norm is ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given
1 Michael Sheehan , ‘Military Security’, in Contemporary Security Studies, ed by Allan Collins, 6 th edn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. 203-216 (p. 205). 2 Tuomas Forsberg, ‘Explaining Territorial Disputes: From Power Politics to Normative Reasons’, Journal of Peace Research, 33.4 (1996), 433-449 (p. 433).
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identity’, 3 in this case the state, while Krasner defines international norms as ‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’. 4 Zacher defines the territorial integrity norm as ‘the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries’. 5 According to
Finnemore and Sikkink, norms go through at least three stages of life: the norm
emergence where norms are proselytized by ‘norm entrepreneurs’; the norm
cascade where norms resonate with a large audience and get adopted by more
actors; and finally the norm internalization where the norm acquires a taken-for- granted quality. 6
Zacher argues that the emergence stage of the territorial integrity norm started
with the end of the First World War. Although conflict had been significantly
reduced in the period between 1815 and 1913 due to constant deliberation
provided by the framework of the Concert of Europe, the great powers were still
engaging in territorial aggrandizement within the Western state system as well
as in colonial expansion. After World War One the norm was reflected in one of
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points: ‘specific covenants for the purpose of
affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to
great and small states alike’ and was ingrained in Article 10 of the League of
Nations Covenant: ‘The members of the League undertake to respect and
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League’. 7 With Western
democracies being the main exponents of the territorial integrity norm, various
3 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52.4 (1998), 887-917 (p. 891). 4 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables’, International Organization, 36.2 (1982), 185-205 (p. 186). 5 Mark W. Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force’, International Organization, 55.2 (2001), 215-250 (p. 215). 6 Finnenmore and Sikkink, pp. 888-908. 7 Paul R. Hensel, Michael E. Allison and Ahmed Khanani, ‘Territorial Integrity Treaties and Armed Conflict over Territory’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26.2 (2009), 120-143 (p. 122).
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treaties supporting the norm were devised, such as the 1919 League Covenant,
the 1925 Locarno Pact, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the League's approval of the Stimson Doctrine in 1931. 8 Nevertheless, multiple transfers of
territory and arbitrary conquest took place during the interwar period with the
norm proponents being unable or unwilling to impose the norm. The cascade
stage begun with the end of the Second World War and the adoption of Article
2(4) in the UN Charter in June 1945, which provided the formulation of the territorial integrity of states in a territorially defined inter-state system. 9 This
was further reinforced by a series of accords such as the 1960 UN declaration
that supported the territorial integrity of states; the OAU's 1963 charter
provision and 1964 resolution upholding respect for inherited boundaries; and
the 1975 CSCE's Helsinki Final Act which prescribed that boundaries could
only be altered by consent. The internalization phase of the norm runs from
1976 to the present where no major territorial aggrandizement has taken place
while certain events like the First Gulf War only helped to reinforce the norm.
In addition, the International Court of Justice adjudicated several territorial
conflicts basing its decisions on the principle of uti possidetis which originates
in 1820s Latin America and obliges states to respect the boundaries they inherited by the previous governing states. 10 There is a substantial reduction in
the re-distribution of territory by war since the cascade phase of the norm. Prior
to 1945, 80 percent of territorial wars led to territorial changes with the percentage dropping to 30 percent since. 11 Furthermore, as international institutions and multilateral agreements have proliferated , states have to adhere to more obligations which makes the norm stronger. 12 In this manner, in order to
be part of an international community or institution, like the EU, states have
8 Zacher, p. 236. 9 James Summers, ‘Self - determination, Resources and Borders: Introduction to the Special Issue’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 22.4 (2015), 459-466 (p. 460). 10 Zacher, pp. 236-237. 11 Zacher, p. 223. 12 Hensel, Allison and Khanani, p. 127.
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willingly sacrificed long-held desires for acquisition of their neighbours’ land, as is the case with Hungary and Romania. 13 The norm has been internalized by
states as well as by their citizens. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 2014
annexation of Crimea and especially the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia
came as a shock to the world society.
