Cases Part 2 2023 - final

Adjudication Case Law Update 2023: Part 2

In the second edition of our 2023 Court Decision

Summaries, Kenneth Salmon MCIArb, consultant solicitor

at Slater Heelis LLP, summarises five court decisions

relating to the enforcement of adjudicators' Awards

under the Housing Grants, Construction and

Regeneration Act 1996.

In Part 2: Access to courts in adjudication proceedings – application of ‘ pay now argue later ’ mantra: A & V Building Solutions Ltd v J & B Hopkins Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 54 King LJ, Coulson

LJ and Popplewell LJ Judgment 27 January 2023

Attacking an adjudicator's decision on enforcement:

J & B Hopkins Ltd v A&V Building Solution Ltd [2023] EWHC 301 (TCC), Mr Roger Ter

Haar KC Judgement 15 February 2023

Fees – Bias – whether the adjudicator's demand for security amounted to threat to exercise a lien over the award:

Nicholas James Care Homes Ltd v Liberty Homes (Kent) Ltd [2023] EWHC 360 (TCC)

Mr Recorder Andrew Singer KC judgment 21 February 2023

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Natural Justice – challenge to enforcement of award and claim for final determination of the validity of final account statement:

Atalian Servant AMK Ltd v B W (Electrical Contractors) Ltd [2023] ScotCS CSOH 14

Lord Sandison (16 February 2023)

Stay of Execution:

WRB (NI) Ltd v Henry Construction Projects Ltd [2023] EWHC 278 (TCC), Pepperrall J.

Judgment 10 February 2023)

Legislation The “ Act ” means the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, as amended by the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act

2009 Pt 8. The 'new' provisions apply to contracts entered into on or after 1 October

2011. The Act applies to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

The main regulations are contained in the Scheme for Construction Contracts

(England & Wales) Regulations 1998 (the 'Principal Regulations').[1] They have been

amended by the Scheme for Construction Contracts (England & Wales)

(Amendment) (England) Regulations 2011[2] (the 'new Regulations'). The new

Regulations apply only to contracts for construction operations in England entered

into on or after 1 October 2011. For earlier contracts, the Principal Regulations apply.

Northern Ireland has its own scheme: the Scheme for Construction Contracts in

Northern Ireland 1999 as amended by the Scheme for Construction Contracts in

Northern Ireland (Amendment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2012. The Northern

Ireland Scheme is broadly similar to that in force in England and Wales.

There are separate regulations for contracts for work in Scotland applicable to

contracts made on or after 1 November 2011.[3] The new Regulations apply only to

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contracts for work in Scotland entered into on or after this date. For earlier

contracts, the Scheme for Construction Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 1998[4]

applies. There are new separate regulations for Wales, applicable to contracts for

construction operations in Wales entered into on or after 1 October 2011.[5]

A reference to "the Scheme" is to the Principal Regulations for England and Wales,

or the Scheme for Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland, as the context requires.

Summary Access to courts in adjudication proceedings – application of ‘ pay now argue later ’ mantra A & V Building Solutions Ltd v J & B Hopkins Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 54 King LJ, Coulson

LJ and Popplewell LJ Judgment 27 January 2023

While the courts were open to parties even in an ongoing adjudication, regard must be had to "the guiding principle behind construction adjudication: the ‘ pay now argue later ’ mantra." Parallel proceedings were not invalid or an abuse of process but part 8 declarations for final determination of issues should be the

exception, not the rule and should not be used to circumvent or undermine

adjudication. The proper procedure should be followed as set out in the TCC

Guidelines. The usual position was that the enforcement proceedings should be

heard first, and any Part 8 claim should be dealt with afte the enforcement unless

the point raised was straightforward and self-contained, and the parties were

agreed that it could be dealt with at the enforcement application without adding

to the time estimate.

Attacking an adjudicator's decision on enforcement

J & B Hopkins Ltd v A&V Building Solution Ltd [2023] EWHC 301 (TCC), Mr Roger Ter

Haar KC

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Judgement 15 February 2023

The pre-action protocol for construction and engineering claims did not apply to

proceedings to enforce an adjudicator's award. Where a second dispute was not

the same as the first dispute and the first adjudicator's award was not claimed to

be binding on the second adjudicator, the second adjudicator's contrary findings

and award was binding. There was some doubt as to whether the second

adjudicator had the power to award payment of a sum found due to the

responding party, but the court gave effect to the award.

