them. The court rejected that argument, noting that the lack of a signature from Tesla did not matter because Tesla had otherwise indicated its intent to be bound by the arbitration agreements. Some of the plaintiffs who were directly employed by Tesla had, in connection with their onboarding, also signed a non-disclosure agreement. These plaintiffs argued that certain terms of the non-disclosure agreement were unconscionable and served to make the arbitration agreement, signed by them the same day, unenforceable. The court rejected this argument too. The court reasoned that the two agreements addressed separate matters and should not be considered together. Some of the plaintiffs claimed they did not recall signing the arbitration agreements, asserting they should not be bound. The court again rejected that contention, noting that Tesla had submitted a declaration that supported Tesla’s conclusion that the plaintiffs had electronically signed the arbitration agreements. The declaration addressed the manner in which the agreements were electronically presented to and accessed by the plaintiffs, including security measures that existed to ensure it was the plaintiffs who had accessed and signed the agreements, and attached an audit report that indicated the precise time the plaintiffs accessed and signed the agreements. Finally, the plaintiffs who had worked for Tesla through a staffing agency argued their signatures to the arbitration agreement had been forged. While Tesla denied this, it asserted in the alternative that those plaintiffs’ claims were further subject to arbitration because they had signed an arbitration agreement with the staffing company. The court concluded, as to these two plaintiffs, that arbitration could not be compelled, but it allowed Tesla the opportunity to present further evidence as to the existence of the staffing company’s arbitration agreement with its employees. Thus, the motion to compel arbitration was granted as to the individual claims of all the plaintiffs other than the two plaintiffs who disclaimed having ever signed Tesla’s arbitration agreement. The court further dismissed the class claims pursuant to an enforceable class action waiver, and it stayed the non-individual PAGA claims pending the conclusion of arbitration. In Vazquez, et al. v. SaniSure, Inc ., 101 Cal.App.5th 139 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 2024), the California Court of Appeal held that an arbitration agreement signed by an employee was not effective as to a subsequent term of employment. The plaintiff was first hired in November 2019 and signed an arbitration agreement with a class and collective action waiver at that time. She then resigned in May 2021. However, four months later she was re-hired. As part of her re-hire, the plaintiff did not sign a new arbitration agreement. After her second stint of employment ended in July 2022, the plaintiff then filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint, also alleging claims under the PAGA. All the claims allegedly arose out of the plaintiff’s second stint of employment. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and the Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the plaintiff’s arbitration agreement was tied to her underlying contract of at-will employment. By terminating the employment relationship after her first stint of employment, the plaintiff revoked that agreement and the arbitration agreement that was tied to it. Moreover, the Court of Appeal emphasized that the plaintiff attested in opposition to the motion to compel that she never agreed that the agreements she signed during her first term of employment would govern her second term of employment. The California Court of Appeal applied Viking River in Lumbo, et al. v. Kelly Services Global, LLC, 2024 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5241 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Aug. 21, 2024). The plaintiffs filed a PAGA action. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of the claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff’s complaint did not contain any individual PAGA claims and therefore could not be compelled to arbitration. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling. While the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the trial court erred in its assessment of the plaintiff’s claims, it ultimately agreed that her individual PAGA claims were not subject to arbitration. The Court of Appeal explained that the arbitration agreement explicitly excluded any “representative proceeding,” which encompassed the plaintiff’s PAGA claims, as they are inherently representative in nature and brought on behalf of the state. Id. at *2-3. The arbitration agreement contained a broad waiver provision preventing arbitration of any form of representative proceeding and a clause stating that if any part of the agreement conflicted with applicable law, that part would be severed. The Court of Appeal determined that the plaintiff’s individual claims fell under the umbrella of representative proceedings and thus could not be compelled to arbitration. For these reasons, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The plaintiffs filed a class action in Guerrero, et al. v. TruConnect Communications, Inc., 2024 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2855 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 8, 2024), alleging that the defendant violated various provisions of the California Labor Code. The plaintiffs brought a representative claim under the PAGA. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal
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© Duane Morris LLP 2025
Private Attorneys General Act Review – 2025
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