The issue of Crimea dates back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and had
been since pointed out as an extremely vital area for Russian interests and, therefore, a potential source of instability. 14 In align with the utis possidetis
principle, in the case of dismemberment of a larger entity like the Soviet Union
the new frontiers, instead of nationalism and common culture, are drawn along
the lines of previous administrative units. Over the course of the twentieth
century in approximately 75 percent of secession cases the new borders conformed to previously existing administrative frontiers. 15 This practice supposedly minimizes potential political, jurisdictional and economic disputes. 16
As in Crimea this is not always the case. From 1921 to 1945 Crimea constituted
an autonomous Soviet Republic when it was delegated to an administrative
unit(oblast). In 1954 the USSR leadership authorized its devolution to the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in an effort to reinforce its control over
Ukraine at a time of bloody clashes in eastern Ukraine where Ukrainian
nationalist and anti-communist paramilitary groups were operating. The
predominantly (75 percent) Russian population of Crimea and the black sea fleet base in Sevastopol would strengthen the Russian grip over Ukraine. 17 After
13 Zacher, p. 222. 14 Zbigniev Brzezinksi, The Grand Chessboard, trans. by Ελένη Αστερίου , (Athens: Εκδόσεις Λιβάνη , 2020), p. 162-164. 15 David B. Carter and H. E. Goemans, ‘The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the Emergence of Interstate Conflict’, International Organization, 65.2 (2011), 275-309 (p. 291). 16 Carter and Goemans, p. 278. 17 See, Ioannis Kotoulas, Η ρωσική προπαγάνδα και η Ουκρανία (2023), <https://www.foreignaffairs.gr/articles/74108/ioannis-kotoylas/i-rosiki-propaganda-kai-i-oykrania > [accessed 14 May 2023].
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the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Crimea remained a part of Ukraine while its
population remained predominantly Russian. Of course, Russia has also serious
strategic interests in Crimea but normative and emotional reasons can dictate or
at least justify military action. Thus, after its annexation of Crimea Russia argued that self-determination can take place over existing state borders. 18
Territories are deeply stored in the collective memories of nations and ethnic
groups and the idea that they have been unlawfully 'stolen away' can motivate conflict. 19 There are numerous tension zones around the globe including
Nagorno-Karabagh, Cyprus, Taiwan, Kashmir among many others and most
combine emotional and interest-based parameters. In addition, many disputes,
such as in the South China Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, have to do with
exclusive economic zones and marine delimitation since the continental shelf,
and the natural resources it contains, is considered a country’s territory.
Therefore, many states in their reports on the implementing economic aspects of
self-determination under Article 1 of the Human Rights Covenants have focused on marine resources. 20 With all that been said, the danger with the war in Ukraine is that it can signal that a great power can get away with territorial conquest and this can lead to escalation in such unresolved territorial disputes. 21
This danger is significantly larger now due to the advent of multipolarity
since, according to the realist notion, changing power relations are often associated with territorial redistribution. 22 Furthermore, research has indicated
that territorial disputes are economically costly and, thus, relatively likely to
18 Summers, p. 462. 19 Forsberg, p. 438. 20 Summers, p, 463. 21 See, Tanisha M. Fazal, The Return of Conquest? Why the Future of Global Order Hinges on Ukraine, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/ukraine-russia-war-return- conquest?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&u tm_term=email_1&utm_content=20230505 > [accessed 15 May 2023]. 22 Forsberg, p. 435.
