Our Catholic Heritage, Volume V

The Mission Era: The End of the Spanish Regime, 1780-1810

OUR CATHOLIC HERITAGE IN TEXAS 1.51.9,1.936

PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS OF TEXAS JAMES P. GIBDONS, C. S. C ., Editor

THE MISSION ERA:

THE END THE SPANISH

OF REGIME

CARLOS E. CASTANEDA, Ph.D., LL. D., K. H. s.

VOLUME V

Austin, Texas VON BOECKMANN-JONES COMPANY, PUBLISHERS 1942

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NIHIL OBSTAT

STANISLAUS F. LISEWSKI, C. s. c., Ph.D., s. T.-D. President, St. Edward's University Austin, Texas Censor . D e,p1,tatus

IMPRIMATUR

v+ RoBERT E. LucEY, D. n., LL. D. Archbishop of San Antonio

+ CHRISTOPHER E. BYRNE, D. D., LL. D. Bishop of Galveston + JOSEPH P. LYNCH, D. D., LL. D. Bishop of Dallas v+ EMMANUEL B. LEDVINA, D. D., LL. D. Bishop of Corpus Christi + ANTHONY J. SCHULER, s. J ., D. D., LL. D. Bishop of El Paso ✓ + MARIANO s. GARRIGA, D. D., LL. D. Coadjutor Bishop of Corpus Christi + LAURENCE J. FITzSIMON, D. D., LL. D. Bishop of Amarillo + SIDNEY M. METZGER, D. D., LL. D. Coadjutor Bishop of El Paso

+ AUGUSTINE DANGLMAYR, D. D., LL. D. Auxiliary Bishop of Dallas

TEXAS KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS HISTORICAL COMMISSION

Honorary Chairman of tlie Commission

THE MosT REv. ARCHBISHOP ROBERT E. LUCEY, D. D., LL. D.

Executive Committee

THE REv. JAMES P. GIBBONS, C. S. C., A. B., Chairman THE RIGHT REv. MONSIGNOR JosEPH G. O'DoNOHOE, LL. D., Secretary ·.1 THE MosT REv. B1sHOP M. S. GARRIGA, D. D., LL. D. THE RIGHT REv. MONSIGNOR PETER Gu1LDAY, PH. D., LL. D. HoN. JosEPH I. DRISCOLL, LL. D., K. S. G., Past State Deputy HoN. Gus STRAUSS, State Deputy.

Diocesan Historians

REv. ALOIS J. MoRKOVSKY, Archdiocese of San Antonio RIGHT REv. MONSIGNOR JOHN S. MURPHY, LL. D., Diocese of Galveston ,,/ RIGHT REv. MONSIGNOR JOSEPH G. O'DoNOHOE, LL. D., Diocese of Dallas REv. DANIEL A. LANING, Captain, U.S. Army, Diocese of Corpus Christi REv. ARNOLD A. BOEDING, Lieutenant, U. S. Army, Diocese of Amarillo REv. DAVID J. KIRGAN, Diocese of El Paso

Historiographer

CARLos E. c.,sTANEDA, PH. D., LL. n., K. H. s.

PREFACE

A series of untoward circumstances delayed the completion of the pres- ent volume. The untimely death of the editor, the Rev. Dr. Paul J. Foik, C.S.C., after a prolonged illness from which he had begun to recover, was a stunning blow to his many friends, and constituted an irreparable loss to the author. His kindly and intelligent criticism, his gentle guidance, and his contagious enthusiasm for a work into which he had placed his whole heart and soul have been sorely missed in the continuation of this volume, half finished at the time of his lamented death. The author wishes to pay the highest tribute to the memory of his friend and fellow-worker, Father Foik, for the invaluable assistance in the production of the first four volumes of Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, the pride and constant goal of all his endeavors during the last fifteen years of his life. The present volume continues the complete narrative of the history of Texas. The panorama of the closing years of the Eighteenth Century, full of momentous events in the history of the world, as well as in that of Texas, is unfolded largely from the sources gathered for the purpose by the Texas Knights of Columbus Historical Commission. The cession of Louisiana to Spain in 1763 brought about a complete reorganization of the northern frontier of New Spain and converted Texas into an in- terior province. This change affected the work of the missionaries and resulted in the ultimate abandonment of the mission as.a frontier institu- tion. In the present volume, the full story of the secularization of the missions, which marks the official end of the mission era, is told for the first time. But the missionary zeal was not spent. In spite of the new policy tc abandon the mission as an agency for the control of the Indians in Texas. the enthusiastic Father Silva succeeded in founding a new mission Nuestra Senora del Refugio, the last bloom of missionary endeavor or. the northern frontier of New Spain. The details of its establishment anc its development are presented in connection with the last efforts at mis• sionary control, upon which discredit was brought by the fantastic plam of the illiterate Brother Alberola, an incident of the greatest significanc< heretofore unknown by historians. The need for the effective defence of Texas made it imperative to es· tablish connections between the outlying provinces of northern New Spain Here we see the details of the steps taken to blast trails between Texa:

