the US and other Western-aligned countries. Following the launch, Khrushchev
increasingly sought to bolster Soviet strategic power. In a speech in January
1960, he announced that the USSR was ‘several years ahead’ of the West in the
development of ICBMs an d IRBMs; boasted that the USSR could ‘literally
wipe any aggressor off the face of the earth;’ and went on to state that the
Soviets had a nuclear weapon in the development stage that was ‘even more formidable.’ 71 Khrushchev’s carefully calculated rhetoric worked to exaggerate
the image of Soviet power and technological superiority. Not only this, it
worked to deceive the American public and major political figures that there
was a ‘missile gap’ between the two cou ntries, contributing to growing nuclear
tensions.
Nuclear tensions peaked, however, when Kennedy entered office. 1961
proved to be a decisive year in Soviet defence policies which saw the
resumption of the nuclear arms race. In reaction to the Kennedy administration's
budget and plans for a strategic force of 800 ICBMs and 45 Polaris submarines,
it was increasingly apparent to Khrushchev that the US were technologically superior in strategic competition. 72 According to Jackson, the growing tensions and dissatisfaction in the strategic balance almost certainly contributed to the near-catastrophic deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. 73
In many ways, the launch of Sputnik came in response to Khrushchev’s
critics to establish power and credibility. In the face of defeat, Khrushchev not
only defeated his opposition but increasingly intensified nuclear relations
71 Ibid, p.248. 72 Ibid, p.249. 73 Ibid, p.249.
73
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