Interest was in law and in fact a purported deed of conveyance which retroactively attempted to adjust the mineral ownership of the lands at issue. More significantly, if the Boundary Stipulation was not a conveyance, are any other documents, issued prior to this opinion OR after this opinion, which instruments contain identifiable grantor(s)/ grantee(s), are signed by the grantor or both grantor and grantee and contain identifiable words of grant such as those used in this case to be considered conveyances? Does the label/title/ style of the document attributed to the instrument by its drafter control over the express words utilized in the instrument? That is, are trustee’s deeds, executor’s deeds, stipulation of interest documents (all containing words of grant) and any and all other deeds which address specific issues (such as distribution of estate/trust assets or the specific location of a boundary) to be treated as conveyances or mere contracts? According to this case, at best unknown. There is not a reader of this article that should have ever had a question regarding whether the instrument made the basis of this article and containing the quoted granting language was or was not a conveyance. All such instruments were conveyances until now . How are drafters of deeds as well as title examiners to interpret this case? It certainly is not limited to the specific instrument before the court. That instrument contains specific words of grant and should have been found to be a conveyance. It was not! So, going forward, how is this opinion to be applied. The general rule is that this decision of the Court is to be applied retroactively Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, (Tex. 1983). That is, each and every instrument which is somewhat in the form of Boundary Stipulation, albeit containing a different label/title/style must be interpreted in light of this decision. This case does not cause mere confusion in deed interpretation. It upends all known principles of law and puts each and every instrument, whether addressing boundary line location or merely distributing lands as required by a will, trust etc. into question. The author cannot even speculate on the effect of this case nor can any industry group afford to wait for the Court to decide the limits of its decision. Has this Court once again refused to declare sacrosanct long in
boundary stipulation was effective as a conveyance. ” (fn 15) In the Court’s second opinion, it was stated, in addition to the above foregoing statement found in footnote 15 in the first opinion: “… That is, we do not hold that the stipulation constituted a conveyance or that the stipulation, in and of itself, affects nonparties to the agreement.” (new fn 15) (See Caution below) As indicated by the lead counsel, Mr. Bob Baxter, in his petition to the Court and by the author in his amicus submitted in the case, and here, the above quoted words are, as a matter of law, words of grant . Harlan v. Vetter, 732 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.App. — 1987). These words of grant, combined with the rest of the Boundary Stipulation document (including the retroactive date), make the Boundary Stipulation a purported conveyance as a matter of law . Smith v. Williams , 779 S.W.2d 479 (Tex.App. — 1989). The failure of the Court to find that the Boundary Stipulation was, as a matter of law, a purported conveyance exposes one of the fatal flaws in the opinion. The Smith case contains the same argument made by Concho et al and the Court in its opinion – that the document by and between the mineral owners was a boundary stipulation only and not a conveyance. Such sophistry! The Court has previously and clearly stated that the label/title/style of an instrument is NOT controlling in determining the classification of the instrument (See Alford v. Krum , 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.1984)). Rather, it is not what the parties meant to say but rather the meaning of what was actually stated in the instrument. In the Smith case, it was argued that since the style of the document was “Transfer of Lien” that the instrument could not be a conveyance of the grantor’s mineral estate. The Court held the opposite – the document being unambiguous, it resulted in a conveyance of all of grantor’s interest in and to the lands at issue REGARDLESS of the label/title/style given the instrument. Based on the actual wording of the Boundary Stipulation, above quoted, coupled with the Texas property rules governing conveyances, the Boundary Stipulation was a purported conveyance. This conclusion should have likewise been reached by the Court BUT WAS NOT. That is, since: (i) there were identified grantors and grantees; (ii) the instrument was signed by both the grantor(s) and grantee(s) and (iii) there were sufficient words of grant, that therefore the instrument labeled Boundary Stipulation of Ownership of Mineral
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