Fees – Bias – whether adjudicator's demand for security amounted to threat to exercise a lien over the award

Nicholas James Care Homes Ltd v Liberty Homes (Kent) Ltd [2023] EWHC 360 (TCC)

Mr Recorder Andrew Singer KC judgment 21 February 2023

"Tenacious and persistent" efforts by the adjudicator's clerk to obtain payment of security for the adjudicator's fees had not "crossed the line ”. They did not amount to an attempt to exercise a lien nor constitute a threat to do so. There was no bias.

Natural Justice – challenge to enforcement of award and claim for final determination of validity of final account statement

Atalian Servant AMK Ltd v B W (Electrical Contractors) Ltd [2023] ScotCS CSOH 14

Lord Sandison (16 February 2023)

The adjudicator had not embarked on a frolic of his own. The parties had been

allowed and taken the opportunity to address him on the matters of complaint.

There was no breach of natural justice. A final account statement was a payment

notice and met the provisions of the contract and the Act. The bespoke clause

providing that the final account statement was to become final and binding on

BW unless adjudication or court proceedings were commenced within 20 days

was to be given its natural meaning. Since both adjudication and court

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proceedings had been commenced within 20 days, the final account statement

was not final or binding on BW. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether

the second adjudication was a continuation of a first adjudication (in which the

adjudicator had resigned) for the purposes of the finality clause. The award was

enforced, and an application for payment on the final account statement was

deemed irrelevant as it would have undermined the award.

Stay of Execution

WRB (NI) Ltd v Henry Construction Projects Ltd [2023] EWHC 278 (TCC), Pepperrall J.

Judgment 10 February 2023

A party who contracted with a newly formed dormant company was not entitled

to stay of execution on the grounds that the dormant company would not be able

to repay the judgment sum if later called upon to do so. Having resisted the

dormant company's proposition that another (active) company was the true contracting party, the paying party had "made its own bed .” Moreover, the delay in giving judgment had afforded the paying party the time to establish the true

entitlement had it chosen to do so.

Court decision summaries in full

Click on the options below to read a full summary and analysis. Access to courts in adjudication proceedings – application of ‘ pay now argue ’ later mantra

A & V Building Solutions Ltd v J & B Hopkins Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 54 King LJ, Coulson

LJ and Popplewell LJ Judgment 27 January 2023

This was an appeal by AVB from the judgment of Eyre J ("the judge") given on 12

April 2022, granting various declarations in favour of JBH. The appeal raised issues

arising out of the parallel jurisdictions of a construction adjudicator, on the one

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hand, and the courts, on the other. It also raised discrete points about the proper

interpretation of the parties' Sub-Contract.

There were two adjudications.

In the first adjudication, AVB sought payment of its interim payment application

number 14. JBH took a very limited part. In his decision in January 2021, the

adjudicator found that interim payment application 14 was valid and awarded AVB

£138,010.86. That sum was never paid.

In December 2021, while the first adjudication was in progress, JBH commenced

'pre-emptive' proceedings for declarations that payment application 14 was

invalid because it was sent one day late, that its own subsequent payment notice

was valid, and that it had overpaid AVB. The application was heard 12 April 2022,

and Eyre J (a) declined to strike out the part 8 application; (b) decided that interim

payment application 14 was late and invalid and that the JBH's payment notice

was valid. AVB applied for and were granted leave to appeal that decision.

Meanwhile, AVB belatedly commenced enforcement proceedings in March 2022.

Because of the delay in the commencement, AVB's enforcement proceedings

were not brought on for hearing at the same time as JBH's part 8 proceedings.

After permission to appeal against the judge's order was granted, there was a

second adjudication. The second adjudication, on the Final Account, was begun in

June 2022 by AVB. The second adjudicator's decision was dated 6 July 2022, in

which he concluded, amongst other things, that AVB had failed to prove any

entitlement to the Final Account sum they claimed of £455,526.53 and that the true

value of the Sub-Contract works was just £289,182.31, which was less than AVB had

already been paid. As a result of the decision in the second adjudication, AVB

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owed JBH the net sum of £82,956.88. Thus, at the time of the appeal, nothing was

due to AVB.

AVB did not pay the sum identified by the second adjudicator. The hearing of the

enforcement application in respect of the second adjudicator's decision was due

to take place after the hearing of the appeal but, for the appellate court's

purposes, it was sufficient to note that, on the face of it, the second decision meant

that no sums were thereafter due to AVB.

The powers of the court in adjudication

Permission to appeal had been given on three grounds (and refused on others).

