Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Action Review – 2025

were speculative. However, the court disagreed. The court noted that the plaintiffs had alleged a clear economic injury – that they paid more for the products than they would have, had they known about the risks associated with the defective products. The court pointed out that in the Seventh Circuit, such allegations of financial loss are sufficient to establish standing, even if the products performed as intended in the short term. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ claims were not based solely on the potential for future harm but on the economic injury they suffered from purchasing products that were allegedly defective and unsafe. Furthermore, the court found that that plaintiffs’ allegations about the specific harmful chemicals in the products were sufficient to support their claims that the products were toxic and posed a health risk. The court next addressed the plaintiffs’ standing to pursue claims under the laws of states where no named plaintiff resided, and the issue of preemption under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The defendants argued that the plaintiffs, who are residents of only 17 states, lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of class members from other states or territories. The plaintiffs conceded that they lacked standing to bring common law claims on behalf of residents in states where no named plaintiff resided, but they argued they should be allowed to pursue statutory consumer protection claims under the laws of multiple states. The court ruled that this issue was best addressed during the class certification phase rather than at the pleading stage. Thus, the court allowed the plaintiffs to pursue statutory consumer protection claims in states where no named plaintiff resided but dismissed the common law claims for those states. The defendants also asserted that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by the FDCA, which regulates cosmetics and their labeling. Specifically, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs’ claims about failing to disclose certain ingredients (such as fragrance components) were preempted by FDA regulations, which do not require disclosure of fragrance ingredients on labels. The defendants argued this constituted an additional requirement that conflicted with federal law. The plaintiffs asserted that their claims were not about the labeling of fragrance ingredients but about the failure to warn consumers about the health risks of the products. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that their claims could be construed as a failure to warn, which is not preempted by the FDCA, and distinguished their claims from those about fragrance labeling. The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted because they involved allegations of misbranding and adulteration under the FDCA. The court ruled that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the products contained toxic substances, which could violate the FDCA’s prohibitions against misbranding and adulteration. In addition, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a viable negligence per se claim because several of the relevant jurisdictions do not recognize negligence per se as a valid cause of action. The court agreed with the defendants that in some states, such as Arizona, California, and Pennsylvania, negligence per se is not a separate cause of action. As to the plaintiffs’ design defect claim, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not provided specific facts about how the products were defective. The court disagreed. It found that the plaintiffs had provided sufficient details to move forward with their strict liability design defect claim. The court also rejected the defendants’ attempt to dismiss the failure to warn claim, ruling that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the defendants failed to warn about the dangerous nature of their products and that they had knowledge of the risks. Finally, the defendants challenged the fraud-based claims (negligent misrepresentation/omission, fraudulent omission, and violations of state consumer protection statutes) on the basis that these claims were not pled with sufficient specificity under the heightened pleading standards for fraud. The court agreed with the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to cure the deficiencies identified in previous orders, particularly the lack of specific facts about the alleged omissions and the failure to establish a special or fiduciary relationship necessary to support a fraudulent omission claim. The court declined to dismiss the claims for breach of warranty, unjust enrichment, and most of the consumer protection claims. As a result, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit in In Re Cook Medical, Inc., 110 F.4th 924 (7th Cir. 2024), affirmed a district court’s ruling finding that the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred. The plaintiff received a Cook Medical inferior vena cava (IVC) filter implant, and alleged that she subsequently developed abdominal pain. After the plaintiff had a CT scan in March 2013, she learned that the filter had perforated her IVC. The IVC filter was removed in April 2013, but a fragment was left behind because the filter had fractured prior to or during removal. Id. at 926. The plaintiff

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