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and New Mexico, which eventually were to lead enterprising American pioneers to the gates of Santa Fe. The retrocession of Louisiana to France and the purchase of this vast province by the United States had a profound effect on Texas. The filibustering activities of Nolan and his successors, the ambitious aims of Burr's conspiracy, the unscrupulous character of Wilkinson, American commander on the Louisiana frontier at the time, and the disturbing spirit of the western frontiersmen as re- flected in the public press, all contributed to arouse Spanish officials to make frantic efforts to safeguard Texas. The reaction of these events and circumstances are given in detail for the first time in the present volume and here are to be found the origins of foreign colonization in Texas, which are traceable to 1803. The spread of the ideas of the French Revolution and the direct inter- vention of Napoleon in Spain had its repercussion in Texas. The effect of this blow to Spanish authority in the peninsula and of the appearance of French agents in Texas, is, likewise, traced in detail and fitted into the general narrative to place in proper perspective the events that followed. Throughout the volume the aim has been to present the complete picture of the social, economic, and political conditions that underlie the main events that mark the end of the period of the Spanish regime by portray- ing realistically the personal considerations and human emotions that often determine the course of history. The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the Knights of Columbus, under whose auspices this work has been carried out; to Rev. Dr. Paul J. Foik, C.S.C., of St. Edward's University, for his unwavering enthusiasm and wise counsel to the very last day of his life; to Rev. James P. Gibbons, C.S.C., likewise of St. Edward's University, who succeeded the deceased chairman in his duties as editor, for a critical revision of the manuscript of the present volume; to Dr. Charles W. Hackett, Dr. Eugene C. Barker, Miss Winnie Allen, and E.W. Winkler, all of the University of Texas, for useful suggestions, friendly advice, and continued coopera- tion in checking materials and sources; to the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress for the courtesies extended to him while consulting source materials; and to Elisa, his wife, for uncomplaining endurance in checking details. C. E. CASTANEDA, University of Texas

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I Reorganization and New Policies, 1780-18oo....... ................................ . 1 CHAPTER II Secularization of the Missions................................................................ 35 CHAPTER III The Founding of Mission Nuestra Senora del Refugio.................... 67 CHAPTER IV Last Attempts at Missionary Control of Indians, 1783-1801................ 110 CHAPTER V Communications between Santa Fe and San Antonio........................ 145 CHAPTER VI Preparing to Weather the Storm..................... .......... ........................... .. 171 CHAPTER VII From San Lorenzo to the Retrocession of Louisiana, 1795-1801........ 210 CHAPTER VIII First Clashes with the United States......... ................... ........... ... .... .. .... 232 CHAPTER IX The Beginning of Formal Colonization, 1803-1810.................... .. ...... 285 CHAPTER X French Intervention and Its Reaction in Texas.................................... 337 CHAPTER XI Texas on the Eve of the Mexican Revolution........................................ 400

Bibliography .......................................................................................... 439

Index ...................................................................................................... 473

ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

Rev. Paul J . Foik, C. S. C., Ph. D., deceased Editor of Ou, Catholic Heritage in Texas ... .. ....... .. ... ... .... ... ... Frontispiece ·

Attempted Assassination of Governor Rafael Martinez Pacheco .. .. .. ...... .... ..... .. .. ............ ... ..... .. ....... .. .... .... .. .... Facing page 16

Secularization of Mission San Jose y San Miguel de Aguayo ... ... .... .... ....... ............ ............. ..... ........ ....... .... Facing page 32

Mission Nuestra Senora del Refugio, drawn from a pic- ture of the original mission............................ ... ..... Facing page 96

Military Plaza, San Antonio.. .......... ....... ....... .. .... .... .. .. ... Facing page I 12

Pedro Vial's Map 1787...... .......... .. ........................... ...... . Facing page 160

Protagonists in the Anglo-American March to the West. . Facing page 272

Royal Order of September 24, 1803.... ..... ...... ........ .. .. .... .F acing page 288

Map of Texas, tracing the various expeditions between 1761 and 1810.. ... ...... .. ..... ...... .. ... ....... ....... .... ... ... .. .. .. . Facing pag6 524

THE END OF THE SPANISH REGIME

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CHAPTER I

REORGANIZATION AND NEW POLICIES, 1770-1800

Contrary to the statement made by a pioneer historian of the state that "There is little to be recorded of Texas during the last two decades of the century," 1 these years are replete with significant details of new policies and developments essential to the understanding of subsequent events. The immediate effect of the cession of Louisiana to Spain was the abandonment of the frontier establishments in East Texas and the reorganization of the line of presidios from California to the Gulf of Mexico. This, however, was followed by a series of changes in the traditional Indian policy along the entire frontier, dictatec:1 by the increasing danger of aggression on the part of the English colonies and by the realization that the northern tribes which crowded upon the outposts of Spain's dominions in North America could no longer be controlled by the time-honored institution of the mission. The ascension of Charles I II to the throne inaugurated a period of political reorgani- zation both at home and abroad, that was to result in fundamental changes in the administrative machinery of the northern provinces of New Spain. These changes were to have a profound effect on distant Texas. Closely related to the administrative reforms was the revision of the missionary system and the policies of the government pertaining to the conversion and civilization of the natives. This resulted in the secularization of the old missions of San Antonio and La Bahia. The innovations of the energetic Charles III were to affect profoundly the social and economic life of Texas. Indian policy. The abandonment of East Texas made more urgent than ever the control of the northern tribes, the traditional enemies of Spain and the loyal friends of France in America. The adoption of Rubi's recommendation to wage a war of extermination against the faith- less Lipan-Apaches required the cooperation of their northern rivals. This meant a complete reversal of the-Indian policy pursued d\lring the greater part of the century. An equally important consideration, and one that did not escape the minds of frontier officials, was the danger lurking in the development of bonds of interest and friendship