The first (Ground 1) concerned the substantive and procedural propriety of the

part 8 proceedings: was JBH permitted to commence and/or to continue such

proceedings, or should they have been struck out? That raised a subsidiary issue: if

the part 8 proceedings were valid, how should they have been addressed in the

context of an outstanding adjudicator's decision in favour of AVB?

Coulson LJ, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said that while the courts

were open to parties in adjudication proceedings, even in an ongoing

adjudication[6], regard must be had ton "the guiding principle behind construction adjudication: the ‘ pay now argue later ’ mantra." That did not mean parallel proceedings were invalid or an abuse of process. However, as the law had

developed, resorting to the courts during an ongoing adjudication for declarations

of the type sought was the exception, not the rule, and should not be used to

circumvent or undermine adjudication[7].

The proper approach to parallel proceedings was as outlined by O'Farrell J in

Structure Consulting Limited v Maroush Food Production Limited [2017] EWHC 962

(TCC). The judge should usually give judgment on the claim based on the

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adjudicator's decision and then – to the extent possible – endeavour to sort out the Part 8 proceedings. The same point was made in Hutton Construction Limited v

Wilson Properties (London) Ltd [8], where the judge said that the Part 8 claim

should be dealt with after the enforcement unless the point raised was

straightforward and self-contained and the parties were agreed that it could be

dealt with at the enforcement application without adding to the time estimate.

Warnings had been given in subsequent cases, and the proper practice was

enshrined in the TCC Guide October 2022 at 9.4.4 and 9.4.5.

Although the duplication of proceedings was a matter of regret, with the part 8

claim relevant only if JBH lost the first adjudication, it was an approach that was

open to them. There was nothing in the 1996 Act to suggest otherwise. The judge

had been right not to strike out the part 8 application, which disposed of Ground 1

of the appeal. While the judge should have considered the part 8 proceedings

through the prism of AVB's successful claim in the first adjudication and the

decision of 19 January 2022 in their favour, it was much too late for that to change

anything by the time of the appeal.

The rest of the judgment was concerned with the construction of the payment

terms of the Sub-contract. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding notably

that interim payment application 14 was not late and was valid; it agreed with the

judge that the payment notice was valid; it found there was no waiver or estoppel

based on a previous late application; but made no other orders. Although AVB was

entitled to enforce the first adjudicator's decision back in April 2022, that

entitlement had long been overtaken by events, in particular by the result of the

second Final Account adjudication, which result JBH had applied to enforce.

Moreover, no part of the appeal sought the payment of any sum by JBH to AVB, so

the court had no power to award payment in any event. In the result, this all

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reflected the fact that the appeal was of a largely academic nature from the

outset.

Comment

This case decides nothing new but emphasises the need for the parties (and the

court) to follow the TCC Guide when dealing with parallel proceedings, to give

precedence to enforcement before part 8 applications, unless the point is short

one which can conveniently be dealt with as part of the enforcement. Here neither

party honoured the adjudicator's award in its favour. This factor ought to have

been at the forefront of the court's consideration of JBH's part 8 application. One

possibility (since strike out was not appropriate) would have been to adjourn that

application to be heard after the enforcement proceedings, but the court of

appeal did not take the opportunity to say so. Further and at first sight, more

surprisingly, neither the court below nor the court of appeal stated that the part 8

application could not or should not have proceeded until the first award had been paid (following the ‘ pay now argue later ’ policy). One can only conclude this leniency was due to the way the parties had behaved with neither honouring the

awards made, unexplained late applications to enforce, failure to follow the TCC

Guide and their concentration on the construction of the payment provisions.

Attacking an adjudicator's decision on enforcement

J & B Hopkins Ltd v A&V Building Solution Ltd [2023] EWHC 301 (TCC), Mr Roger Ter

Haar KC Judgement 15 February 2023

This case followed the unsuccessful appeal of AVB above. It was the hearing of

JBH's application to enforce the (second) adjudicator's award in its favour.

JBH was represented by counsel. AVB had no legal representation but appeared

by a director/shareholder and a surveyor employee. The Judge decided that the

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court had power to allow the employee to appear as a 'McKenzie friend'[9] since it

was apparent the director (who was entitled to appear) could not fully deploy the

arguments relied on by AVB and that it was in the interests of justice to do so.

AVB put forward arguments in three categories.

First that JBH had not followed the applicable pre-action protocol in failing to

respond to AVB's letter of claim and therefore, the enforcement proceedings

should be struck out. Although it was made late, that was not fatal to the strike our

application as JBH's counsel, once aware of it, was able to deal with it. The court

dismissed the application since the protocol did not apply to adjudication

enforcement proceedings. The letter of claim was, however, useful in summarising

AVB's complaints about the adjudicator's award.