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escalate to militarized conflict. 23 In some cases, like with China and Taiwan,
territorial claims have been made without explicitly challenging the norm, since
Taiwan is considered a break-away province by China and is not universally
recognised as a sovereign state. The diffusion of the conflict in Ukraine to other
disputed areas can lead to what scholars have identified as ‘norm regression’
which is a situation when ‘[T]he norm loses salience in the international arena
through a process of emulation by leaders of other states who note that the normative stigma for breaking the norm is now significantly reduced’. 24
Nevertheless, the global response demonstrates the defence of the norm by the
majority of the members of the international system. Global support for the
territorial integrity norm tends to strengthen it, since the greatest effect of the
norm comes from pressure by other, particularly strong, states that are able to
intervene diplomatically or militarily and, thus, deter a revisionist state from challenging the territorial status-quo. 25 Most states in the international system
have a self-interest in adhering with the norm either because they have no
territorial ambitions; or their societies have internalized it so deeply that
violating it is domestically unsustainable; or they view the stability of the
international system as being in their interest; and of course out of fear of
punishment. Furthermore, the economic and strategic gains from conquest have diminished due to the globalized economy and technological advancements. 26 Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine had triggered a global increase in military spending which reached its all-time high in 2023, 27 an indication that states have
become more anxious about their territorial integrity. However, imperial
conquest for the aggrandizement of territory and the subjugation of other people
23 Carter and Goemans, p. 283. 24 Ryder McKeown, ‘Norm Regress: US Revisionism and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm’ International Relations , 23 .1 (2009), 5 – 25 (p. 11). 25 Hensel, Allison and Khanani, pp. 139-140. 26 Zacher, p. 244. 27 See, Al Jazeera, World military spending reaches all-time high of $2.24 trillion, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/24/world-military-spending-reaches-all-time-high-of-2-24-trillion > [aceessed 14 May 2023].
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is clearly a thing of the past and this is due to the internalization and
institutionalization of the territorial integrity norm. Therefore, apart from certain
hotspots that involve national minorities or territorially limited disputes over
resources, the majority of states that realistically need to worry about their
territorial integrity do not face external but rather internal threats.
During decolonization the principle of utis possidetis was applied. The 1960
UN declaration pronounced that existing colonies and not ethnic groups were eligible for self-determination. 28 The Organization of African Unity declared in 1964 that ‘the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality’. 29 As mentioned above preserving previous
administrative frontiers aims to limit uncertainty and conflict. There were fears
that questioning the legitimacy of any African border could lead to challenges against every African border. 30 But that created ethnically, religiously and
linguistically diverge state entities. Such states exist in other parts of the world
as well. The main threat to their territorial integrity are separationist
movements, often backed by external powers with certain interests. The Tigray
War and the various separationist movements in Myanmar are some examples.
It is common for the state, the referent object of security in cases of
separationist movements, to label, in an act of securitization, the secessionists as
terrorists in order to diminish their legitimacy and justify external support and
intervention. The right to self-determination is enshrined in the UN charter
(Article 1) but is outweighed by territorial integrity. However, international law
has a much more nuance attitude towards secession. According to Allen
Buchanan ‘the consensus among legal scholars at this time is that international
law does not recognize a right to secede in other circumstances, but that it does
28 Zacher, p. 237. 29 Stuart Elden, ‘ Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders’, The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 26.1 (2006), 11-24 (p. 12). 30 Hensel, Allison and Khanani, p. 124.
21
not unequivocally prohibit it either’. 31 A certain conditionality regarding
territorial integrity when it comes to secessions derives from provisions
referring to compatibility with the principles of the UN Charter 10 or relevant
norms rather than an explicit prohibition. One example is the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, which does not authorise or encourage acts against the
territorial integrity of a state as long as it does not violate the societal security of
its people, perpetrating for example, cultural cleansing. This shading is apparent
in the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo which was not found
by the ICJ to be contrary to international law or UNCS Resolution 1244, while the ICJ did not specify if non-state actors have the right to self-determination. 32 For Halim Moris ‘the defining issue in international law for the 21 st century is finding compromises between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity of borders’. 33 However, the Kosovo case involved the interest-based
intervention of the US.
There is an ad-hoc selection by the strongest actors on whether to respect
territorial integrity obligations. Like the US did in Kosovo, Russia in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Crimea disregarded the territorial integrity norm because it
was in its interest to do so. Furthermore, the notion of ‘contingent sovereignty’
after 9/11 further erodes the principle of territorial integrity as the invasion of
Iraq has demonstrated. Humanitarian interventions too is not free from
ambiguities and often reflects certain agendas. It is orchestrated in the
framework of the Security Council and the Permanent Five Members. In this
manner, the principle of the Responsibility to Protect is monopolized by strong
actors and has been reduced into a narrative shell, used to justify intervention
and, thus, undermines the principle of territorial integrity which renders
31 Allen Buchanan, ‘Theories of Secession’, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 26.1 (1997), 31-61 (p. 33). 32 Summers, p. 461. 33 Elden, p. 19.
