The Berlin Pulse 2018/19

2018/19

47% 46%

believe the cohesion between EU member states has weakened 77% describe US -German relationstoday as somewhatbad or very bad 73%

Yes:

No:

Was EU enlargement in 2004 the right decision? Germans are divided

believe the UK should be treated like any non- EU member state 65%

are in favour of Germany increasing its defence spending 43%

say Germany should coordinate its refugee policy together with its European partners 78% 78% 74% German Foreign Policy in Perspective With Contributions by Kersti Kaljulaid, Filippo Grandi, Mateusz Morawiecki, Heiko Maas and others are in favour of sanctions for EU member states that violate fundamental EU valuessuch as the rule of law

agree that Germany and the EU are raising tariffs against the US

Involvement or Restraint? A representative survey on German attitudes to foreign policy commissioned by Körber Foundation

47% 46%

believe the cohesion between EU member states has weakened 77% describe US -German relationstoday as somewhatbad or very bad 73%

Yes:

No:

Was EU enlargement in 2004 the right decision? Germans are divided

believe the UK should be treated like any non- EU member state 65%

are in favour of Germany increasing its defence spending 43%

say Germany should coordinate its refugee policy together with its European partners 78% 78% 74% are in favour of sanctions for EU member states that violate fundamental EU valuessuch as the rule of law

agree that Germany and the EU are raising tariffs against the US

Involvement or Restraint? A representative survey on German attitudes to foreign policy commissioned by Körber Foundation

Dear Readers,

Welcome to the second edition of THE BERLIN PULSE ! At times of turmoil, when the rules-based international order is put into question and traditional alliances become weaker, the majority of Germans still do not favour a more active stance in foreign policy: 55 percent of Germans prefer restraint rather than Germany engaging more strongly in international crises. Apparently, the demands by leading politicians and think tanks for Germany to take on greater international respon­ sibility have not persuaded Germans to change their mind. THE BERLIN PULSE guides policy-makers and experts along the fine line between domestic constraints and international expectations. Political leaders such as the Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and the President of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid express their hopes and expectations for German foreign policy in 2019. Their perspectives meet the attitudes of the German public – sometimes they overlap, sometimes they clash. This year’s issue brings together data, analysis and different perspectives on the most pressing challenges for German foreign policy today and in the years to come – including some trends and outliers that may surprise you. With its new focus topic “The Value of Europe”, Körber Foundation is contribut- ing to the debate on the past, present, and future of the European project and is paying special attention to the question of how a new split along the former “Iron Curtain” can be avoided. We are witnessing a growing internal division in the European Union: 77 percent of Germans believe the cohesion between EU member states has recently weakened. A striking 46 percent of Germans believe the EU ’s Eastern enlargement in 2004 was not the right decision. At a time when the transatlantic relationship is going through turbulent times, three out of four Germans describe US -German relations as “somewhat bad” or “very bad” and favour a more independent foreign policy from the US . However, this alienation is not mirrored in the US : even if they consider Germany not a very important partner, 70 percent of Americans believe the relationship between the US and Germany is somewhat good or very good. We thank our transatlantic partners from the Pew Research Center for fielding joint questions on the trans­ atlanticrelationship in the US together with us. The results of the representative survey commissioned by Körber Foundation in September 2018 should enrich the conversation about German foreign policy during and beyond the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum, which we are proud to host together with the German Federal Foreign Office. “Talk to each other rather than about each other” – the motto of our founder Kurt A. Körber continues to guide Körber Foundation’s activities today. I hope you enjoy reading.

Thomas Paulsen Member of the Executive Board, Körber-Stiftung

Thomas Paulsen November 2018

4

Content

6

Leaving the Comfort Zone? Editorial by JULIA HARRER

The Value of Europe

8

10 “Our aim is to strengthen cohesion” The German Foreign Minister about Germany’s role in Europe and beyond WITH HEIKO MAAS 13 East-West Divide in Europe? Perspectives from France, Poland and Germany WITH SYLVIE KAUFFMANN, MAREK CICHOCKI AND MICHAEL LINK

16 “I do not see the risk”

Why concerns about reforms in Poland are ungrounded WITH MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI

