Diotima: The Marist Undergraduate Philosophy Journal
D
efining humor has been a struggle amongst philosophers for centuries.
Claims of necessary and sufficient conditions for humor have become
more descriptive over time but have not yet been entirely successful. As
Thomas Hobbes notes in The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic , “There is a
passion that hath no name, but the sign of it is that distortion of the countenance
which we call laughter, which is always joy; but what joy, what we think, and
wherein we triumph when we laugh, hath not hitherto declared b een by any.” 1 In
this paper, I will discuss two theories of humor: Hobbes’ own Superiority Theory,
and Peter McGraw and Caleb Warren’s modern Benign Violation Theory. I will
show that while the Benign Violation Theory is a better description of humor than
Hobbes’ Superiority Theory, it does not provide the necessary and sufficient
conditions for humor as it claims. In response to this shortcoming and in
contribution toward a more encompassing theory of humor, I will offer my own
considerations of how mental state, particularly receptivity, plays a part in
establishing conditions for humor.
To start, it is worthy to note the language regarding humor has evolved over
time. The word “humor” was not used in its typical sense until the 17 th century,
though theories about humor have existed long before then, typically in terms of
“laughter” or “amusement . ” 2 Language has developed to distinctly name these acute
concepts only relatively recently; modern philosophers are apt to understand that
regarding the state of mind, “laughter is its full expression, amusement its essence,
and humour its intentional object .” 3 Roger Scruton prefaces in his article
“Laughter,” how to navigate early philosophers’ accounts of humor:
To feel our way towards the mental phenomenon that concerns us, we must recognize that common usage will be an inaccurate guide…The first step towards imposing order on this usage is to stipulate that the phenomenon which we seek to describe has intentionality. It is not laughter, but laughter
1 Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic (Oxford: Thornton, 1888), 41. 2 Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/89416. 3 Roger Scru ton and Peter Jones, “Laughter,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , Supplementary Volumes 56 (1982): 198, JSTOR (4106931).
Volume VI (2023)
3
Made with FlippingBook Annual report maker