survived. 45 However, this is because the Melians perhaps best represent how smaller states
were vulnerable to violation of their neutrality, especially in the face of powerful
belligerents whose interstate policy did not align with the neutral party. 46 The neutrality of
Melos is first noted in the Thirty Years Peace, which seems to formally recognise the Melian
and Theran position of neutrality during the First Peloponnesian War, stating “if any Hellenic
state is allied with neither side, it is permitte d to enter whichever alliance it pleases”,
seemingly acknowledging the rights of neutral states. 47 Unfortunately, this respect would
not last. In 426, the Athenians sent sixty ships and 2000 hoplites to Melos to try to force
them into the Delian League after successfully recruiting Thera but, despite ravaging the
island, failed. 48 As a result, Melos tribute was assigned at an unreasonable 15 talents,
despite having never been a tributary. 49 Athens returned with forces from the League in
416, allegedly due to Melos sending money to the Spartans, and starved the state into
unconditional surrender. 1 Bauslaugh argues that Athen’s attack was, like making the
state a tributary, a desperate attempt to score funds out of Melos. 2 De Ste Croix is
determined to suggest that Athens, particularly regarding Melos, was not exceptionally
more cruel than other ruling states. 3 If this is to be believed, despite neutrality being a policy
which allows a state a chance to regain some control, it would not be unreasonable to
suggest the possible consequences exemplified in Melos simply outweighed the benefits for
most small city st ates and that Athens’ behaviour simply shows how easy it was for
45 Bauslaugh, p. xxi. 46 Bauslaugh, p. 74.
47 Bauslaugh, p. 102, Thuc. 1.35.2. 48 Thuc. 3.91.1-3; Bauslaugh, p. 114. 49 Bauslaugh, p. 116. 1 Thuc. 5.84.1, 5.116.; de Ste Croix, p. 13.
2 Bauslaugh, p. 116. 3 De Ste Croix, p. 14.
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