10

41

20 Political Earthquake Ahead About the rise of populism and authoritarianism in Europe WITH YASCHA MOUNK 22 How Migration is Seen by the “silent majority” The Czech Prime Minister about the future of Europe WITH ANDREJ BABIŠ 24 In Different Leagues What Brexit means for defence and security in Europe BY ALAN MENDOZA & JAMES ROGERS 28 The Most Complex Conflict The UN Special Envoy about the conflict in Syria WITH STAFFAN DE MISTURA 30 “The EU should deliver on its promises” Turkey’s role in migration and security in the Middle East WITH Mevlüt ÇAVUŞOĞLU 32 Can the EU Buy its Way Back into Syria? In cooperation with the International Crisis Group BY JOOST HILTERMANN A Neighbourhood in Turmoil

13

5

33 SUPPLEMENT : Involvement or Restraint? Results of Körber Foundation’s representative survey on German attitudes to foreign policy 41 “The dismissive attitude towards Africa is the problem” How Europe could reduce migration from Africa more effectively WITH HANNA TETTEH 44 African Countries in Transition In cooperation with Eurasia Group BY TOCHI ENI-KALU 45 Germany as a Model? How to share responsibility for migrants and refugees worldwide WITH FILIPPO GRANDI 50 Who Will Be Better Off? The role of the US , China and the EU in the global trade system WITH RYAN HASS AND JIANZHANG LUAN 52 Transatlantic Vox Pop About the state of US -German relations – in cooperation with Pew Research Center 54 Creating a Better Global Trade System What states should do to benefit from trade in the digital era BY CHRISTINE LAGARDE 57 Digital Frontrunner How Estonia transformed into a digital state and is preparing for AI BY KERSTI KALJULAID 60 Multilateralism in Crisis Four questions about multilateralism to the President of the Paris Peace Forum WITH JUSTIN VAÏSSE 62 So German … Four foreign policy moments that are “typically German” 64 Berlin Foreign Policy Forum About our annual gathering in Berlin The Future of Multilateralism

33

Supplement

Representative survey: German attitudes to foreign policy

45

57

48

6

Editorial

Leaving the Comfort Zone? While Germany prepares for the UN Security Council, the majority of Germans continue to prefer restraint in foreign policy

H as Germany really done enough to end the war in Syria? Was EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 the right decision? And is China’s growing influence positive or negative? Half of the German population answers: “Yes!” The other half determinedly says: “No!” The results of Körber Foundation’s most recent representative survey on Germans’ foreign policy attitudes demonstrate that the German public is divided about certain foreign policy issues. At the same time, our numbers demonstrate that the majority of German citizens are strongly interested in foreign policy and want Germany to stand up for European values. Even though almost two thirds of German citizens think that the European Union is not on the right track, Germans strongly believe in the value of Europe: preserving peace and securing freedom of expression, the rule of law and democ­ racyis what the majority of Germans regard as the EU ’s most important achievements. This might be one of the reasons why three quarters of them expect their country to work towards sanc­ tioning EU member states that do not respect those fundamental values, for instance by cutting financialresources that these states receive from the

about “strict” Germans who love rules and regula- tions. Germany “has a certain tendency” to be a moraliser, as Polishresearcher Marek Cichocki told THE BERLIN PULSE . However, the result could also be an encouraging sign that the majority of Germansare willing to defend a value-based system, especially at times when political polarisation is widening at home and abroad. Since 2014, the “Munich Consensus” on Germany’s responsibility to take on a more active international role has defined the discourse and rhetoric of policy-makers and experts in Berlin. Four years later, however, the German public still does not seem to be convinced. Körber Foundation’s polls measure the German perspective on the question of involvement or restraint since 2014, and, over the years, our records do not display any change in mentality: while 41 percent of Germans believe their country should become more strongly involved in international crises (and 52 percent among 18- to 34-year-olds), 55 percent continue to prefer restraint (43 percent among 18- to 34-year-olds). Considering the country’s past after the Second World War, it took Germany a long time to regain confidence in its international role. The question about involvement or restraint will hence stay with us. In an increasingly volatile international environ-

EU budget. It might feed well into the stereotype

Editorial

7

International responsibility: Should Germany become more strongly involved in international crises?

