Six Habits of Merely Effective Negotiators
habitat conservation—did not result from common interests but because farmers, envi- ronmentalists, and the utility had different pri- orities. Similarly, when Egypt and Israel were negotiating over the Sinai, their positions on where to draw the boundary were incompati- ble. When negotiators went beyond the oppos- ing positions, however, they uncovered a vital difference of underlying interest and priority: the Israelis cared more about security, while the Egyptians cared more about sovereignty. The solution was a demilitarized zone under the Egyptian flag. Differences of interest or priority can open the door to unbundling dif- ferent elements and giving each party what it values the most—at the least cost to the other. Even when an issue seems purely economic, The campaign workers were paralyzed in the face of what they saw as sharply conflict- ing monetary interests and their pathetic BATNA. From their perspective, Moffett’s only choice was how to exploit their despera- tion at the prospect of losing the presidency. By contrast, dodging mistake 5, Perkins im- mediately grasped the importance of favor- ably shaping Moffett’s BATNA perceptions, both of the campaign’s (awful) no-deal op- tions and Moffett’s (powerful) one. Perkins looked beyond price, positions, and common ground (mistakes 2, 3, and 4) and used Mof- fett’s different interests to frame the photog- rapher’s choice as “the value of publicity and recognition.” Had he assumed this would be a standard, hardball price deal by offering a small amount to start, not only would this as- sumption have been dead wrong but, worse, it would have been self-fulfilling. Risky and ethically problematic? Yes…but Perkins saw his options as certain disaster versus some chance of avoiding it. And was Moffett really entitled to a $3 million wind- fall, avoidable had the campaign caught its oversight a week beforehand? Hard to say, but this historical footnote, which I’ve greatly embellished, illuminates the intersection of negotiating mistakes, tactics, and ethics. the negotiator’s central task: shape how your counterpart sees its problem such that it chooses what you want.
operative actions needed to create value and competitive ones needed to claim it. The pie must be both expanded and divided. Mistake 4 Searching Too Hard for Common Ground Conventional wisdom says we negotiate to overcome the differences that divide us. So, typically, we’re advised to find win-win agree- ments by searching for common ground. Com- mon ground is generally a good thing. Yet many of the most frequently overlooked sources of value in negotiation arise from dif- ferences among the parties. Recall the battle over the dam. The solu- tion—a smaller dam, water flow guarantees,
Solving Teddy Roosevelt’s Negotiation Problem Theodore Roosevelt, nearing the end of a hard-fought presidential election campaign in 1912, scheduled a final whistle-stop jour-
proached campaign manager George Per- kins, a former partner of J.P. Morgan. Perkins lost no time summoning his stenographer to dispatch the following cable to Moffett Stu- dios: “We are planning to distribute millions of pamphlets with Roosevelt’s picture on the cover. It will be great publicity for the studio whose photograph we use. How much will you pay us to use yours? Respond immedi- ately.” Shortly, Moffett replied: “We’ve never done this before, but under the circum- stances we’d be pleased to offer you $250.” Reportedly, Perkins accepted—without dick- ering for more. Perkins’s misleading approach raises ethi- cal yellow flags and is anything but a model negotiation on how to enhance working rela- tionships. Yet this case raises a very interest- ing question: why did the campaign workers find the prospect of this negotiation so diffi- cult? Their inability to see what Perkins im- mediately perceived flowed from their anx- ious obsession with their own side’s problem: their blunders so far, the high risk of losing the election, a potential $3 million exposure, an urgent deadline, and no cash to meet Moffett’s likely demands for something the campaign vitally needed. Had they avoided mistake 1 by pausing for a moment and thinking about howMoffett saw his problem, they would have realized that Moffett didn’t even know he had a problem. Perkins’s tacti- cal genius was to recognize the essence of
ney. At each stop, Roosevelt planned to clinch the crowd’s votes by distributing an elegant pamphlet with a stern presidential portrait on the cover and a stirring speech, “Confession of Faith,” inside. Some three million copies had been printed when a campaign worker noticed a small line under the photograph on each brochure that read, “Moffett Studios, Chicago.” Since Moffett held the copyright, the unauthorized use of the photo could cost the campaign one dol- lar per reproduction. With no time to re- print the brochure, what was the campaign to do? Not using the pamphlets at all would dam- age Roosevelt’s election prospects. Yet, if they went ahead, a scandal could easily erupt very close to the election, and the campaign could be liable for an unaffordable sum. Campaign workers quickly realized they would have to negotiate with Moffett. But re- search by their Chicago operatives turned up bad news: although early in his career as a photographer, Moffett had been taken with the potential of this new artistic medium, he had received little recognition. Now, Moffett was financially hard up and bitterly ap- proaching retirement with a single-minded focus on money. Dispirited, the campaign workers ap-
harvard business review • april 2001
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