The modern U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operate a complex and interconnected fleet of vessels, aircraft, tactical ground vehicles, and combat systems, each dependent on robust and reliable sustainment infrastructures for operational readiness and long-term sustainability.
For decades, the Department of the Navy (DON) acquisition process, while effectively producing cutting- edge technology, often fell short on ensuring the long-term sustainability of these systems. Program managers and requirements officers, driven by the pressures of development and production timelines, often priori- tized fielding capability over early planning and adequate assessment of life-cycle supportability. This sys- temic imbalance incentivized budget trade-offs to reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC), only for the fleet to inherit a “system” that was expensive to maintain, difficult to repair, and challenged to sustain. To address this pervasive issue, the DON established a rigorous and enduring program review known as the Gate 7 Sustainment Review. The Gate 7 Review is part of the Navy’s Two-Pass Seven-Gate Governance procedures, which are designed to ensure alignment between Service- generated capability requirements and systems acquisition. To further address long-term sustainability, the DON overhauled Enclosure 11 “Life- Cycle Sustainment” of Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5000.02. This article links program manager success directly to the ma- turity of a program’s sustainment strategy. It also highlights a symbi- otic relationship between early Core Logistics Assessments (CLAs) and the Gate 7 Sustainment Review as a criti- cal mechanism for ensuring the DON’s long-term readiness and affordability. Historically, the DON’s acquisi- tion framework was characterized by a distinct separation between de- velopment and in-Service sustain- ment, especially during early Gate reviews. The acquisition program office primarily focused on navigat - ing through design, testing, produc- tion, and maintenance establishment milestones, culminating in the formal
Program managers and requirements officers, driven by the pressures of development and production timelines,
often prioritized fielding capability over early planning and adequate assessment of life-cycle supportability. This systemic imbalance incentivized budget trade-offs to reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC), only for the fleet to inherit a “system” that was expensive to maintain, difficult to repair, and challenged to sustain.
declaration of IOC. Once a system was officially “in the fleet,” the program office often needed to pivot to new challenges, such as system upgrades, leaving the burden of sustainment affordability to the Navy and Marine Corps fleet. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has written extensively on this topic, including in GAO-20-2 Navy Shipbuilding, where it found that the Navy does not consider sus- tainment issues early enough in the shipbuilding acquisition process. The results of poor sustainment planning are well documented in such clear examples as systems fielded with insufficient parts inventories, a lack of trained maintenance personnel, and insufficient established organic or contracted repair capability to en- sure required materiel availability. In essence, uninformed sustainment trade-offs can deliver a product but not a total warfighting capability.
The Navy’s implementation of the Gate 7 Sustainment Review was codified in the April 2022 revision of SECNAVINST 5000.02 as a direct and necessary response to this enduring problem. It also serves as the Navy’s implementation of the mandatory requirements for Sustainment Re- views of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) under 10 U.S.C. § 4323, embedded in the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. This statute formally codifies the requirement to review the execution of a “covered system” Life Cycle Sus- tainment Plan (LCSP) not later than IOC plus five years and every five years thereafter. It also makes the Secretary of the Navy responsible to the Office of the Secretary of War (OSW) and to Congress; both the Navy and OSW must submit an annual report on outcomes of Sustainment Reviews. The timing (covered systems must establish core logistics capabilities
In essence, uninformed sustainment trade-offs can deliver a product but not a total warfighting capability.
MARCH – APRIL 2026 | DEFENSE ACQUISITION MAGAZINE 37
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