55% 52%

41% 43%

2018

Restraint

Become more strongly involved

2017

2018: don’t know 3%, no answer provided 1% | 2017: don’t know 3%, no answer provided 2%

lateralism” and the rules-based international order. While Germany prepares for its non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2019/2020, the majority of Germans do not seem ready to leave the comfort zone. Yet, Germany will be asked to react quickly to international crises and deliver on the promises it made to take on more inter­ national responsibility. For German policy-makers, the balancing act between international expec­ tations and explaining its decisions on the ever-cautious home front will be an even greater

ment, the message that Europe needs to take its fate into its own hands (Angela Merkel) seems to have resonated at least in some regards: the number of Germans who think that Germany should increase its defence spending has grown from 32 percent in 2017 to 43 percent in 2018. This is a significant shift, also against the backdrop of the US ’ continuous pressure on its NATO ally. Despite tensions within the common alliance, two thirds of the German public have a “somewhat positive” or “very positive” view of NATO . At the same time, from the German perspective, the transatlantic relationship is in bad shape: taken together, 73 percent of Germans describe relations with the US as “somewhat bad” or “very bad” (compared to 56 percent in 2017), and almost half of the German population believes Germany should cooperate less with the US – a cold breeze is blowing over the Atlantic. In contrast, according to results of the Pew Research Center, seven out of ten Americans consider the relationship as somewhat/very good. Furthermore, only 38 percent of Germans think that having close relations with the US is more important than having a close relationship with Russia (32 percent). Germany’s Foreign Minister told THE BERLIN PULSE that he stands ready to “defend multi­

challenge.

Julia Harrer Editor THE BERLIN PULSE

The Value of Europe

A blue carpet with yellow stars covers the stairs leading to the Konzerthaus, Berlin.

The Value of Europe

9

9 

M onths ahead of Brexit and the elections to the European Parliament, 63 percent of Germans do not think that the European Union is on the right track. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, on the contrary, argues, “the recent decisions in Brussels regarding internal and external security issues, economic and financial governance, and migration and border protection illustrate that we are on the right track”. Germans expect Eurosceptic parties to significantly increase their number of seats in the European Parliament, and Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš announces: The elections will show how migration is seen by a “silent majority”. Once the UK leaves the EU , the two partners will have to redefine their relation­ ship, for example in the context of defence and security policy: “The UK – like the US – is likely to lose patience with Germany if additional defence spending increases are not forthcoming”, claim Alan Mendoza and James Rogers (both Henry Jackson Society). While uncertainty around the Brexit deal remains, internal divisions thrive within the EU : is there still a common understanding of what constitutes the value of Europe? Political scientist Yascha Mounk from Harvard University argues:“We need to show that we are willing to fight for the re-implementation of our values.” The French journalist Sylvie Kauffmann, the Polish researcher Marek Cichocki and the German politician Michael Link discuss the issue of whether there is an increasing East-West divide within Europe. While Mateusz Morawiecki, Prime Minister of Poland, expects Germany to think more about how to align developments in Central European countries with Western European levels, half of the German population thinks that EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 was the wrong decision.

The EU is often credited with the following achievements. Which is the most important to you?

Preserving peace between the countries in Europe 47%

35%

8%

7%

Securing values such as free- dom of expression, the rule of law and democracy

Increasing prosperity through the single market

Personal benefits such as freedom of travel

don’t know 1%, no answer provided 1%

10

The Value of Europe

“Our aim is to strengthen cohesion”Interview with Heiko Maas, German Foreign Minister

Körber-Stiftung: Foreign Minister, why do you think that “EuropeUnited” is the answer to “America First”? Maas: “Europe United” is, to my mind, our best response to a dramatically changing strategic and geopolitical environment. The global order is faltering and old and new powers like China and Russia are challenging the foundations of the global and regional security architecture. Moreover, the US Government under President Trump is develop- ing an approach that combines withdrawal from international agreements with a policy of maximum pressure vis-à-vis friends and foes alike. In this new strategic context, “Europe United” is and remains the overarching aim of our foreign policy. We want to build a strong, sovereign Europe based on the rule of law and respect for the weak, and in the firm belief that international coopera­ tion is not a zero-sum game. Our influence on global issues like climate change, free and fair trade, migration, crisis management and the social impact of globalisation will increase significantly if we act with the combined forces of 500 million Euro­ peans. Körber-Stiftung: What are the main reasons behind the recent drop in approval ratings for the EU in many member states?

Heiko maas Foreign Minister of Germany

Maas: Since 2008, the EU has been more or less in constant crisis mode, beginning with the bank- ruptcy of Lehman Brothers 10 years ago, which led to a deep economic and financial crisis in Europe and beyond. The terrorist attacks that hit many European societies as well as the migration crisis in 2015/16 also gave rise to a general feeling of inse­ curity. This accumulation of crises together with the repercussions of globalisation and the rapid spread of digital technology resulted in an eroding of trust in political and economic elites within our societies.This happened at both the national and

The Value of Europe

11

Is the EU on the right track?