The second argument centred on a complaint that the adjudicator had found a

sum due to JBH, contrary to the award in the first adjudication, which has been a

monetary award in its favour. Although it was doubtless a shock to AVB, who were

seeking an increased sum on the final account following a successful adjudication

on an interim account, to find a sum awarded against them, not for them, they

had not tried to argue that the second adjudicator was bound by the findings and

award of the first. Indeed, the final account dispute was a different dispute from

the interim payment dispute.

Looking at the jurisprudence, the law was conveniently summarised by Coulson

J[10] (as he then was) as follows:

"If the decision was within the Adjudicator's jurisdiction and the Adjudicator

broadly acted in accordance with the rules of natural justice, such defendants

must pay now and argue later."

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Thus, only if the decision was one made without jurisdiction or the decision was

made in the presence of material breaches of natural justice would it not be

enforced. Neither of those features was contended for in present in this case. The

court reminded itself that the principles of enforcement were subject to two

narrow exceptions[11], namely (a) admitted error; or (b) a self-contained legal

point concerning timing, categorisation, or description of payment notices or

payless notices in respect of which the potential paying party had issued Part 8

proceedings. Neither of those two exceptions applied either.

Third, AVB complained of a series of what they said were errors by the adjudicator.

The court considered each of the complaints and looked at the way the

adjudicator had dealt with them. While in two instances, he might have done

better to refer to specific materials, the court found the complaints were

unjustified. Moreover, errors of fact, even if proven, would not invalidate the

decision.

There was a final matter. Although AVB brought the (second) adjudication, it was

AVB who was held to be the party who should make payment. Insofar as the result

of the Adjudicator's conclusions was to show that a sum was due or would

become due to JBH, that seemed to the court to be a legitimate conclusion.

However, "the court had some doubt as to whether it was within [the adjudicator's]

jurisdiction to go on to order payment." Nevertheless, the court found it should

grant summary judgment since the conclusion that monies were due to JBH was

still binding upon AVB, and the court should give effect to it.

Fees – Bias – whether adjudicator's demand for security amounted to threat to exercise a lien over the award

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Nicholas James Care Homes Ltd v Liberty Homes (Kent) Ltd [2023] EWHC 360 (TCC)

Mr Recorder Andrew Singer KC judgment 21 February 2023

There were three issues before the court.

(1) Should the Decision of the adjudicator (Dr Chern) be enforced summarily (the

Decision)?

(2) Should a freezing injunction obtained by the claimant (NJCH) be discharged or

continued?

(3) Should there be a stay of execution of enforcement of the Decision of Dr

Chern?

NJCH had employed the defendant, Liberty, for construction works at its Beacon Hill

care home. There were two adjudications between the parties, the Decision in the

second of which was the subject of several applications before the court. The first

application in time was an application to enforce the Decision. The second was an

application by Liberty to discharge a freezing injunction granted by O'Farrell J. The

third was Liberty's application for a stay of execution of any judgment. Liberty also

made a part 8 application based on its objections to the enforcement

application.

At the heart of Liberty's case was an assertion that 'the way in which Dr Chern

demanded payment for his services in advance of the delivery of the Decision' in a

series of emails sent by Dr Chern's clerk amounted to the purported exercise of lien

for payment before he would issue his Decision. That, it was argued, amounted to

manifest bias, and the result was that the Decision was not enforceable.

Pursuant to his terms of appointment, Dr Chern required each party to deposit

£10,000 by way of security for his fees. In response, Liberty's solicitors made it clear

that Liberty was reserving its position on its jurisdictional arguments (both raised in

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the adjudication and which might thereafter arise) and that payment would be

made without prejudice to that position. NJCH's solicitors confirmed they would not

take any point on any jurisdictional challenge relating to payment of the fees.

About ten weeks later, after a considerable amount of work had been done, Dr

Chern's clerk asked for a further payment by way of security for fees of £15,000 per

party. NJCH were slow in paying and asked for more time. Liberty did not pay

either. Dr Chern's clerk issued several repeated demands for payment, latterly with

a 5pm deadline, finally saying that no further extension would be given and if

payment was not made, the matter would be 'taken out of his hands'. NJCH paid

and ultimately, it appears so did Liberty, in their case under a further reservation of

their position but without objection as to Dr Chern's entitlement. The reason now

put forward by Liberty was that to have objected would have been embarrassing

and the matter had to be handled sensitively.