1 Bancroft, H. H., Nortli Mexican States and Te:ras, I, 634.

[ I ]

Our Catliolic Heritage in T e~as

between these Indians and the aggressive English pioneers. Powerful and warlike, the northern nations could not be brought under subjection by the Spanish mission. Prolonged contact with Europeans had ~cquainted them with the use of firearms, and the growing infensity of national rivalry had taught the Indians the value of their material assistance. A sharp break in the policy, long pursued with success by the French, would result in the total loss of their friendship. When O'Reilly took possession of Louisiana in 1769, he realized all these facts and-wisely chose one of the most remarkable men on the French frontier to win the support of the northern tribes. Athanase de Mezieres, son-in-law of the redoubtable St. Denis, brother-in-law of the Duke of Orleans, an experienced and tried officer, was appointed lieuten'" ant-governor of the Natchitoches district, with jurisdiction over the Red River Valley. This area included a large portion of eastern and northern Texas and most of Arkansas and Oklahoma.s The instructions given him reveal the general policy to be adopted in dealing with these Indians. Licensed traders were to be appointed for the friendly tribes. Hostile nations, however, were to be deprived of the advantages of trade, whether conducted by the Spaniards or the French. Traffic in stolen horses and Indian captives was .to be discouraged and rigorously suppressed. The center of this reprehensible exchange had long been the villages of the Taovayas on Red River. Here the Comanches, when at peace, obtained firearms, munitions, and agricultural products for their stolen horses and Indians taken in raids made upon Spanish outposts. Spanish captives, while not so numerous as Apaches, were not infrequent, but these were generally taken to San Antonio for ransom. 1 The worle of De Meeieres. De Mezieres proved himself eminently successful in his first expedition. He visited some of the tribes in . the upper Red River, appointed traders for the friendly Yatasi and Cado- dacho, conferred medals on Chiefs Tinhioiien and Cocay, expelled all unlicensed traders and white vagabonds, and held a council at San Luis, a Cadodacho village near present Texarkana. Thr chiefs of the Taovayas, Tawakonis, Yscanis, and Kichais attended the council and promised to 2Bolton, H. E., AtliOMS, de M,iur,s, I, 1-48. The introduction to the letters, dlariea, and reports of this outstanding figure constitute the best biographical sketch and api,raisal of his work. A brief summary of his various visits to the northern tribes in Texas is found in Morli, J. A., History of Texas, Part 2, Chapter X, translated by Carlos E. Castaneda. 'Bolton, o,. cit., I, 47-48; 88-92; 127-193.

Reorganization and New Policies, 1770-1800

, visit San Antonio to cement a lasting peace. The visits to the Indians of the north by Pablo le Blanc and Father Fray Pedro Ramirez in 1771 followed, but the Comanches and Tonkawas still distrusted the Spaniards.' Rumors of English traders, the desire to learn more about the country recently visited, and the actual strength of the northern tribes prompted De Mezieres to undertake a new expedition in 1772. Setting out from Natchitoches in March, accompanied by a few soldiers and some interpreters, he went west to the Trinity, where he visited the villages of Kichais, Yscanis, and Tawakonis near the site of Palestine. He then continued in the same direction to the Brazos and visited two Tawakoni pueblos located near Waco. Going up the Brazos for about two hundred miles he arrived at the village of the Wichitas. Here he sent word to the Taovayas on Red River, and, accompanied by seventy Indians, returned south to San Antonio. I1,1 eighty-eight days he had traversed over a thousand miles of country seldom if ever frequented by white men; he had learned much about the northern Indians, and had won their good will. 5 During this expedition he found that the Taovayas were carrying on an extensive and lucrative trade with the English who furnished them with goods in exchange for stolen Spanish horses. This he attempted to stop. He also learned that the northern tribes, who had recently made peace with the Spaniards, were being hard-pressed by the Osages. He suggested that they move southward to be under the protection of a Spanish presidio. The Indians expressed their willingness to do it after the fall harvest. On his return he, therefore, proposed to Governor Rip- perda the establishment of a presidfo in the country of the Cadodachos. Although the governor enthusiastically endorsed the plan, Spanish officials were dubious of its practicability, and wary of the expense involved. The plan, consequently, was abandoned. At the same time De Mezieres and Ripperda proposed a joint campaign with the new allies against the Apaches, as previously suggested by Rubi. But nothing came of this. On his return to Natchitoches, De Mezieres spent several days among the Bidais and in the villages of the Hasinais, in order to disrupt a dangerous friendship that was beginning to form between these Indians and the Apaches. Temporary failure of D8 J11 stieres' plans. In spite of the zealous efforts of De Mezieries and the determined support of Governor Rip-

'Bolton, H. E., Texas in t/i4 Middle Eighteenth Century, 1::u-122. 5 Bolton, D11 Mezier11s, I, 95·99; :.183-351.

