only states who could access Theban help would dare abandon the league, again
emphasising how smaller states were given the illusion of choice with only one viable
answer. 39 This, more than anything, stresses how small states certainly did have to give up
autonomy to survive. However, the small likelihood of having much to give up to begin with
means it is perhaps not as high stakes a decision as the statement suggests.
There is one final option to explore for smaller poleis and preservation of their
autonomia and that is the concept of neutrality. There is no single word for neutrality in
Ancient Greek. 40 Thucydides uses various specific and non specific phrases that all
fundamentally suggest neutrality. 41 Bauslaugh points out that acceptance was often
inconsistent as competitive spirit was central to Greek culture, as Nixon and Price
highlighted in relation to peer polity interaction. 42 He goes on to emphasise that interstate
agreements were focussed on security and that neutral states, in their refusal to commit
themselves, left an “unresolved question of commitment” and “denied the predictability of
supportive involvement”, which threa tened other states deeply. 43 It is tempting to suggest
neutrality was a chance for small poleis to reclaim some degree of autonomia when
considering states could set their own laws or restriction regarding belligerents’ activity in
their territory. 44 However, when looking at the fate of one of the most famous practitioners
of neutrality in the classical period, the small state of Melos disproves this. Although non-
belligerents are not often of interest in ancient sources, the neutral policy of Melos has
39 Cawkwell, p. 47. 40 Robert A. Bauslaugh, The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece (Oxford: University of California Press, 1991), p. xx. 41 Bauslaugh, p. xx 42 Bauslaugh, p. 75. 43 Bauslaugh, p. 75. 44 Bauslaugh, p. 73, examples include no passing through neutral territory, no belligerents in city walls etc.
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