63% 59%

32%

2018

No

Yes

36%

2017

2018: don’t know 4%, no answer provided 1% 2017: don’t know 5%

the EU level. I think that the EU and its member states should take these grievances very seriously. The recent decisions in Brussels regarding internal and external security issues, economic and financial governance, and migration and border protec- tion illustrate that we are on the right track. Körber-Stiftung: Certain governments in Europe no longer seem to share or even disregard fundamental EU values. Are sanctions a useful option in these cases? How could these partners be persuaded to return to European values? Maas: In the EU , some national governments have different interpretations of European norms and values due to their specific history and experiences. We have to manage these differences, but at the same time, we have to protect and preserve the core of our common values and convictions. I believe that our values are indeed an essential part of the European identity. But this is not an issue between Germany and the countries concerned. It is a European issue that is currently being discussed in a constructive manner – in the European Parliament as well as in the Commission and the Council. It is within these institutions that we should try to find European answers. We must not forget that the European idea was always the antithesis to totali­ tarian ideas. The European Communities helped to

resurrect Europe after the Second World War, and the EU was a crucial factor behind reuniting the continent after 1990. The EU is attractive because it is not just an economic project. It is, first and foremost, about democracy, the rule of law and freedom. Körber-Stiftung: The German-Polish Barometer found that 39% of Poles – the largest group of respondents – considered Germany to be too dominant and not demonstrating enough willingness to compromise at the EU level. What is your response to this perception? Maas: I take it seriously. Germany would be well advised to take a close look at such criticism. Fortunately, the German-Polish Barometer also revealed that 64% of Poles consider relations with Germany to be good or very good, and 74% would favour even closer cooperation with Germany. Our aim is to strengthen cohesion within the Union. We are constantly seeking to consult and reach out to all our partners, such as with France and Poland bilaterally and in the Weimar Triangle. Further- more, we consider our special dialogue formats with the Baltic and Nordic countries to be particularly valuable. My experience is that these exchanges help a great deal to prepare the ground for political compromises at the European level.

12

The Value of Europe

forward in many fields and have reached a con­ sensus that internal and external security are areas in which the EU could deliver much more. In this regard, 25 countries have recently agreed on Permanent Structured Cooperation ( PESCO ), which is an important step forward. The financial and social union should also be a priority. European citizens need to feel that the EU has a positive impact on their daily lives. However, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for all policy fields. In order to achieve and preserve unity, we have to find the right mix of inclusiveness and flexibility. Not all countries are part of the Eurozone or Schengen area. We also have to discuss the extent to which majority voting in some aspects of foreign and security policy will improve our capacity to act. Körber-Stiftung: How can the necessary level of European unity be achieved so that Europe can help shape the changing international order? Which political projects are paramount and what role does Germany play in this process? Maas: Multilateralism is part of the EU ’s DNA . Therefore, we have a very strong interest in a rules-based international order. Europe has to be a strong pillar within the international system, not only to defend its interests, but also to stabilise this system. In this context, we will seize the opportunity of our membership of the UN Security Council in 2019/20 to strengthen Europe’s voice and its capacity to act within the UN . We will support the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to implement his ambitious reforms. Together with our European partners, we will work to put the security implications of climate change onto the Security Council agenda. Moreover, we will seek to strength- en the UN ’s capacities in the field of crisis preven- tion. Beyond the EU and the UN , we have to do more to support and enhance the global multilateral order. We are therefore striving for a multilateral alliance, a network of partners who, like us, are committed to international cooperation and the rule of law. It is not enough just to complain. We have to defend and fight for multilateralism.

Should Germany cooperate less or more with each of these countries in the future?