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perda, many of the advantages secured by the work of these two men in gaining control of the northern tribes were lost through the personal rivalries of other officials. Particularly was this true in regard to the opposition offered by Hugo Oconor. From the first he and his friends suspected the natives, De Mezieres, and Ripperda. They emphasized the bad faith of the Indians, exaggerated the extent to which French traders were profiting individually through these illicit relations, and accused Ripperda of partiality towards the French and participation in illegal profits. Viceroy Bucareli y Ursua was won over to the Oconor faction and ended by not only prohibiting all trade with Louisiana, but also by eventually removing Ripperda from office. Although he was notified as early as November 15, 1776, of his transfer to Comoyagua, Honduras, the peculiar circumstances prevailing during this time in Texas kept him from departing until 1778. 6 Croi:r!s plans for the extermination of the Apaches. Early in 1776 a new administrative unit was created with the appointment of Teodoro de Croix, generally known as Caballero de Croix, as commandant general of the Interior Provinces, who chose Chihuahua as his capital. The new commander set out shortly thereafter to inspect the frontier, accom- panied by Fray Juan Agustin Morfi, who was to write a history of Texas after his return.7 The first task of the new commander was to devise a plan to check permanently, if possible, the Indian hostilities that in recent years had devastated the frontier settlements of Texas, Coahuila, New Mexico, and Chihuahua, and to chastise in particular the Apaches, the worst offenders, The Caballero de Croix counted heavily in his plan on the cooperation of the brilliant young governor and soldier of Louisiana, Bernardo de Galvez. It was his intention to unite the nations of the north, who, aided by three hundred CJ,ausseurs from Louisiana under the command of Galvez, were to fall simultaneously upon the eastern Apaches while Croix attacked them from the south and west with the entire available forces of the Interior Provinces. Pursuant to his plan, he held a council of war at Monclova in December, 1777, in which he presented for discussion sixteen questions 6 /bkl., I, 107-108; II, 13-81; Viceroy BucareU to Arriaga, April 26, 1776. A. G, /., A11diu1cla d, G11atlalafara, 103-5-21 (Dunn Transcripts, 1776). 7 Morfi wrote the well-known but unpublished Memorias and a history of Texas based on these notes, the existence of which was doubted until it was discovered and translated by the writer and published by the Quivira Society as Volume VI of its P11blicatwns. See Castaneda, Morft's History of Texas, Part I, 27-36.

Reorganization and New Policies, 1770-1800 5 "regarding the Apache on the one hand and the nations of the north on the other hand, their divisions, habitat, fighting strength, and depre- dations; the possibility of making an offensive alliance with the Apaches against the other group, or vice versa." The council approved Croix's plan for uniting with the northern Indians against the Apaches and recommended that the details of the proposed campaign be worked out by a council to be held in San Antonio.• Junta lzeld in San Antonio, January 5, 1778. The meeting was presided over by the Caballero de Croix. Governor Ripperda, Captains Rafael Martinez Pacheco, Luis Cazorla, and Domingo Diaz, and the adjutant-inspector and secretary of the commandancy-general, Antonio Bonilla, fully discussed the recommendations of the previous ltmta held in Monclova. They agreed that the peace sworn to by the Apaches had been repeatedly and flagrantly violated; that the enmity of the northern nations was provoked by the friendship of the Spaniards for the Apaches; and that the only remedy for the evils afflicting the Interior Provinces was a war of extermination against the perfidious nation. To that end the plan proposed by Croix was adopted and the council unanimously recommended that De Mezieres, who was now in Louisiana, be trans- ferred to Texas and commissioned to explain the details of the plan to the northern tribes. 9 De Mezieres lost no time in answering the summons. By February 20 he was in San Antonio, where he outlined the essential features of the plan regarding the cooperation of the northern allies. He proposed that one thousand Indians be assembled in the villages of the Taovayas. These he would lead personally to the Colorado, where they were to join three hundred Spanish troops. Their forces having been split into two sections, they were to march west to the Pecos and northern Coahuila, and drive the Apaches before them toward the advancing troops of the Interior Provinces under the command of the Caballero de Croix. Mindful of the ill-treatment accorded to captives, he proposed that all Indians taken prisoner should be bought by the missionaries at a prearranged price to swell the thinning ranks of the neophytes. 10 •Bolton, D11 MhiJr,s, I, 110-1u; II, 147-170. The text of the questions and the deliberations of the Junta held ln Monclova on December 9·II, 1777, are found ln A. G. M., Provincias lnternas, Vol. 64, pp. 58-71. 9 Junta de Guerra, A. G. M., Provin&ias lnt,rnas, Vol. 64, pp. 71-78. 10 Bolton, o-p. &it., II, 172-186.

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New expeditions of De Mezieres and liis untimely deatli. The plan outlined by De Mezieres had to be submitted to the various Spanish officials before it was put into execution. Unwilling to remain idle in San Antonio, he now revisited the northern tribes. In March, 1778, he set out from San Antonio with a small escort and went first to the new settlement of Bucareli on the Trinity. He proceeded to the pueblos and ranchenas of the Kichais, the Tonkawas, and the Tawakonis on the Brazos. Following the Cross Timbers, he went on to the villages of the Taovayas on the Red River. While among the Taovayas, he sent a stern message to the Comanches who had been lukewarm in their attitude towards the proposed alliance with the Spaniards. He learned to his amazement that since his last visit several English traders had pene- trated this area and successfully disposed of their wares. To prevent such incursions in the future and to strengthen the influence of .Spain over these Indians, he dispatched an urgent appeal to Croix for the establishment of a Spanish settlement among the Taovayas. But this, like many other proposals, was disregarded. Shortly afterwards he left the site of what is now known as Old Spanish Fort and went to Natchi- toches, taking with him the two cannons abandoned by Parrilla in his hasty retreat almost twenty years before. These he left at Bucareli. 11 In the meantime Croix had returned to Chihuahua. The plan drawn up by De Mezieres was carefully considered in several councils and approved in principle, but it was concluded that its execution required more troops than were available. While the matter was being decided by the viceroy, De Mezieres was formally transferred to Texas, and his permanent residence was established in San Antonio. The purpose was to have him continue his work out of San Antonio among the nations of the north, particularly the Comanches who had not been won over completely. The change seems to indicate that the authorities in New Spain had eventually adopted the recommendations of Ripperda in this regard and decided to transfer the control of the northern tribes from Natchitoches to San Antonio. But fate decreed otherwise. In May, 1779, De Mezieres set out from Natchitoches for Texas. Instead of going directly to San Antonio, he decided to call upon the new allies in an effort to win the friendship of other tribes and strengthen the good will of those who were now at peace. When he reached the Atoyaque River, he suffered a severe fall from his horse which stumbled and threw him on his head. He went back to Natchitoches, or rather was carried

