another ideal of a hypothetical state rather than a realistic goal for poleis to achieve
perfectly, of which autonomia appears to be. Nevertheless, autarkeia was more accessible
and could be preserved at a higher level than autonomia for smaller states.
This then begs the question of whether it was a particularly negative thing for poleis to
have to sacrifice their autonomy since many small poleis would not have had many aspects
of it to give up in the first place. Nixon and Price’s sentiment regarding the theory of peer
polity interaction does well to highlight that interaction and rivalry between states in a
common Greek culture certainly did exist, but states were not peers. 32 The differences in
size and resources produced a hierarchy with smaller states, with lesser populations and
resources, at the bottom. These states would have to rely on other, more prosperous states,
putting in place barriers to achieving autonomia from the beginning. Hansen claims that
many members of the Delian League seemed to have been content with their status as
hypekooi or submissive poleis , not attempting to seize autonomia even in the last few
chaotic years of the Peloponnesian War, alongside several perioikic communities in
Messenia which seem to have remained loyal even after Leuctra. 33 Elsewhere, Hansen
suggests that phoros could be compatible with autonomia , despite Thucydides saying
otherwise, as long as it was imposed by consent not hegemony. 34 This frame of thinking
must be approached with extreme caution. De Ste Croix echoes Hansen’s sentiment in his
work on revolts against the Athenian Empire. Arguably, he is too comfortable with
suggesting that any revolt was orchestrated by the Few alone, even in instances without
information beyond the name of the revolt, trusting Thucydides’ contradictions of himself
32 Nixon and Price, p. 165. 33 Hansen, p. 24. 34 Hansen, p.31; Thuc. 7.57.3,
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