I put my cards on the table: ‘Here’s a generational talent with
charisma and global appeal who will instantly rocket Nike Golf
into the big leagues... But it’s going to cost top dollar.’
as ranking bonuses normally were, but on the highest ranking achieved at any time during the year. Thus, even if Tiger were to reach the No 1 position for just one week, he would get that level of bonus. I guess no one at Nike bothered to check the contracts I had reached for Strange and Jacobsen a decade earlier – $5 000 for a major championship win in year one, $7 500 in year two. Had someone done so, Nike could have laughed my Woods numbers out of the room. But no one did, and those clauses would add $8 million to what Nike paid Tiger between 1997 and 2001. When Steve eventually came back to me with a counteroffer of $40 million – $8 million a year guaranteed for five years – well, it was the most delightful compromise imaginable. Delivering the news to Earl and Tiger was the most sublimely satisfying moment of my career. Then a few days later, as the final contracts were being drawn up by our legal department, something astonishing occurred – an attempt was made to sabotage the deal. By one of our rival agents? No, by Phil Knight. Knight had a notorious hatred of agents, and on this occasion, he decided he would eliminate me. At the 11th hour he secretly dispatched a young black Nike executive to the Woods home in California with an offer for Earl: “You don’t need IMG. Deal with us directly, and you’ll save the 20-percent commission fee.” To Earl’s everlasting credit, he called right away and told me about it. Barely able to breathe, I waited to hear the outcome. “I told the guy no,” Earl said. “I told him to go back and tell Phil Knight it’s important for me to be able to trust someone, and Hughes Norton is that guy.” Earl’s loyalty in that moment meant the world to me. When it came to equipment, Titleist was the perfect home for Tiger. He had been playing a Titleist ball forever, carried a Cobra (owned by Titleist) driver and Titleist fairway woods and had no loyalty to the Mizuno irons in his bag, confident he could win with any brand of clubs. The timing was perfect to marry Tiger with Titleist and make him the spokesman for their new era of top-line equipment for better players. I was so convinced that Tiger and Titleist were the ideal match that I had mentioned it to Titleist CEO Wally Uihlein on more than one occasion as Tiger was compiling his USGA Juniors and Amateurs. When the time for negotiation approached, we did most of the back and forth by phone and confidential email. I began by making Wally aware that we had been talking to Nike about some very big numbers. Being the super-prepared guy he was, he parried by reciting the statistics on Tiger’s then-lacklustre performance in pro tournaments.
The Nike swoosh on his shirt front and cap will be the only branding he displays – no other company logos on the shirt collar, chest, sleeves or back of the hat – a pure Nike message, front and centre, for all to see. Based on his unprecedented amateur achievements, every other company will want him. Nike can preempt them all, but it’s going to cost top dollar.” Then, swallowing hard, I told Steve about $50 million over five years would get it done. No one else in golf – not Palmer, not Norman, no one – was earning anything like that for apparel and shoes, but through our tennis guys, I knew Agassi’s Nike contract was about $5 million a year, and from Steve I had a pretty good feel for Jordan’s compensation, so I thought, Why not go for it? Steve’s first response, of course, was “That’s ridiculous,” but he didn’t say forget it. From the beginning he was straightforward about Nike’s strong interest. I figured the $50 million, while an overreach, wasn’t too far from where I might be able to end up, and that was a huge win not simply in sheer dollars but in the worldwide promotional power Nike would bring to the table. No other company in golf had the advertising budget or clout to help make Tiger a household name. On that score, Nike could have argued that it should pay Tiger less, not more. But they never did. The other unusual part of my proposal on which they did not balk (and I still can’t believe I got it) was all five years of Tiger’s compensation was guaranteed, regardless of his performance. I wanted Tiger to have financial certainty no matter whether he failed to get his tour card, missed Q school, struggled initially or whatever. Nike would have been within its rights to ask for significant reductions in compensation for years two through five if Tiger failed to live up to the hype, but it never did. Then there were the bonus clauses – dollar figures that were unprecedented in golf. I knew that Nike was used to paying bonuses to tennis players, so I checked the contracts of Agassi and other IMG tennis clients and was astonished to see six-figure payments for victories in Grand Slam events. Again, I went for it with Tiger: $500 000 per major championship win in year one, increasing $100 000 per year to $900 000 per win in year five. Then I added the same bonus payment related to the Official World Golf Ranking if Tiger were to reach World No 1: $500,000 in year one escalating to $900 000 in year five. There were also provisions for ranking second to fifth ($350 000 in year one, increasing to $550 000 in year five) and sixth to 10th ($250 000 increasing to $350 000 in year five). These bonuses were based not on year-end ranking,
GOLF DIGEST SOUTH AFRICA 47
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2024
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