11 /bid., I, 113-116.

Reorganization and New Policies, r770-r800

back on an improvised stretcher. Here he remained until early in August when he again undertook the journey, going first to the Nabedache. From these he continued to the villages of the Kichais and the Tawakonis, proceeding to San Antonio by way of the San Xavier (San Gabriel) River. Shortly after his arrival in San Antonio, he learned that his faithful and loyal services had been rewarded by his appointment as governor. But he never fully recovered from the severe fall near the Atoyaque. Before taking office, he died on November 2, 1779. 12 Events moved rapidly during these years. Simultaneously with the untimely death of De Mezieres, Spain had joined France as an ally of the rebellious English colonies in their war for independence; Governor Galvez had become indispensable in Louisiana; the troops needed for the proposed campaign against the Apaches could not now be spared. Temporarily the doomed Apaches were once more saved from annihilation. Figliting tlie Apaclies. Spanish officials in Coahuila and Texas, however, did not abandon the new policy. They soon became convinced that the Mescaleros of New Mexico, the Lipans of Texas, and the Apaches proper were all blood kin and inseparable allies. It was now decided to arouse rivalry and enmity among them in a desperate effort to pit one against the other. Spanish agents in Coahuila were partially successful in attaining their object. In 1780 the Apaches and the Mescaleros attacked the Lipans in. Coahuila. The latter were forced to move into the area between present Laredo, San Antonio, and Goliad. With their range of activity reduced, they renewed (under the guise of friendship) their thieving and raiding expeditions on the settlements in Texas, particularly along the Rio Grande, with greater audacity than ever. 13 The Mescaleros and Apaches, who continued their depredations in Coahuila, Nuevo Santander, and Nueva Vizcaya (Chihuahua), soon made peace with the Lipans of Texas with whom they were reconciled by the end of 1781. Needing arms and ammunition, they decided to obtain them from the Tonkawas who at this time lived between the Brazos and the Colorado. The latter secured their arms and ammunition from French traders who frequented their lands. The emissaries of the Mescalero-Apache-Lipan group found a ready welcome by the chief of Ufbid., I, l 16-122; II, 239-288. 13Domingo Cabello to Viceroy Matias de Galvez, September 30, 1784. A. G. /., Provincias lnternas, Vol. 64, pp. 132-134. This excellent report on Indian relations from 1680 to 1784 deserves to be published in full. It consists of sixty pages.

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the Tonkawas, called El Mocho (The Mutilated), because he had lost an ear in battle. His real name was Toquet. This Indian was really not a Tonkawa but an Apache, who had been captured while very young and who had risen to the position of the great chief of the Tonkawas through his personal prowess and ability. In vain did Governor Cabello attempt -to dissuade him from becoming an ally of the Apaches. Neither gifts nor threats moved him. The governor repeatedly invited him to come to San Antonio, but fearful of treachery, he as steadfastly refused. In January, 1783, while visiting La Bahia with a group of Apache friends, he became involved in an argument and was killed. His death, which Cabello claimed was not entirely accidental, temporarily checked hostilities. Governor Juan de Ugalde, of Coahuila, had personally taken the field against the Apaches in 1781 and 1782, and he had succeeded in inflicting a series of defeats upon them in northwestern Coahuila and the lower Pecos. These victories brought him considerable renown, but did not put an end to the depredations. An idea of the extent of their marauding activities may be gathered from the fact that in June, 1784, alone, the Apaches killed forty-six persons and took six hundred horses and mules.u Plan conceived b,y Governor Cabello. Viceregal officials were really puzzled by the unsolved problem of the continued hostilities of the A,pacliena in the Interior Provinces. Viceroy Galvez even contemplated the negotiation of peace with the Lipans of Texas and the Mescaleros of, Coahuila in the hope of obtaining a temporary respite. To this proposal Governor Cabello emphatically replied in the negative. To make peace . with the Lipans would be tantamount to opening the door wide to the Apaches and their kinsmen, the Mescaleros, who, feigning friendship, would penetrate the provinces of Coahuila, Nuevo Santander, Nuevo Leon, and Nueva Vizcaya, commit their accustomed depredations with impunity, and discover the poor state of the frontier defences. Such a peace would soon reduce the prosperous establishments of the Interior Provinces to the miserable condition of those of Coahuila and Texas. On the contrary, Cabello argued, the war. against the Apaches and their blood allies should be intensified and no quarter given until "only the memory of their existence in this province remains." In order to carry out this purpose, a number of troops was essential, adequate to prevent these Indians from penetrating from Coahuila and

16 /bia., pp. 135-140.

