(1859) ‘Harm Principle’ was notable: “ Power can [only] be rightfully
exercised... to prevent harm to others ” (p.18). His attitude towards epistemic
freedom reinforces this, as a vehement defender of speech’s instrumental value,
professing there should be the “ liberty of... discussing... any doctrine ” even if
“ immoral ” (unpopular) (p.22). While Rawls justified free speech as enabling
justice, for Mill free speech permits falsities to be rectified through “ discussion ”
(p.35), or, for partial correctness, enables truth to emerge (p.8). Mill asserts
denying opinions is assuming “ infallibility ” (p.30). While he attests there is “ no
absolute certainty ” (p.33), in relative correctness, he argues, without discussion,
an opinion’s “ grounds ” are forgotten (p.66), becoming a “ dead dogma ” (p.59).
Truth, by Mill, maximises happiness, contributing to his utilitarian stance
(p.20).
Regarding contemporary speech, Mill’s arguments make likely his defence of
one’s right to express oneself as one pleases, even if in-factual or offensive,
positing no speech regulation. Offending (through hateful/false rhetoric), in
Mill’s opinion, is not ‘harm’ (p.142), therefore the ‘Harm Principle’ does not
apply. Nevertheless, Mill recognises potential implications. He analogises
offensive speech’s potential to harm in certain contexts, for example, spouting
hateful corn-dealer rhetoric “ to a... mob... before the house of a corn-dealer ”
(p.94). In a suberogatory sense, while he believes all speech deserves
protection, there are circumstances where potential incitement to harm, or even
customary morality, should prevail. In my preceding examples, Mill would
likely support Muhammad Adil’s COVID-19 denial, to give “ all sides of the
truth ” (p.81). Similarly, Mill would challenge Luton’s homophobia fine, unless,
perhaps, such chants were sung before a mob.
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