consciousness and a change in consciousness does not mean a change of man
but does mean a change of person.
I dispute Locke’s ideas. I believe that this theory of personal identity is
flawed as it fails to explain many circumstances in which a person may not have
their memories and how an identity can be maintained in this instance.
Firstly, the theory does not explain the identity of young babies. Research
shows that children are not capable of holding memories from the earliest days
of their lives, a phenomena referred to as “infantile amnesia” within
psychological research (Nelson, 1993, p26). A person’s first memory is likely to
come from around the age of 3 or 4. If a person is only the same person as they
have always been as far back as their memories extend, then who were they
before their first memory? If a person’s first memory is playing football in the
garden as a young child, are they not the same person as before they played in
the garden that day? To me, the absurdity of Locke’s argument exists in the literal
reading, in which his argument implies that I am not the same person as the baby
my mother held, as I do not remember that era of my life. Locke’s theory of
personal identity explains that a person remains the same person through their
memories and consciousness, regardless of their body’s physical changes.
Therefore, the fact that I have existed as the same physical mass with the same
DNA (despite growth and cell renewal), is not enough for Locke to secure my
identity. The persistent memories of others of my identity and presence in their
life are not valid proof for Locke of the persistence of my personal identity.
Locke’s theory gives no explanation as to how I can be sure I existed before my
first memory.
Arguments have been presented in attempts to apply Locke’s theory to
this situation and produce a satisfying resolution. Locke does not insist that a
person must remember each moment of their life in order to retain their identity.
96
Made with FlippingBook HTML5