that plaintiff has brought on behalf of the state. The California Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal and the trial court. Justice Jenkins authored the decision, with Chief Justices Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, and Groban concurring. The California Supreme Court first addressed whether a PAGA plaintiff can intervene in another PAGA action that settles. The Supreme Court noted there was nothing in the PAGA statute expressly permitting intervention, and that PAGA’s purpose — to penalize employers who violate California wage and hour laws and to deter such violations — was well served by the settling PAGA plaintiff. Thus, having other PAGA plaintiffs involved in a settled PAGA claim is not necessary to effectuate PAGA’s purpose. The Supreme Court also found significant the fact that the PAGA only requires that notice of settlement be provided to the LWDA and approved by the trial court, necessarily implying that other litigants need not be informed of the settlement or involved. The Supreme Court also noted that permitting intervention would result in a PAGA claim involving multiple sets of lawyers all purporting to advocate for the same client and fighting over who could control the litigation and settlement process, and who could recover their attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court opined that not only does the statute not address such complexities, but also such a messy situation would thwart the pursuit of PAGA claims, which would be contrary to the statute’s purpose. The Supreme Court highlighted that PAGA plaintiffs nonetheless have a variety of options to pursue other than intervention. They remain free to seek consolidation or coordination of PAGA cases to facilitate resolution of the claims in a single proceeding. Or a PAGA plaintiff can offer arguments and evidence to a trial court assessing a PAGA settlement or can raise his or her concerns with the LWDA so as to spur LWDA action. The Supreme Court held that the same reasoning for its conclusion against a right to intervention also meant that a PAGA plaintiff has no right to move to vacate the judgment obtained by another PAGA plaintiff in a separate PAGA action, or to require that any objections he or she files to another plaintiff’s settlement be ruled upon. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kruger emphasized that there is nothing preventing a private plaintiff (rather than a PAGA plaintiff) from intervening to protect their own personal interests as an allegedly aggrieved employee, and she emphasized the trial court’s duty to carefully examine PAGA settlements. Justice Liu penned a lengthy dissent. Seemingly mistrustful of trial courts’ ability to gauge the fairness of a PAGA settlement, Justice Liu expressed his view that the majority’s opinion creates a substantial risk of auctioning settlement of PAGA claims to the lowest bidder and insulting those settlements from appellate review. Justice Liu encouraged the California Legislature to take action to amend the PAGA to expressly confer the rights the majority found lacking. The Turrieta decision has significant ramifications for employers facing a multiplicity of PAGA actions. By settling with one plaintiff who then amends the complaint to cover the claims at issue in the other PAGA actions, the employer can pull the rug out from underneath the other plaintiffs and their counsel. Recent amendments to the PAGA now require that a PAGA plaintiff have suffered the same alleged injury as the other allegedly aggrieved employees he or she is, as the State’s proxy, representing. That amendment diminishes the likelihood of employers continuing to face multiple overlapping PAGA claims. But, to the extent an employer is facing a multiplicity of overlapping PAGA actions, the Turrieta decision makes clear that settlement of one such action can be accomplished without substantial interference from other PAGA plaintiffs. On January 18, 2024, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills , 15 Cal.5th 582 (2024). It is a game changer for employers operating in California. The Supreme Court held, in a unanimous decision, that trial courts lack inherent authority to dismiss claims under the PAGA with prejudice due to lack of manageability. The Supreme Court declined to address whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant’s right to due process might ever support striking a PAGA claim. As such, the decision in Estrada is a required read for employers and their decision-makers.
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© Duane Morris LLP 2025
Private Attorneys General Act Review – 2025
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