These claims, however, by the political right were shrouded in controversy.
Kennedy, alongside Democratic Senators Jackson and Symington did not have
access to any classified intelligence that would suggest the US faced a ‘missile crisis.’ 58 Like so many others during this period, Kennedy had to rely on figures published in the public domain and assumed such figures on the ‘growing’ Soviet missile programme to be accurate. 59 Yet, much of the information
published in national news outlets and magazines like the Times overstated the
nature of the Soviet threat. Despite this, many journalists, defence analysts,
politicians and scholars adopted the worst-case scenario approach, utilising the
information to attack Eisenhower and his ‘New Look’ doctrine. Intellectuals
such as Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, announced on live
television that the US had ‘lost a battle more important and greater than Pearl Harbor.’ 60 Teller went on to speak about the implications of Sputnik, and how it indicated the Soviets were beginning to take the lead in science and technology. 61 In the immediate months and years, the political right
continuously stressed the military danger implicit with the launch of Sputnik
and the growing vulnerability in national security, which consequently
contributed to rising tensions in US politics.
When Kennedy entered office in January 1961, he had a well-developed
strategy of how to tackle the country’s national security needs. He believed the
US needed to ‘develop a capability for a controlled, flexible response, a response tailored to combatting political or military aggression.’ 62 According to
Nash, Kennedy ordered the construction of roughly 1,700 strategic nuclear
58 Preble, p.804. 59 Ibid. P.804. 60 Divine, p.16. 61 Ibid, p.61. 62 Bose, p.53.
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