In summary, Liberty's submission was that Dr Chern was making demands which

amounted to a breach of Paragraph 19 of the Scheme. Although he did not

exercise a lien, the (implicit) threat to do so was unlawful and/or contrary to

Paragraph 12(a) of the Scheme, there was manifest bias and that Dr Chern's

conduct should be rejected and his Decision not enforced.

The court noted what Sir Peter Coulson stated in his textbook Construction

Adjudication (4th ed) at para.10.45:

"In adjudication, the courts have indicated firmly that, because of the emphasis on

speed in adjudication above all things, the purported exercise of a lien will not be

permitted."

The court was referred to previous authority to the effect that an adjudicator could

not exercise a lien over his decision pending payment of his fees[12]. It was

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submitted that it was a moot point as to whether Liberty had ever agreed to be

bound by Dr Chern's terms, and indeed they did not entitle him to seek security

from the responding party but only the referring party.

In fact, it was not disputed before the court that the effect of the Scheme and the

authorities set out above was that an attempt to exercise a lien over the delivery

of a decision within the statutory or agreed time periods was unlawful and that

such an attempt might well render the decision once delivered unenforceable.

The court noted that while Liberty had objected to paying the fees and had fully

reserved its position to avoid the suggestion of waiver of any jurisdictional

challenge[13], it had not objected to the fact of, or manner in which the clerk had

sought, payment of the fees.

The court analysed the emails and concluded that, despite the fact the demands

for payment were "tenacious and persistent," they had not "crossed the line". There

was no attempt to exercise a lien nor threat to do so. The Decision was

enforceable.

The second issue concerned an allegation by Liberty that NJCH had failed to make

full and frank disclosure (as required by previous case law and practice) when

obtaining the interim freezing injunction continued by O'Farrell J after an earlier

hearing. In the result, they sought the discharge of the injunction. The court found

there had not been any deliberate and material non-disclosure.

The third issue. The application for a stay of execution was predicated on the

assumption that the freezing injunction would be discharged. Since that

application failed, the grounds for the stay fell away.

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Comment

We already knew that, at least where the Scheme applies, an adjudicator cannot

withhold the decision pending payment of fees. The interest of this case lies in

wider questions. It assumes that it is permissible for an adjudicator to seek

security for fees, as in this case, whether from the referring party only or from both

parties. In this case, the adjudicator's terms of appointment entitled the

adjudicator to require security from the referring party, but he sought security

from both parties. Could the responding party have refused to give security? And

if they had, might it have led to a risk of unconscious bias or the appearance of

bias? What would have happened if both parties had refused to give security or

further security? The questions did not directly arise and therefore are not

addressed. The whole question of security for fees is fraught with danger for the

adjudicator and the parties, especially where there are jurisdictional objections.

Contractual adjudication can deal with it by its own rules. Statutory adjudication

will sooner or later require changes to the Scheme as it seems doubtful that it can

or should be dealt with on an incremental basis by the courts.

Natural Justice – challenge to enforcement of award and claim for final determination of validity of final account statement

Atalian Servant AMK Ltd v B W (Electrical Contractors) Ltd [2023] ScotCS CSOH 14

Lord Sandison (16 February 2023) AMK was subcontractor for works at Lord’s cricket Ground and engaged BW as its electrical subcontractor. Under the bespoke subcontract between AMK and BW,

AMK had to provide a statement as to the practical completion of the works. BW

then had two months to present its final account and doing so within that period

was a condition precedent to any entitlement to payment on that account. AMK

then had 28 days to provide a final account statement showing the sum it

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considered due. If BW did not agree with the sum stated due in final account

statement, it had 20 days in which to commence adjudication or court

proceedings to challenge the stated sum.

By its final account, BW claimed some £1.8m net. AMK's final account statement

showed a net sum due to BW of a mere £2,700.

Within the 20 days, BW commended an adjudication before Mr Entwistle to

establish the sum due. Mr Entwistle resigned because of the massive amount of

material submitted to him and the short time he was allowed to decide the

dispute. BW, again within the 20 days, commenced an action to finally establish

the sum due on the final account. Three months later, it commenced a second

adjudication before Mr Tony Bingham to determine the sum due on the final

account. The court noted that the dispute referred was framed in the widest

possible terms.

Mr Bingham awarded BW £1.4m plus interest of £18,000. He found that the AMK final

account statement was invalid and of no effect and he revalued the whole of the

works on a quantum meruit basis finding that the contract had been converted to

what he described as a "beck and call" contract.