22
conditional. 34 According to Walzer ‘the practice of intervening often threatens the territorial integrity and political independence of invaded states’. 35
Intervention must be an apparatus aiming to preserve human security not an
instrument of state interest. Of course, as Kofi Anand had noted ‘national
sovereignty was never meant to be a shield behind which massacres are carried
out with impunity’. Therefore, he proposed that ‘Intervention need not entail
force. It can extend to peacekeeping, to humanitarian assistance, to rehabilitation and reconstruction’. 36
Territorial conquests have been a constant reality throughout human history
until the end of the Second World War. Since then the territorial integrity norm
has been deeply internalized, institutionalized and enshrined in the collective
psyche. The are numerous unresolved territorial issues around the globe, but
those constitute limited disputes over small geographical spaces and maritime
delimitations while there is strong international consensus against the altering of
any kind of borders. The demarcation of frontiers according to the utis
possidetis principle renders separationist movements the foremost threat to the
territorial integrity of many states given that the international law remains
nuanced regarding this matter. The prospect of such movements been backed by
a stronger actor which sometimes defines the character of intervention amplifies
such as threat. Let’s not forget that regardless of its wider geopolitical aspects,
the current war in Ukraine is such a conflict.
34 Jack Kalpakian, ‘The Decline Of The Territorial Integrity Norm (1947–2018)’, World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, 23.4 (2019), 10-25 (p. 16). 35 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 2 nd edn., (New York: Basic Books, 1992), p. 57 36 Elden, pp. 16-17.
23
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25
Country Report: Pakistan. – PO-209- Sarah Taylor
Assignment 1: Classifying your country’s regime
Table1: Regimes scores
Polity
Polity
Freedom House 2001-
Freedom House 2023
2002
2018
2002
-5
7
Status: Not Free
Status: Partly Free
Pakistan
PR: 6
PR: 15/40
CL: 5
CL: 22/60
Total: 37/100
9
9
Status: Free
Status: Partly Free
India
PR: 2
PR: 33/40
CL: 3
CL:33/60
Total: 66/100
6
-6
Status: Free
Status: Partly Free
Bangladesh
PR: 3
PR: 15/40
CL: 4
CL: 25/60
Total: 40/100
Source: Freedom House 2002, Freedom House 2023, Polity V 2018
This report focuses on the state of democracy in Pakistan, alongside India and
Bangladesh, as they share a common colonial history under British rule.
26
In 2002, Polity V (2018) assessed Pakistan as being an anocracy, or mixed
regime, and Freedom House (2002) said its polity was military, giving her status
‘not free’ . This is due to a military regime that began in 1998 by General Pervez
Musharraf (Freedom House, 2002). Resultingly, Polity V scored XRCOMP and
XROPEN at 0, and XCONST at 2, representing near unlimited authority for the
executive. Freedom House (2002) agrees, describing Pakistan as having limited
transparency and accountability, but already showing differences in the
democracy scores. Polity V (2018) scored India at 9, democracy, consistently
for all years. Freedom House (2023) judges India as a multi-party democracy
until 2021, where her status drops to partly free, due to violence and
discrimination towards the Muslim population, a factor not measured on Polity
V indices. Bangladesh, as with Pakistan, has also experienced political crises
and states of emergency being declared. In 2007, the military had an increased
role in maintaining law and order, but it was not a military coup as it was in
Pakistan (Freedom House, 2023). Difference in measures between Freedom
House and Polity V is most apparent with Bangladesh, scoring similarly with
Pakistan on Freedom House but being 13 points lower on Polity V. This
demonstrates how the point assigning methods of Polity V can distort the
overall picture, as scoring well in some areas, brings the regime score up,
making the country appear more democratic than it is. This is also demonstrated
in the scores for Pakistan, both measures agree the country holds regular
elections, but only Freedom House acknowledges that the elections are
vulnerable to military interference.
