justified by the principle of utility’ (Crisp, 1997). This argument provides grounds for silencing speakers who go against customary morality, such as racist speakers. However, while what Crisp argues is true, Mill holds universal free speech in such high regard in pursuit of the truth that it would seem that Mill would have believed that Stacy should not have been silenced. A further example can be examined in the case of David Irving. It is illegal in Germany and Austria to deny the occurrence of the Holocaust because of the offence it can cause. In 1989 David Irving, a British author, gave two speeches in Austria in which he denied the Holocaust. An arrest warrant was promptly ordered and he was subsequently barred from entering Austria, Germany, Italy and many other countries (Warburton, 2009). At first glance it may seem obvious that it that Mill would object to the silencing of Irving’s opinions; he has a right to free speech, no actual harm caused but only offence and the judge’s ruling could represent a fallible view. However, after closer inspection we once again see how complicated and at times contradictory Mill’s theories were. David Irving was speaking a twentieth Century European context in which denying the holocaust has become contrary to customary morality. Therefore, silencing and punishing Irving can be justified on the grounds of customary morality. This seems a somewhat confusing contradiction on Mill’s part if he indeed would have silenced this ‘offence against decency’ (Mill, 2007). Mill is walking a tightrope as he appears to be torn between the danger of allowing society to oppress individuals and that how certain actions can be seen as just plain wrong. Mill does not find a solution to this confusing paradox. Mill’s position on the limits of free speech is both simple and complicated. It is simple in the fact that the avoidance of harm is the only limit which he allows, but complex in so far as the application of this limit requires controversial judgments on a range of issues, which can be interpreted in multiple ways. Ultimately, Mill’s arguments for freedom of speech rest on the principle of utility as Mill states ‘I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions’ (Mill, 2007). Both his justification for customary morality and the harm principle rests on this utility principle. If the curbing of free speech reduces harm or prevents harm, then intervention is legitimate. The difficulty in interpreting Mill’s theories, as these examples demonstrate, lies in the subjective and at times controversial process of defining and quantifying harm. Brink, David, 2014. Interview via Email. Interviewed by Chris Sealey, 3 August 2014. Cartwright, Will, 2003. John Stuart Mill on Freedom of Discussion. Richmond Journal of Philosophy 5 . Crisp, Roger Mill on Utilitarianism (1997) Routledge, Abingdon. Crisp, Roger, 2014. Interview via Email. Interviewed by Chris Sealey, 2 August 2014. Daniel Overgaauw, The paradoxes of Liberty: The Freedom of Speech (RE-) Considered (2009). [online] available at: http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/104/186> [Accessed 21 st August 2014] Fabrice Muamba: Racist Twitter user jailed for 56 days. BBC NEWS [online] available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-17515992 [Accessed 14 th August 2014]. Mill, John Stuart On Liberty (2005) Cosimo, New York. Skorupski, John Why Read Mill today? (2007) Routledge, London and New York. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford [online] available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freedom-speech/#HarPriFreSpe [Accessed 26 th July 2014]. The Three (Four) Criteria of Legitimate Coercion in Mill’s Moral Theory, 2005. New York University available at:
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