Yet, by December 1958 after an analysis of the US Hardtack II series of
nuclear tests, the President Science Advisory Committee concluded that the
Geneva inspection agreement was inadequate in detecting underground testing of nuclear weapons, thus rendering the agreement inoperable. 82 With deadlock
at Geneva and a comprehensive test ban in doubt, several American scientists
came up with a limited atmospheric test ban agreement, allowing both the US
and the USSR to perfect new weapons through underground testing, which sought approval from previous Eisenhower critics. 83 With both Eisenhower and Khrushchev in agreement, both the US and the USSR, alongside France and Britain, sought to convene at the Paris Summit in May 1960. 84 However, this
summit never materialised. When the Soviets successfully shot down an
American U-2 spy plane, it provoked an international controversy between the
two superpowers, which culminated in the collapse of the Paris Summit and the subsequent collapse of nuclear co-operation. 85 Although it is undeniable that the
launch of Sputnik overall increased nuclear tensions, it must be acknowledged
that the Sputnik programme also significantly increased nuclear cooperation
between the two superpowers, despite the ultimate failure in fulfilling a
successful test ban treaty.
This essay argues that the launch of the Sputnik programme in 1957
significantly increased tensions between the US and the USSR from 1957 to
1961, due to the complex responses of political actors that greatly challenged
nuclear relations. However, it must be acknowledged that although Sputnik was
responsible for a dramatic increase in tensions, it also contributed to increased
co-operation between the two superpowers. Both countries sought to cooperate
82 Wang, p.132. Hardtack II was a series of 37 nuclear tests conducted by the United States in 1958. 83 Robert, p.141. 84 Ibid, pp. 142-146. 85 Bruce Geelhoed, ‘ Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Spy Plan, and the Summit: A Quater-Century Retrospective’, Presidential Studies Quarterly , 17.1 (1987), 95-106 (p.95) < https://www.jstor.org/stable/27550396 > [accessed 22/02/2024].
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