To what extent was it a foregone conclusion that the Tsarist autocracy would be overthrown in 1917?
Ronan Patrick
On the 15 th March 1917, Tsar Nicholas II abdicated from the throne. The Romanov dynasty, which had ruled for 304 years, was at an end. The backdrop for Nicholas’ resignation was a social and economic crisis, escalating demonstrations and finally a military mutiny in Petrograd. However, there is an on-going debate about the inevitability of the Romanov fall from power. For example, Soviet historians often characterized the Russian Revolution as an ‘inevitable climax of a process of historical development’ 1 . Alternatively, having developed a ‘virtual mirror-image interpretation’ 2 , someWestern historians such as Richard Pipes have argued the Romanov fall was in no way inevitable. I would argue that a state is doomed when it neither generates consent, nor successfully coerces its opponents. In order to assess the question of inevitability, I will explore three areas: the nature of political opposition; economic and social backwardness, and finally Tsarist militarism. Radical opposition was an issue that haunted the Tsarist autocracy throughout the 19 th and 20 th century. In 1825, the Decembrist revolution demanded a constitution to limit the power of the Tsar. Whilst Russia never succumbed to the violent Nationalist revolutions that shook Europe in the 19 th century, but the ideas of representation certainly spread to an increasingly radical intelligentsia. This was exacerbated by Alexander II’s liberalizing of the universities from 1860 onwards (for example, increasing freedom of speech and access), which had the unexpected consequence of producing a large cadre of radicalized students to lead revolutionary activities. Furthermore the Tsarist autocracy largely failed to engender consent within liberal sections of the intelligentsia. Party politics remained illegal until 1905, forcing liberal groups willing to work through the Zemstva to be categorized alongside radical movements such as Populists and Nihilists. The Tsarist autocracy thus never rewarded moderation. Indeed, the imperial government often over- reacted to peaceful challenges, as epitomized by the massacre of 200 innocent petitioners during Bloody Sunday in 1905. The massacres of an oppressive regime provided a rallying point for revolutionary Opposition. Thus, the Tsarist autocracy arguably doomed itself by perpetuating the radical opposition who would welcome 1917. Whilst it was true radical groups such as the Bolsheviks emerged, overall opposition was usually largely spontaneous, as opposed to being directed. This was epitomized by the escalation of working- class protest between 1911 and 1914. Protest was fuelled by incidents such as the Lena Goldfields Massacre in 1912, but also ranks of dissatisfied and idealistic students. It began with a May Day Strike in 1912 involving 500,000 workers, and culminating in a general strike in St. Petersburg in July 1914. The Russian gentry’s support was another crucial pillar for Tsarist rule. However, by 1917, the infamous Rasputin had alienated large sections of it. After the Spala miracle, where Rasputin had supposedly stopped the bleeding of the haemophilic Tsarivich, Rasputin possessed huge influence over Alexandra Feodorovna, the Tsarina. Aristocrats were offended that a peasant had so much influence; his willingness to accept bribes, gifts and sexual favours poisoned the Monarchy’s relation with the gentry. The sheer scale and diversity of Russia made the Tsar’s tasks of generating consent more difficult. Alexander III had been hugely inspired by the British Empire, whose forging of the ‘British’ identity
1 A. Wood, The origins of the Russian Revolution 1861-1917( London and New York, Routledge, 1993)p. 50 2 E. Acton, p.4.
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