scte long read
Dr Kavanagh agreed. “It’s not very different to what it was back in like the 19th century with the under the British Empire and then with the British trying to maintain their dominance of the sector”.
What outages mean Broadband Journal readers are learned, highly technical engineers who hardly require an explanation on the implications of a cut cable to modern communications, but just in case this issue does end up in a doctor’s surgery, for the lay person: at a macro level there will be severe internet slowdowns; loss of bandwidth, latency and congestion. On a more micro level, this translates to sticky card payments, broken ATMs, delays in calls, texts and messages. Any of your smart devices will suffer performance issues. Medical records will be difficult to access. Flights grounded. Electronic border gates would fail. However, realising I sound like the kind of overwrought tabloid I am keen to distance myself from, this really is the worst-case scenario, and the army of industrious experts we will meet later unanimously agree that despite the challenges we face, there is plenty of good news, and not a lot to worry about. A little history For an area so cutting edge, there are distinct historical throwbacks that may surprise you. Last year journalist Samanth Subramanian produced a comprehensive history on the subject in a self-published page turner called The Web Beneath the Waves: The Fragile Cables That Connect Our World, going to considerable trouble to lay out case studies and interview key personnel.
Mr Subramanian is right to assert that the global pattern of subsea cables originated in the 19th century; on a remote beach in Cornwall the first subsea cable was pulled out of the sea having started its journey in Carcevelos, Portugal, in 1870, “the final leg of a system that ran through Italy, Malta, Egypt, the Suez and Aden, all the way down to Bombay. The first message, sent from Porthcurno to Bombay read, ‘How are you all?’ a reply returned in five minutes: ‘All well.’ By 1907 there were 200,000 miles of cable deployed.” Astonishing enough but then he concludes, “By 1929, the British government, keenly aware of how vital its cable networks had become to its colonial enterprise, encouraged a merger of assorted telegraph companies into one giant entity called Cable & Wireless.” Britain’s imperial and commercial footprint helped lay many of the foundations of today’s cable geography; that was the product of both commercial incentives and strategic design. The telegraph cable network was built to serve trade and trade followed established shipping routes. Ports became communication hubs and cable economics understandably favoured existing routes – for topographical and navigational reasons as much as relationships that existed out in the field. Additionally, British strategists deliberately routed cables near major shipping lanes so that the Royal Navy could protect them.
The reality
There are countless fretful articles available about the increased threat to our national and international security, and in an age of populism driving rage and misinformation driving the internet, it is a reasonable assertion that anxiety drives people to spend money. Whether that money is spent on Botox or a self- help book, market intelligence, especially where risk is concerned, is surely a lucrative business. Insikt Group is one such resource, telling readers “Events over the last eighteen months indicate that the risk environment for submarine cables has very likely escalated, and the threat of state-sponsored malicious activity targeting submarine cable infrastructure is likely to rise further amid heightened geopolitical tensions.”
Note the inclusion of ‘likely’ in here. Twice.
It goes on to say, “Insikt Group’s assessment of the current risk
environment for submarine cables aligns with the findings of our 2023 assessment, which highlighted the convergence of geopolitical, physical, and cyber threats. Based on an analysis of 44 publicly reported cable damages occurring in 32 distinct groupings in 2024 and 2025 (Appendix A), Insikt Group assesses that three factors in the submarine cable ecosystem –– lack of redundancy in cable networks, lack of diversity of cable routes, and limited global repair capacity –– very likely increase the likelihood of significant outages from damages. Regions with low redundancy, such as parts of West and Central Africa, isolated Pacific islands, and certain secondary European routes, are more likely to suffer disproportionate impact from cable damage, especially when geopolitical tensions coincide with infrastructure constraints.” Therefore, the risk is still very low, if there at all. There may be no recorded incidents of malicious activity in Europe, but producing reports full of ‘likely’ and ‘might’ does pay the bills after all. There is the element of plausible deniability of course, and for that it’s time to introduce our new friends, the Shadow Fleet, and their younger brothers, the Grey Fleet and the Dark Fleet.
Submarine Cable Map 2026. Telegeography 2026 ©
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SEPTEMBER 2026 Volume 48 No.3
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