Not Any Doctrine: Challenging Mill’s Case for Unrestricted Speech. – HUP-133- Charlotte Williams
Free speech is a topic of currency, controversy, and ultimately, complexity
with even influential freedom thinkers’ theories such as Mill’s, while generally
in favour, having caveats. While the multitudinous views on speech restriction
cannot be understated, I argue the state should regulate speech, including hate
speech and denialism. In what follows, I compare current UK restrictions of
speech or lack thereof, discuss Mill’s arguments, and apply them to
contemporary debates before expressing and defending my views. I consider
opposing arguments, but overall conclude the power speech wields is too great
not to be checked.
Abel et al. (2021) define ‘hate speech’ as expression that singles out some
“ socially salient characteristic”, attributes one a “ repugnant quality ”, or casts
one as “ unwelcome ” (p.30). As of March 2024, the ‘Public Order Act 1986’
restricts hate speech in Britain, including hateful expression towards race and
sex that causes “ harassment, alarm or distress ” (Legislation.gov.uk, 2001). The
‘Human Rights Act 1998’ reinforces this, stating freedom of expression is
“ subject to... restrictions... by law ” (Legislation.gov.uk, 2000), including fines
and imprisonment. Britain’s hate speech stance is recently reflected in the case
of Luton Football Club who were fined £120,000 in 2023 after fans chanted
homophobic remarks (Latham-Coyle, 2023). While Feinberg (1984) argues the
restriction of profoundly offensive speech promotes liberties, the ‘Offence
Principle’ (p.13) - adding a normative sense to Mill’s ‘Harm Principle’ - there
remains considerable debate. For example, in Unsafe Space , Slater (2016)
argues against restricting potentially ‘hateful’ speech in universities, asserting
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