Reorgani&ation and New Policies, 1770-1800

Texas into Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander. To safeguard Nuevo Leon, soldiers from the Presidio of Coahuila {Monclova) should patrol regularly the country from that post to Laredo. Similarly a group of soldiers from Monterrey should make inspections at regular intervals as far as Pesqueria. These patrols would soon drive the raiding bands of Apaches east of the Rio Grande. The Indians would then naturally come to prey upon the settlements of Laredo, Dolores, San Ambrosio, San Ignacio, Revilla, Camargo, and Reynosa, as well as upon the ranches in their vicinity. In all these establishments there were numerous ranches on either side of the Rio Grande with an abundance of stock and cattle. To protect the lower Rio Grande settlements and their ranches, Governor Cabello suggested the establishment of a competent detach- ment of troops at Camargo. But more important still was the reenforce- ment of Laredo, located east of the river and constituting the natural defence for the rich ranches of Dolores and San Ignacio. With an adequate garrison at this point afid sufficient troops in the neighboring presidios and outposts of Coahuila and Texas, the settlements in the two provinces would have ample protection; and the Apaches, unable to continue their habitual thievery, would be starved into submission. The larger garrison at Laredo could then send out at regular intervals a detachment to reconnoiter the country in the direction of La Bahia. This detachment would meet another at the half-way point in the vicinity of the mouth of the Nueces where Corpus Christi stands today. If the troops at La Bahia were increased, the commander at this point could also send a similar detachment to meet one from San Antonio at Rancho de San Bartolo, located about midway. The Presidio de Bejar would also send another patrol in the direction of San Juan Bautista to meet the one from that place at Palo Alto, located about the same distance from the two. By this means the country between these three strategic points would be regularly patrolled and the Apaches kept constantly at bay. He further proposed the patrol of the country along the east bank of the Rio Grande by detachments from San Juan Bautista and Laredo. He was fully aware of the large number of additional troops needed for this elaborate plan. But, in his opinion, the benefits accruing to the two provinces and their wretched settlers from the effective protection

Our Catl,olic Heritage in Texas

afforded them against the Indians would in a short time more than offset the initial expense.1 5 Tl,e military resources of Texas. The actual number of men in the two remaining presidios after the reorganization of the northern frontier in accord with the new regulations of 1772 was one hundred seventy- six soldiers, nine officers, and two chaplains. This gave the Presidio of Bejar and the Presidio of La Bahia eighty-eight men each, not including the officers. But not all this force could be used to fight the Lipans and Apaches because some had to do guard duty, while others had to look after the horses, provide escorts, and carry the mail. These indispensable duties left only sixteen men available in San Antonio for campaigns against the Indians and thirty-three in La Bahia. It was preposterous to rely on any effective aid from the friendly Indians of the north in the war against the Apaches and the Comanches. Indian allies were more of a liability than an asset. They had to be humored constantly, supplied with horses, arms, ammunition, and pro- visions; and they could never be relied upon on account· of their lack of discipline, their fickle nature, and their irresponsible character. Governor Cabello called attention to the fact that the Gilefios, while belonging to the same family as the Lipans, Mescaleros, and Apaches, and while having the same habits and customs, lived far to the west along the Gila River from which they derived their name. They, there- fore, constituted no danger to the Interior Provinces of Nuevo Leon, Nuevo Santander, and Texas. "If His Majesty," declared the governor, "cannot afford at this time the expense necessary for the war [against the Apaches], the time will soon come when his dominions in this region will be totally lost and his vassals will find themselves obliged to abandon their homes and property and move to places where, in spite of poverty and misery, they may find protection for their lives and those of their wives and children." The commandancy-general, with its limited resources, could neither afford any effective aid nor remedy the sad situation of the Interior Provinces. 16 Danger from the United States. A French Indian agent, Juan Gasiot, with remarkable foresight, called the attention of the new commandant general, Felipe Neve, in 1783 to the grave danger which 15 Governor Cabello to Viceroy Galvez, September 30, 1784. A. G. M., Provincias /nternas, Vol. 64, pp. 142-149. 16 /bid., pp. l 50-157.

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Re01'ganization and New Policies, I770-I800

the attainment of independence by the English colonies presented to the interests of Spain. "It is necessary to keep in mind that a new independent power exists now on this continent," he declared. "It has been founded by an active, industrious, and aggressive people, who, free from the war sustained for many years against their mother country, from which they have at last succeeded in obtaining independ- ence, are already considering the means that will cause it to be respected in the future. These men, freed from the hardships of war that have engaged them so long, will turn their industrious genius to agriculture, the arts, and commerce. Their development," he said, "will constantly menace· the dominion of Spain in America and it would be an unpar- donable error not to take all necessary steps to check their territorial advance by strengthening the outposts of Spain, particularly in Texas Coahuila, and New Mexico. "If we fail to do so, your lordship will see that the citizens of the United States of America, led by the advantages for trade offered by the uncontrolled Indians in the territories lying between their [western] frontiers and our provinces of New Mexico and Texas, will make frequent incursions and establish trade relations with the natives, who will thus become attached to them. They will next establish forts among them and will continue to advance until they reach the limits of our posses- sions where they will have to be checked. By this time, they will have become formidable by their new acquisitions and the winning of numerous allies." To forestall this impending danger Spain had to take immediate steps to win the support of the Indians in the intervening area and enrich her resources with the resultant trade. There was gold in the country of the Taovayas, the Comanches, and the lands beyond, and all the natives had valuable pelts and furs. While peace reigned, this was the time to prepare for the futur.e struggle. Significant, indeed, is the profound observation of Gasiot concerning the fundamental power inherent in a free people. "The character of their republican government," he said, "has great influence over the individual. The voice of public interest binds them and moves them as one, and in this union of action their strength is found. Such a people may be exposed to suffer more internal disturbances than any other, but they are likewise capable of undertaking and accomplishing greater things than any other. ·A Senate, that is ready to meet at any time, that is always ready to deliberate upon anything that may benefit the