Cooperate more Cooperate less

82% 90%

France

6%

3%

Russia

69% 78%

23%

16%

China

67%

19%

22%

69%

Britain

55% 61%

34%

30%

US

47%

41%

34%

56%

2018 2017

Körber-Stiftung: Within the EU, different ideas exist about how far and how swiftly European integration should progress. Maas: Competing concepts have existed from the outset of the European integration project. We are all European countries with our own idiosyn­ crasies and our own unique histories. At the same time, we have a common destiny, and it is our common responsibility to shape this future in the best possible way. This will not work with purely national positions or bureaucratic orthodoxy. We need to adopt a positive stance on Europe and we need courage and creativity. We are moving

The Value of Europe

13

East-West Divide in Europe? A discussion between the French journalist Sylvie Kauffmann (Le Monde), the Polish researcher Marek Cichocki and Michael Link, Member of the German Parliament

Körber-Stiftung: According to the German- Polishbarometer, the majority of both Germans and Poles want more European integration. Is there no East-West divide in Europe, after all? Link: I do not think the divisions depend on geog­ raphy, but on differences in values and political views. This makes me hopeful, because it implies we can influence political debates and processes. That is also why it is so important which political family wins the European elections next year. Kauffmann: I agree. We have grown accustomed to this schematic dividing line of “populists in Central Europe and liberal democracy in the West”, but today, populist and nationalist movements exist across the EU . Körber-Stiftung: Mr Cichocki, most Germans think Poland contributes to an increase in tensions in Europe and is not a reliable partner. Cichocki: Germans have had a critical attitude towards Poland for many years. Poles do not always agree with German policies, but they tend to view German society positively. However, I also think it is outdated to focus on an East-West divide. The main challenge for Europe are rising inequal­ ities between regions and within societies. The biggest hope related to European integration was that it would reduce inequalities. Today, it rather

Michael Link Spokesperson, European Affairs, Free Democratic Party (FDP) Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag

seems as if socio-economic conditions or political views are growing further apart. Körber-Stiftung: Ms Kauffmann, why do these different perceptions surface now? Kauffmann: The big enlargement of 2004 is now 15 years old, so we are witnessing a crisis in the expansion of the EU . The migrant crisis has revealed

14

The Value of Europe

that we underestimated the dimensions of enlarge- ment. For instance, with regard to the relationship to the concept of the nation, the founding members wanted the EU to move beyond the nation-state due to our war-ridden history. Central European member states on the contrary aspired to reconnect with their national identity after 1989. How should we deal with this? Körber-Stiftung: Mr Link, will the Commission’s proposal to make EU funds conditional on the respect for the rule of law strengthen the adher- ence to fundamental values, or will it deepen divisions? Link: We should never question that Poland and other countries are entitled to these funds. On the other hand, we need to insist on the respect for fundamental European values. Maybe the actual disbursement of these funds could be withheld as long as there are pending fundamental rights cases with the European Commission. This would of course have to apply to every member instead of singling out individual governments. Körber-Stiftung: Mr Cichocki, is Germany a moraliser?

Cichocki: I do not want to generalise, but there is a certain tendency. Link: Maybe one of the biggest mistakes of Ms Merkel is that unlike Helmut Kohl and Hans- Dietrich Genscher, she has never really managed to put herself in the shoes of our neighbours. Having said that, I expect our neighbours to also put themselves in our shoes. Statements by the current Polish government about reparations towards Germany are simply not helpful. We need to respect the standpoint of others and be ready for compromise. Cichocki: I understand the arguments against reparations. However, a majority of Polish people believes neighbouring countries do not sufficiently acknowledge what their country experienced especially in the Second World War. We cannot ignore this. I agree entirely with what Mr Link said on European integration. Still, I think we should organise EU decision-making within its traditional institutional framework again. Recently, informal crisis management has been predominant. Especiallyfor member states in this region, it is worrisome if two political leaders meet somewhere

Marek Cichocki Programme Director, Natolin European Centre, College of Europe

Sylvie Kauffmann Editorial Director and Columnist, Le Monde

The Value of Europe

15

and pre-determine what the right direction is on issues that affect vital national interests before all member states meet to discuss. Körber-Stiftung: Ms Kauffmann, does the Franco-German tandem contribute to fragmen­ tation? Kauffmann: The Franco-German tandem is part of the solution, but we definitely lost momentum due to those endless coalition talks after the Germanelection [looks at Michael Link and laughs] . If we want to develop a common defence and security policy, France and Germany have to find a common strategic vision. However, there is resist­ ance from other members. Europe is atomised when we should be more united than ever. Körber-Stiftung: Should France try harder to strengthen ties with countries like Poland? Kauffmann: Of course! But what is Poland’s outlook on foreign policy? For understandable reasons, Poland always had very close relations with the US . However, US President Trump is funda­ mentally changing the equation. This also affects Poland’s relations with its European partners: can we find a common position towards the US ? Link: We are sitting here in the Weimar format. This is a format of equals, and it is crucial for the EU . There are obvious differences between the three governments, but we need each other. Otherwise, extreme right wing parties like the AfD or Le Pen’s Rassemblement National will continue to grow. Körber-Stiftung: Mr Cichocki, do you see potential in the Weimar Triangle? Cichocki: The potential depends on whether the three countries are ready to talk with each other as equals, as Michael Link said. In principle, it is a good idea to bring these countries together. However, while it was always clear that Germany and Poland wanted each other to be partners, France has always had a different approach to enlargement and to Central Europe. Therefore, the future of the triangle depends on the future of Polish-French relations. It also depends on whether the other countries acknowledge that Poland is not only a recipient of