BW sought enforcement of Mr Bingham's decision, and AMK opposed on the same

on the following grounds.

First, Mr Bingham had not answered the question referred to him, namely "what

was the sum due?", but had embarked on a frolic of his own in assessing a fair

price based on what he regarded as a new contract. This was not a matter raised

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by either party, nor had they had the opportunity to address it, and that was a

breach of the rules of natural justice.

Second, Mr Bingham had decided that the final account statement was

contractually invalid without this issue having been raised by either party, again in

breach of the rules of natural justice.

Separately, Mr Bingham had failed to address and thus failed to exhaust his

jurisdiction in relation to various lines of defence advanced by AMK, including

several items of cross claim. It was suggested that it was not sufficient for Mr

Bingham simply to say that he had taken all the submissions into account; he

ought to have expressly dealt with the several arguments.

Decision

At paragraph [17], the judgment his Lordship said

"The Court's approach requires to be informed, indeed infused, by the need to

promote the aims of the statutory scheme for adjudication, which provides parties

to construction contracts with a simple and rapid means of determining their

mutual financial rights and obligations, at least on an interim basis. Subject to the

minimum legal standards which any power of decision-making must observe, the

Court should avoid an approach to the assessment of criticisms of the work of an

adjudicator which would tend to complicate and delay such work."

The question put to the adjudicator could scarcely have been wider: what sum (if

any) was due from AMK to BW? The subcontract permitted the valuation of

additional works on a fair and reasonable basis, and that could, to a greater or

lesser degree, be regarded as a quantum meruit. What might be described as

inexactitude of the language used did not mean the adjudicator had regarded

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payment as being governed by a new contract. The term 'beck and call' may have

been equally used to describe the changed nature of the works. The parties made

it clear to him that neither was suggesting there was a new contract, and any

initial attraction there might have been to that view was not persisted in as

informing his decision. The view as to a fair valuation might yet prove to be correct.

The court was not persuaded that the approach to valuation was a frolic of his

own but rather a genuine attempt to answer the question put to him. The

objection on that ground failed.

As to the issue of the validity of the final account statement, the adjudicator was

clearly entitled under paragraphs 13 and 20 of the Scheme (for Scotland) to raise it

with the parties. Once he had done so, there was extensive correspondence in

which every opportunity was offered and taken for each party's position to be

amply elucidated. In accepting BW's position, he had obviously rejected AMK's

position.

On each of the residual complaints, similar observations were made. On a fair

reading of the correspondence, each party was given ample opportunity to

advance its case. Indeed, if anything, the parties had been overindulged. None of

the relevant criticisms were made out.

Decree granted in favour of BW to enforce the decision.

In its action AMK sought declarations that (a) its Final Account Statement was

validly issued in terms of clause 33.3 of the subcontract; (b) it was final and

binding on BW unless and until the contrary may be determined in the substantive

action; and (c) that it was final and binding on Mr Bingham in his adjudication. It

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finally sought payment of the sum of £1,039,438.14, being the amount brought out

by the Final Account Statement.

Issue (a) – was the final account statement validly issued? The short answer was that it met the two requirements of the subcontract. It was issued in time and

stated the amount AMK considered to be due on the basis that the final account

statement was a payment notice and subject to the provisions of section 110A of

the Act. It met those provisions and was, therefore, validly issued.

Issue (b) - was the final account final and binding on BW and therefore, on Mr

Bingham? It was noted that the clause in question was in a bespoke subcontract,

not a standard form which meant that analysis of conclusivity in the context of standard forms did not assist. Second, it was only binding on BW and not on AMK – indeed, AMK had sought a different sum in the Bingham adjudication than had

been claimed under the final account statement. The clause said nothing about

being evidentially conclusive. The only requirement was that either adjudication or

court proceedings were issued within 20 days. BW had done both. Upon the first

being done (the commencement of the Entwistle adjudication), the final account

statement lost the capacity to become final and binding on BW. That was the

natural construction of the clause. As to whether one set of proceedings could be

considered to be a continuation of another (i.e., the Bingham adjudication

considered to be a continuation of the Entwistle adjudication), there was no clear

answer, and it was unnecessary to decide the point.

The final matter was whether the court should address the claim for payment by

AMK. To grant the declaration for payment would be to undermine the award in

favour of BW. While the claim was not incompetent, in that the court ought to

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consider it, it was ruled to be 'irrelevant', meaning the relief claimed by AMK would

not be granted.