Our Catl,olic Heritage in Texas

states, and that has the necessary means at its command for the accom- plishment of the purposes desired must keep the people of a monarchical government always on the alert, with the spring of its resources far removed and the need of waiting for decisions and resources that must come from [the seat of power] more than two thousand leagues away." The governor of Texas, he pointed out, could not possibly maintain friendly relations and, from this distant residence in San Antonio, attend to the exigencies of trade with the Taovayas, Wichitas, Tawakonis, lscanis, and Quitseys. These Indians were well-disposed towards the Spaniards at this time. Advantage of their receptive mood should be taken. Their request that a fort be established in their midst should be granted immediately. Such an act would give great power to the Spaniards in holding the area indicated. It would serve as a trade center and a rallying point for allies in the event of hostilities. The country occupied by the nations enumerated offered easy access to the provinces of Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas. With the proper commander in a post established among them, foreigners could be effectively kept out of the three provinces. Kind and fair treatment of the warlike nations would win their friendship, and the establishment of trade would develop ties of interest that would strengthen their attachment. Gasiot further pointed out that through these Indians the Comanches also could be brought under the influence of Spain. The plan suggested by Nicolas Lamathe to accomplish this was imprac- ticable. Special commissioners to deal with the various Indian nations gave rise to conflicting policies. Too many administering officials resulted in inconsistencies. Gasiot advocated the appointment of one agent or governor of Indian affairs to handle all the northern nations. One Indian agent could and should be placed under the immediate direction of the governor of Texas, the nearest important official. He could easily go to San Antonio once or twice a year for instructions and to secure the presents to be distributed among the new allies. He concluded by stressing the importance of establishing trade rela- tions with Louisiana through La Bahia and by way of the mouth of the Trinity River. Such trade would bring the settlers of the two provinces closer together, increase their prosperity, build ties of union, and make effective their mutual cooperation in resisting the advance or penetration of the English.11

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l7Juan Gaslot to Felipe Neve, October 9, 1783. San Francisco El Grande Archives, xxxm, pp. 1s1-162.

Reorganization and New Policies, 1770-1800

Indian ,policy of Viceroy Galvez. In 1785, Bernardo Galvez, count of the same name, who had distinguished himself by his services in Louisiana during the struggle of the English colonies for independence, was appointed viceroy of Mexico. His experience and intimate acquaint- ance with Indian affairs had prepared him in a large measure for his new task. It was natural that he should turn his attention to the most pressing problem, that of the northern frontier. On August 26, 1786, he prepared a long set of instructions for Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, the new commandant general of the Interior Provinces, designed to guide him and all the frontier commanders in their relations with the Indians in their respective provinces. The influence of Rubi, Croix, Ripperda, and Cabello, as well as that of Lamathe and Gasiot, is evident in the general instructions. He emphatically stated that the Apaches were the worst enemies of the Interior Provinces. "They are the cause of their desolation," he declared, "the enemies most to be feared because of their treachery, their warlike customs, their habit of stealing for a livelihood, and their knowledge of our strength." While their actual number has been greatly exaggerated, nevertheless, their rapidity of movement and constant roaming made them a formidable enemy. In view of these facts, the first concern of commanders should be to protect all exposed frontiers and wage an incessant campaign against bands marauding in the vicinity of their respective posts. This would prevent attack. Frequent raids at unexpected times should be made upon their temporary camps. Experience had shown the futility of large scale operations or formal campaigns against them. Such enterprises had proved costly and worthless on account of the inability to maneuver with the necessary dispatch and secrecy. In fighting Indians on the frontier it was necessary to adopt their own strategy. The chief element was surprise. Success depended on it. Quick and telling blows alone would eventually either .exterminate or bring to subjection these nomadic tribes. The ideal number for such campaigns was from one hundred fifty to two hundred soldiers, well mounted and armed, and unimpeded by trains of supplies or bulky baggage. Frontier troops, furthermore, should be commanded by officers who were experienced in Indian warfare, regardless of their age or rank. Troops in frontier presidios should always be ready to pursue raiding Indians. The report of marauders should be followed up by tracking them down immediately. Time was the most important element. The

