Populo - Volume 1, Issue 2

Rwanda and Bosnia & Herzegovina. 12 The United Nations had been aware of

human rights violations in Bosnia, such as the massacres which occurred in

Srebrenica, but did not act. As a result, widespread human rights violations and

murders occurred without UN action, and those within the organization who

consciously prevented UN involvement received promotion rather than punishment. 13 A comparable situation occurred in Rwanda, where over eight

hundred thousand individuals were murdered before humanitarian intervention

stopped it. It is said that in this situation the UN was overly cautious and too restricted by member states to intervene, 14 and as a result genocide was allowed

to be perpetuated without international action. It is of course impossible to say

whether action would have prevented or reduced the conflicts damage, but inaction guaranteed that it could occur, 15 and for that the UN cannot be seen as enormously successful. Even the Gulf War, often considered one of the UNs greatest successes in the post-Cold War era, 16 cannot be seen as an absolute

success for the organization, as the UN Charter offered an array of opportunities

to prevent conflict. These were not taken - military action was almost immediate,

which has caused massive long-term negative impacts on the region’s economy

and human rights record. Its domination by the US military also ensured they

could take much of the praise for its successes, while allowing the UN to take criticism on a collective level. 17 It is hard to deny that the UN’s failures and

criticisms regarding military and humanitarian intervention overshadow its

numerous successes in scope.

12 Kennedy, p. 95 13 Adam LeBor, “Complicity with Evil,” The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 124; LeBor, p. 255 14 Michael N. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 155; Barnett, p. 167 15 Barnett, p. 168 16 Barnett, p. 9 17 Whittaker, p. 99

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