Comment

It is interesting to note the interaction between adjudication enforcement and

proceedings for the final determination of issues arising on enforcement in

Scottish courts. As we know, in England, the practice is that the two are heard

together, provided doing so will not add to the time allowed for the enforcement

proceedings and there is no need for any additional evidence or extensive

argument. In Scotland, the position is somewhat different. In Scotland, it has been

decided[14] that such a challenge could proceed if it was ripe for decision and

could result in final determination of the dispute. In this case, the court did

consider the claims for declaration by AMC, which were granted in part but not so

as to undermine the right to payment awarded in the Bingham adjudication; and

without prejudging the final determination by the court of the true value of the

final account in the proceedings yet to be heard.

Stay of Execution

WRB (NI) Ltd v Henry Construction Projects Ltd [2023] EWHC 278 (TCC), Pepperrall J.

Judgment 10 February 2023) WRB sought to enforce an adjudicator ’ s award in its favour for the sum awarded plus interest, together with VAT where applicable, and administrative charges and

legal costs on the adjudicator's fees ordered to be reimbursed to WRB by HCP but

which were only paid after the adjudicator had sued both parties to obtain

payment and which had been met by WRB.

There were several oddities about the case. First and foremost, WRB was a

dormant company and it claimed the true party to the subcontract giving rise to

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the dispute with HCP was made with WRB Energy Limited. WRB asserted that the

subcontract was with WRB Energy Ltd. That issue had been resolved for the time

being in the adjudication, where it was decided that WRB was the contracting

party entitled to the payment.

Next, the amount claimed was less by some £100 than the payment awarded by

the adjudicator due to an arithmetical error by WRB. Further, WRB had indicated

before the application that it would not pursue payment of the VAT, yet it now

sought summary judgment for the 'applicable VAT'. Finally, it had not included a

claim for the adjudicator's charges and costs in its application but still asked the

court to give judgment for that item.

The court gave judgment for the sum claimed in the summary judgment

application (corrected for the arithmetical error) and no more; no VAT as it was

not clear that a dormant company was registered for and liable to pay VAT; and

no adjudicator's charges and costs as these had not been claimed in the original

claim or application.

HCP asserted it had a substantial counterclaim and set off having overpaid WRB

and now sought a stay for a short period to enable it to adjudicate its cross claims.

It relied on the case of Wimbledon[15] grounds, namely that WRB was impecunious

and would be unable to repay the judgment sum if HCP succeeded on its cross

claims.

The judge quoted the principles paid out by HHJ Coulson QC (as he then was) in

Wimbledon : "(a) Adjudication … is designed to be a quick and inexpensive method of arriving at a temporary result in a construction dispute.

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(b) In consequence, adjudicators' decisions are intended to be enforced

summarily and the claimant (being the successful party in the adjudication)

should not generally be kept out of its money.

(c) In an application to stay the execution of summary judgment arising out of an

adjudicator's decision, the court must exercise its discretion with considerations a)

and b) firmly in mind (see AWG Construction Services v. Rockingham Motor

Speedway [2004] EWHC 888 (TCC)).

(d) The probable inability of the claimant to repay the judgment sum (awarded by

the adjudicator and enforced by way of summary judgment) at the end of the

substantive trial or arbitration hearing may constitute special circumstances

rendering it appropriate to grant a stay (see Herschell Engineering Ltd v. Breen

Property Ltd (unreported) 28 July 2000, TCC).

(e) If the claimant is in insolvent liquidation, or there is no dispute on the evidence

that the claimant is insolvent, then a stay of execution will usually be granted (see

Bouygues (UK) Ltd v. Dahl-Jensen (UK) Ltd (2000) 73 Con LR 135, [2001] 1 All ER

(Comm) 1041, CA and Rainford House Ltd v. Cadogan Ltd [2001] BLR 416).

(f) Even if the evidence of the claimant's present financial position suggested that

it is probable that it would be unable to repay the judgment sum when it fell due,

that would not usually justify the grant of a stay if:

(i) the claimant's financial position is the same or similar to its financial position at

the time that the relevant contract was made (see Herschell); or

(ii) the claimant's financial position is due, either wholly, or in significant part, to the

defendant's failure to pay those sums which were awarded by the adjudicator

(see Absolute Rentals v. Glencor Enterprises Ltd [2000] CILL 1637)."