Has cohesion between the EU member states recently ...

77% tended to weaken

5%

tended to strengthen

16%

basically remained the same

don’t know 1%, no answer provided 1%

benefits from European integration, but also con­ tributes to it, for example in terms of security at the Eastern border. This is often rejected because of our attitude to migration policy. We will not always do what others expect, but solidarity should imply that they recognize the contribution nonetheless. Kauffmann: It is important to show that the Weimar Triangle can work as one of many formats within the EU . Working in smaller groups should not raise suspicion or the feeling of exclusion. If we try to do everything among the 27, it will be a showcase for paralysis. Link: Maybe we Germans and French also need to understand the concerns of non-Eurozone countries. On the other hand, Poland needs to accept that a multi-speed Europe already exists. We need a more united Europe, otherwise we will be even more vulnerable and exposed to increasingly authoritar- ian powers like China, Russia and others – especially during the tenure of an increasingly unpredictable US President. The interview was conducted during the Bergedorf Round Table in June 2018 in Warsaw.

16

The Value of Europe

“I do not see the risk” Mateusz Morawiecki, Prime Minister of Poland, explains why concerns about reforms in Poland are ungrounded

Körber-Stiftung: Prime Minister Morawiecki, why do the Poles have a more favourable view of the EU than all other EU citizens? Morawiecki: Poland was part of the Soviet sphere of influence, but Europe was our promised land. Therefore, we wanted to be a part of the European Union. Many Poles migrated to Western Europe during the darkest days of communism, which has left scars. Körber-Stiftung: Does the past nourish the Poles’ pro-European attitudes more than the present? Morawiecki: Both play a significant role. We are a part of Europe and we have always felt a part of it. Körber-Stiftung: Why, of all member states, is Poland then the first-ever country to face an infringement procedure under Article 7 of the Treaty of the EU ? Morawiecki: These are two different aspects. Europe is the symbol of our aspirations, but at the same time, we have to rebuild the post-communist society. We never underwent a deep vetting process of our judiciary system 1990, as happened in Germany for example. Berlin kept after very few of its judges and prosecutors. In Poland, the commun­ ist apparatchiks remained in charge for many years, and this should have been changed a long

Mateusz Morawiecki Prime Minister of Poland

time ago. This is why I believe we will manage to explain to the European Commission that our reforms will not make our judicial system less independent or less objective. Körber-Stiftung: Is the infringement procedure merely a misunderstanding between Poland and the EU Commission about the importance of Article 2? Morawiecki: Fighting for democracy and freedom has been Poland’s motto for centuries. Therefore, we are aware of the importance of Article 2. Some people try to call our judicial reform a risk to

The Value of Europe

17

Morawiecki: There are no particular fields where we would like to see less integration, as long as there is no intrusion into necessary domestic reforms. Can EU officials from Brussels properly judge what is best for the Polish judiciary system? I would look forward to more integration in 70% of the areas and less misunderstanding in 30% of the areas by 2030. Körber-Stiftung: In contrast, what is your dystopian vision for the EU ? Morawiecki: We still have a very dangerous Eastern neighbour. Russia is trying to disintegrate the EU by stirring uneasiness and anxieties in European societies. We must address this threat, for example by avoiding a divide of NATO . I would also be worried if we allowed a disintegration of the European single market, which has made our companies so much more efficient and effective. Finally, I am also concerned about a future with increasing misunderstandings between European societies. We should try to understand each other better, Germans and Poles, the French, the British.

the rule of law, but I do not see the risk. I am convinced that the reformed judiciary system will provide more justice, more objectivity, and more transparency. Körber-Stiftung: Let us turn to the future of the EU . If the EU were pefect in 2030, what would it be like? Morawiecki: The perfect EU would contain a fully implemented single market, where the freedom of movement applies not only to goods, people and capital, but also to services. There would be more convergence with respect to wealth and income across countries, and stronger cohesion. In other words, Central Europe would have caught up with Western Europe. And the perfect EU would be proud of a strong common defence system that is integrated into NATO . Körber-Stiftung: In one sentence: deeper integration in economic governance and defence? Morawiecki: Absolutely. Körber-Stiftung: Which fields should be less integrated?

