unchecked produces repercussions which are against the self- interest and that’s how humans
came to understand that it is in their own self-interest a convention based on a promise to
respect others’ self -interest (justice). This did not happen suddenly at a certain point in
history- hence the contract’s implausibility - but was rather a long process of development. 26
Thus, nature can correct and refine itself in the process, an attribute that accounts for
humans ’ exit from the animal condition. 27 In this manner, it does not matter at all how
humans where in their primitive condition or at any time in history whatsoever. What matters
is what the character of human nature is in the present.
Hume sees the social contract as a ‘needlessly lengthy development of his own
utilitarian rationale’. 28 He refutes it on three main grounds based on human nature in the
form of perception: (a) it is an ahistorical concept and one that the people whom it concerns
are not aware of (while awareness being a standard for a contract to exist). Tacit consent is
also refuted since the authority under which someone is born can never be labelled a choice
(even tacit). 29 Also, subordination, as well as rulership, is, in the long term, associated with
the idea of no choice and right respectively, a predisposition towards the status quo; (b)
common opinion is authoritative in matters of moral judgement while judgement is
associated with feelings. Common opinion dictates a moral obligation to obey the
government regardless of the existence of an actual contract. This unanimity stems from the
human nature of the individual that expects similar feelings of his fellows in like
circumstances; (c) ‘the sole foundation of the duty of allegiance [to the government] is the
advantage which it procures to society by preserving peace and order’ which would have been
26 McClelland, pp. 407-408. 27 See, Thomas Prufer, ‘A Reading of Hume's "A Treatise of Human Nature’’’, The Review of Metaphysics, 30.1 (1976), 115-119. 28 P. F. Brownsey, ‘Hume and the Social Contract’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 28.111 (1978), 132-148 (p. 144). 29 Buckle, p. 477.
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