regime was arguably less vulnerable during the Great War than it was in 1905, because of the drastic reforms undertaken byWitte and Stolypin. In the midst of the 1905 revolution, Witte, who recognized ‘the restoration of order…required fundamental changes’ 6 , proposed the October Manifesto. This conceded freedoms such as speech, assembly and the press, and also a constitution. Liberal leaders such as Miliukov accepted Nicholas’ offer; they were willing to work through the new Duma (a popularly but indirectly elected lower house). Witte had split Russian opposition, isolating the more radical elements. The membership of the SD Party (the Bolshevik and Menshevik party) declined from 150,000 to 100,000 following the 1905 revolution. Moreover, Nicholas II and Stolypin were able to influence the Duma; in the 1907 3 rd June reforms, it was ensured that the wealthiest 1% of the electorate controlled 66% of the seats in the new Duma. Peasant and worker representation was cut by roughly 50%. As we have already seen, Figes posits that alienation of the large peasant body doomed the regime. However, this reform ensured loyalty to the Tsar among the wealthy electorate, whilst excluding the more revolutionary candidates (who were previously elected by poorer peasants and workers). With radicals such as Lenin exiled and deported to Siberia, the regime was arguably in a stronger position by 1914. Stolypin’s agrarian reforms are another key point of contention between Figes and Pipes. Pipes argues that if Stolypin’s policies were given more time it may have preserved the regime. In 1906-1907, Stolypin brought about the annulment of redemption dues (fees that peasants were required to pay through the Mir for their emancipation). This enabled peasants to leave the commune, thus decreasing the power of the Mir. By 1914, 25% of peasants had left the communes, and 10% had consolidated their holdings. Given that Russia’s peasant population numbered about 100 million, this was a profound change. The purpose of the so-called ‘Stolypin peasants’ 7 was twofold; firstly, the creation of a new entrepreneurial landowning class would hopefully modernize Russia’s backwards agricultural practice. Secondly, this new class would owe their fortunes to the Tsar, and thus hopefully a loyal pillar of the autocracy. This ‘would provide the foundations of national stability’ 8 . Indeed in 1914, Lenin was concerned that the revolutionary potential of the peasantry was being eroded. Ultimately, Stolypin’s reforms are a historical ‘what if ’. Stolypin himself accepted the creation of this class would require at least a generation, but the war threw the Russian society and economy rapidly off course. Additionally, by 1914 Russia’s economy was modernizing at an astonishing rate. Witte, securing multiple French loans, undertook a policy of rapid and forced industrialization. From 1890-1900, Witte pumped loans into capital infrastructure projects, most notably railways. This provided vital infrastructure for the Russian economy. In 1914, Russian industrial production was more than four times what it was in 1881. Russia was modernizing at such a rapid rate that the German Chief of Staff, Herman Moltke, pushed for war, ‘the sooner the better’ 9 . Economic progress also generated consent among the businessmen who profited. Russian Nationalism, and thus loyalty to the regime, was inevitably bolstered by the threat of foreign powers. Indeed, the Tsarist regime frequently justified its existence through military means. In 1833, Minister of Education, Surgey Uvarov defined Russia’s ideological doctrine as orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality. Following the outbreak of war in 1914, the Tsarist regime was bolstered by large- scale popular support. Vast swathes of the population and the Orthodox Church seemingly stood behind Tsar Nicholas II’s defence of the Slav peoples. The declaration of war thus ‘temporarily diffused the [domestic] situation as a wave of primitive patriotism swept across the country impelling tsar, government, society and the people to unite.’ 10 However, the intrinsic militarism of the Tsarist regime often led to over optimism about its military prospects, and thus poor decision-making. Both the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Japanese War
6 R.Pipes, The Russian Revolution 1899-1919 ( London, Fontana Press edition, 1992) p.43 7 J. Bromley, Russia 1848-1917 (Oxford, Heinemann, 2002) p. 112 8 R. Pipes, The Russian Revolution, p. 173 9 J. Bromley, p. 116 10 A. Wood, p. 38
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