The Polity V conceptualisation of democracy is minimalist and procedurally
focused (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2018). Freedom house has a substantive
view of democracy, outcomes focused, which contrasts Polity V. Varieties of
Democracy (2023) conceptualisation of democracy is broad and states that the
27
electoral principle of democracy is foundational, aligning with the views of
Freedom House and Polity V. Despite the similarities, Freedom House
requirements for democracy are broader, acknowledging the influence of state
and non-state actors (Freedom House, 2023). This means the validity of
freedom house is stronger because it includes more attributes to justify a
country as an electoral democracy, but the reliability of Polity V and Freedom
House can be questioned because of coder subjectivity. Replicability of Polity V
is stronger than freedom house because they provide more detailed coding rules
(Clark et al. 2017). Although Polity V has classed Pakistan as a democracy, we
have demonstrated how the minimalist approach to democracy measures is
insufficient in judging a country and a wider context needs to be provided, as by
Freedom House, to assess a state's true nature. Therefore, Pakistan is assessed as
a mixed regime, an anocracy; it has elements of democratic and autocratic
regimes.
28
Assignment 2: Explanations for Regimes
The CIA World Factbook (2023) states that Pakistan holds different ethnic
groups and languages, the largest being Punjabi, making up 44.7% of the
population and 38.8% speaking the language. Pakistan’s official religion is
Islam, with Islamic law embedded in the constitution and legal system
(Pakistan, 2012) and 96.5% of the population identifying as Muslim (CIA World
Factbook, 2023).
Table 2: Economic Average Scores
Country
GDP PER CAPITA
GINI INDEX 2018
(US$) (2022)
Pakistan
6,437.2
29.6
India
8,379.1
34.6
Bangladesh
7,395.1
32.4 (2016)
South Asia
7931.1
31.9
Source: World Bank: GDP per capita 2022, Gini Index 2018
https://data.worldbank.org/
As late as 2009, Pakistan had the highest GDP per capita compared against
India and Bangladesh but has since been overtaken (World Bank Data, 2022).
The Gini index from 2000 shows that Pakistan has always scored lowest for
income inequality, but this does not defend the Pakistani economy which has
been experiencing a worsening economic situation since the COVID-19
pandemic; the country is reliant on loans from the IMF and foreign aid, whilst
suffering high inflation (BTI, 2022). Modernisation theory has been revised by
political scientists asserting that the probability of transitioning to a democracy
increases as income increases and is more likely to survive (Clark et al. 2017)
Pakistan’s economy, although weak, is industrialised so the explanation for the
29
lack of democratic transition can be directed at military interference in the
economy. Privatisation policies introduced in the 1980’s benefitted the military
and recent Prime Ministers felt the need to appease the army by giving them
greater economic opportunities, suppressing the possibility of democratic
transition (Giunchi, 2014).
Alternatively, cultural modernisation theory argues that socioeconomic
development does not result in democracy, democracy is caused through
cultural changes, facilitated by economic development (Clark et al. 2017). If we
engage in Przeworski’s survival theory (2019), that economic development
allows for democratic survival but not emergence, then cultural determinants for
democracy become more relevant (Almond & Verba, 1963). 51.2% of World
Values Survey (2018) participants thought that democracy was absolutely
important, 46.7% believing it is essential leaders are chosen in free elections,
and 42% believe having a democratic political system is very good. Almond &
Verba (1963) argued a civic culture is necessary for democracy; although results
show a cultural desire for democracy, voter turnout average is 52% (Election
Guide, 2018) so participation must be improved to enable democratisation
(Inglehart &Welzel, 2011).
Regarding signs of potential crisis, Pakistan has never enjoyed a period of
political stability, so crises are often and plenty. Most recently, the ousting of
former Prime Minister Ihram Khan sparked violent protests across the country
(Curtis, 2018). Khan’s election campaign positioned him as the anti-corruption
candidate, with promises of social justice, economic development and poverty
alleviation. The protests show civil political attitudes want these changes and
30
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