The court also referred to the remarkably similar case of Westshield Civil

Engineering Limited v. Buckingham Group Contracting Limited[16], in which

Akenhead J refused a stay. There as here, the claimant had been a dormant

company both at the time of the subcontract and enforcement proceedings and

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had itself contended that the true contracting party was a different and solvent

company. The parties were, however, bound by an earlier adjudication decision

that the claimant was the true subcontractor. In Westshield , the associated

company that claimed to be the true sub-contractor offered to guarantee the

repayment of the judgment sum in the event that it was later determined that it

was the true contracting party.

WRB Energy Ltd offered to guarantee payment here if the court was otherwise

minded to grant a stay.

While finding it was probable that WRB would be unable to repay the judgment

sum, the court refused to grant a stay. On its own case, HCL chose to place the

subcontract with a newly formed dormant company. The risk it now complained of

was "the result for which it contracted". It would be unfair and contrary to the spirit

of adjudication to allow HCL to escape its liability on the basis of WRB's unchanged

financial position. Also, it was HCL who had resisted the argument that the true

subcontractor was WRB and thus had "made its own bed." Finally, the judgment

had been unavoidably delayed, giving HCL ample opportunity to establish its

alleged entitlement upon its cross claims.

Comment There is little new in this case on the question of stay and given the ‘ pay now argue later ’ mantra, the outcome was inevitable. It does, however, act as a reminder that VAT is not awarded automatically and that a claimant must at least

show it is registered for and liable to charge VAT. The comment that the delay in

giving judgment had allowed HCL time to establish its alleged entitlement is,

however, curious; since if HCL expected to obtain a stay, it would presumably not

have paid the judgment; and its entitlement to start another adjudication before

23

making payment would have been contrary to the law and practice exemplified in

S&T v Grove[17].

About the author: Kenneth Salmon MCIArb is a qualified solicitor in England, Wales

and Eire. He is a Ciarb qualified and CMC accredited Mediator and Chair of

Education at Ciarb North West Branch. Kenneth is a construction specialist

currently working as a consultant to Slater Heelis Limited. He has extensive

experience of all forms of dispute resolution including arbitration, adjudication,

expert determination and mediation He is the author of Cases on the Enforcement

of Construction Adjudication Awards (2012) and the series Cases (on adjudication enforcement) published in Ciarb’s journal Arbitration: The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management 1999-2017.

Read more about our work in adjudication.

If you want to develop your knowledge and skills in construction adjudication, look

at our training courses.

Find out more about how to apply to Ciarb's Adjudication Panel.

Footnotes

[1] Scheme for Construction Contracts (England & Wales) Regulations 1998 (SI

1998/649).

[2] Scheme for Construction Contracts (England & Wales) (Amendment) (England)

Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/2333).

[3] Scheme for Construction Contracts (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2011 (SI

2011/371).

[4] Scheme for Construction Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/687)

(S.34).

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[5] Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998

(Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1715) (W.194).

[6] See, e.g. , Jarvis Facilities Limited v Alston Signalling Ltd [2004] EWHC 1285 (TCC);

Walter Lilly & Co. Ltd v DMW Developments Ltd [2008] EWHC 3139 (TCC); and Dalkia

Energy & Technical Services Ltd v Bell Group UK Ltd [2009] EWHC 73 (TCC); 122 Con

LR 66.

[7] See WW Gear Construction Ltd v McGee Ltd [2012] EWHC 1509 (TCC);[2012] BLR

255; and Kersfield Developments (Bridge Road) Ltd v Bray and Slaughter Ltd [2017]

EWHC 15 (TCC).

[8] [2017] EWHC 517 (TCC); [2017] BLR 344.

[9] Following the helpful guidance in the judgment of Hildyard J. in Bank St

Petersburg v Arkhangelsky (No. 2)[1] at paragraphs [73] to [76]

[10] Hutton Construction Limited v Wilson Properties (London) Limited [2017] BLR 344

at [14]

[11] Identified in Hutton v Wilson [2017] BLR 344.

[12] Mott MacDonald Ltd v. London & Regional Properties Ltd [2007] EWHC 1055

(TCC).

[13] Platform Interior Solutions v. ISG Construction [2020] EWHC 945 (TCC) at

paras.49-50; Cubitt Building & Interiors Ltd v. Fleetglade Ltd [2006] EWHC 3413

(TCC).

[14] D McLaughlin & Sons v East Ayrshire Council [2020] CSOH 109; 2021 SLT 1427.

[15] Wimbledon Construction Company 2000 Ltd v. Vago [2005] EWHC 1086 (TCC),

(2005) 101 Con LR 99.

[16] [2013] EWHC 1825 (TCC), 150 ConLR 225.

[17] [2019] EWCA Civ 2448.

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