Our Catholic Heritage in T e:xas

Indians had the advantage over the Spaniards in that they knew the country better, were generally less impeded in their movements, and better mounted. Immediate pursuit, consequently, was essential to success. The most effective method of destroying the largest number of Indians possible was to follow them to their ranclzerias, feign a retreat, and thereby draw them into an ambush. The viceroy urged frankness and honesty in reporting all Indian engagements, and condemned the practice of those officers, who continually exaggerated the strength of the enemy in order to exalt their own prowess. Such reports were responsible for numerous misrepresentations. In the relentless war against the Apaches, the settlers had a moral obligation to aid the troops whenever necessary. The government would supply them with arms and munitions. If settlers proved indifferent, the governors of the various provinces not only could, but also would be obliged to conscript them. The war against the Apaches was to be persistently and vigorously prosecuted, but after the Indians had been vanquished and had sued for peace, a treaty was to be granted and its stipulations enforced. Reasonable and even generous terms, it was hoped, would make the peace permanent. Treachery, however, should be punished with harshness in order to compel obedience to authority. 11 In time the Indians would develop respect for the Spaniards. Presidio del Paso del Norte was strategically located to prosecute the war against the Apaches. The viceroy instructed the new commandant general of the Interior Provinces to make a special study of the condition, the state of the defences, and the needs of the post. If more arms and ammunition were required by the settlers to defend themselves and cooperate with the garrison, these would be supplied. Because of its location as a half-way station between Chihuahua and the Province of New Mexico, and the habit of the various Apache tribes of visiting this post, this presidio was in position to learn much about the plans of the Indians, influence them for peace, and keep open the line of communication between Nueva Vizcaya and New Mexico. Recommendations concerning El Paso and New 1Jfe:xico. With regard to New Mexico, the settlements and presidios in that province were too distant from El Paso to expect any material aid from

UBernardo Galvez to Jacobo Ugarte, August 26, 1786. Nacogdoclles Arclli-ves, VI, pp. 222-241.

Reorganisation and New Policies, 1770-1800

its garrison. They would have to depend on the support of the settlers for defence. For the same reason, help from Sonora or Nueva Vizcaya was an even more remote possibility. The Indian policy in New Mexico was to have as its cardinal point the maintenance of peace and the cultivation of the friendship of the Yutes to use them in opposing the Comanches on the northern and eastern frontier. It was equally important to stir up still more the enmity between the Navajos and Gila-Apaches, in order to set one against the other so as to secure their ultimate destruction or subjection. At Taos the J icarilla-Apaches and the Co- manches were both to be courted and their friendship and confidence won through kind treatment, judicious distribution of gifts, and the establishment of trade. 19 Recommendations concerning Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander. For military purposes the provinces of Texas, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Nuevo Santander were placed under the immediate command of Colonel Juan de Ugalde, who had previously served as governor of Coahuila and had successfully campaigned against the Apaches in this region. Ugalde, being subordinate to the commandant general only in a general way, was given authority over the available troops in the four provinces and full discretion to conduct the war against the Indians. The viceroy pointed out that in these four provinces the chief enemies were the Mescalero-Apaches. Their kinsmen, the Lipans, maintained a nominal peace in Texas and Coahuila, as also did the Comanches further to the north. But au · Indians, including the various tribes generally designated as nations of the north, were to be distrusted. All officers, however, should scrupulously observe the terms of peace negotiated by Governor Domingo Cabello and other agents, giving no justification for the renewal of open hostilities with any Indians now at peace. But every unprovoked violation or infraction of these terms by the natives was to be severely punished. Caution was to be exercised in ascertaining the perpetrators of outrages, because it was well known that the Lipans in particular took great pains to blame either the Mescaleros or the northern tribes. While firmly enforcing the terms of peace, they were to court the friendship of all these tribes and to build bonds of interest by developing active trade with them. At the same time the traditional rivalry between the Apaches and the northern Indians was to be tactfully kept alive

19/bul., pp. 220-222.

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Our Catliolic Heritage in T e:tas

and fostered in order to remove all possibility of the two great factions uniting against the Spaniards. Commanders and officials in the four provinces were to exercise great secrecy in the execution of their plans, and place no confidence in the friendly nations. The Indians, in visiting the Spanish outposts a,nd settlements, observed everything that was going on and revealed the plans to the enemy, even joining them in many instances. All troop movements were watched closely by the perfidious Lipans. From San Juan Bautista to Espiritu Santo there were more than one hundred leagues of unprotected country. In this area and along the Rio Grande to Reynosa there were many ranches and small settlements exposed to the treachery of friendly Indians and the fury of the open foe. From San Juan Bautista (near Eagle Pass) to La Junta (present Presidio) the country was equally unprotected. These facts should cause settlers and officers in Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander to redouble their vigi- lance and keep themselves ready at all times to repel attack or avoid surprise. 21 Colonel Ugalde lost little time in putting into effect the instructions of the viceroy. His vigorous pursuit of the Mescaleros and Lipan-Apaches met with success both in Coahuila and Texas and abated to a large extent the impudent raids and depredations of these Indians who suffered severe losses. In his campaigns he was effectively aided by the new governor of Texas, Rafael Martinez Pacheco, former captain of the ill- fated Presidio de San Agustin near the mouth of the Trinity. San Anto11io lielps defeat tl,e Apaches. In 1789, Colonel Ugalde made an expedition from Monclova to the site of the former Presidio of San Saba (Menard), pursuing the Mescalero and Lipan-Apaches. The Villa de San Fernando and Presidio de Bejar were suddenly stirred into action the night of December 21 by the arrival of Lieutenant Casimiro Valdez, an Indian scout named Joaquin Gutierrez, and Chief Sofias of the Comanches, who, accompanied by a small escort of soldiers, brought an urgent mess~e from Colonel Ugalde. These men had set out from the old and abandoned Presidio of San Saba on the 19th. They brought a request for eighty-five men and two thousand cartridges. These soldiers, or as many as could be mustered, were to set out within forty- eight hours in order to join at San Saba the force of Colonel Ugalde and two hundred Comanche allies with their eight chiefs to deal a

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20 /bid., pp. 222-230.

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