Was EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 the right decision?

47%

46%

Yes

No

don’t know 6%, no answer provided 1%

18

The Value of Europe

Körber-Stiftung: What do you expect from Germany in order to realise your vision of the EU ? Morawiecki: I would envision that Germany thinks more about how to align development in the CEE countries with Western European levels. Secondly, I would expect Germany to take a leading role in solving the issue of global monopolies and tax havens. Tax havens can be challenged if strong countries,such as France and Germany, back the efforts. If we do not act, European societies will continuously be deprived of funds, which they deserve. Körber-Stiftung: Are there aspects of German policy that contribute to a negative trajectory for the EU ’s future? Morawiecki: I think Germany plays a very positive role in terms of fiscal and financial discipline as well as the proliferation of policies that spread economic development evenly across various sectors. This should be continued and enhanced in the future. The interview was conducted in February 2018.

Lets’s learn from Brexit what can happen if citizens are not being heard. Körber-Stiftung: Is the increasing East-West divide part of a European dystopia? Morawiecki: It is not only between East and West. I notice more and more misunderstandings between the North and the South. There is this very efficient German or Scandinavian model of the economy, which we try to emulate, while the economic outlook in Greece, Portugal or Spain is not as inspiring. There are different interest groups, and we have to be aware of them. Körber-Stiftung: Would you approve if some EU countries were more closely integrated with each other than others? Morawiecki: I’m not concerned by this Two-Speed- Europe vocabulary. There are so many different dimensions in which we need to work together. We need to find platforms for cooperation for each one of them. Poland, together with our European partners, for example managed to build PESCO . I would suggest looking towards the future, instead of focussing the discussion on things that divide us.

Körber PULSE : Europe’s Outlook for 2019

› The Good, the Bad & the Ugly: With the elections to the European Parliament ( EP ) looming, EU politics faces a major shake-up. Populist anti-European parties gear up for the vote – and are poised to score a strong showing. An increased populist presence in the EP may not only be seen as a verdict on the EU “as we know it”, but will also pose obstacles to the formation of a new commission. › The English Patient: Exiting the EU will leave Britain worse off – on a spectrum from unpleasant to catastrophic. On its part, the EU will have to deal with a new internal balance. With “Brexit Day” only weeks before the EP elections, pro-European forces should have their counter-narratives ready to prevent pictures of celebrating Brexiteers from playing into the hands of continental populists. › Once Upon a Time in the West: As NATO turns 70, all eyes will be on the transatlantic partnership – or what is left of it. Trump’s “We’re the schmucks paying for the whole thing” argument may be distressing to European ears, but Europeans must keep the US on board and fulfill their pledges to NATO . A display of Western unity would be a welcome birthday gift for an alliance in crisis.

Nora Müller Executive Director International Affairs, Körber-Stiftung

The Value of Europe

19

German-Polish Barometer

52%

of Germans and 62% of Poles think that relations with their neighbour should focus more on cooperation than on defending national interests.

39%

of Poles think that Germany tends to dominate the EU and that it should be more prepared to accept compromises. A similar view is held by 13% of German respondents;

33% of Germans want their country to become more dominant in Europe.

43%

of Poles think that Germany always or often treats Poland as an equal partner in the EU . However, an equally large number of Poles believe that this is rarely or never the case. Many Germans have a similar opinion:

45% believe that relations between the two countries rarely or never resemble those of equal partners.

26% of Germans and

15% of Polish respondents consider that populist movements pose a threat to democracy and the rule of law and are a challenge to the EU .

The “German-Polish Barometer” 2018 is a project carried out by Körber Foundation, the Institute of Public Affairs and the Warsaw Office of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. It regularly collects and publishes the opinions of Poles and Germans about the condition of Polish-German relations and about the challenges the two countries face.

20

The Value of Europe

Political Earthquake Ahead Yascha Mounk, author of “The People vs Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It”, about the rise of populism and authoritarianism in Europe

Second, European Parliament elections tend to have relatively low turnout, which means that people with more extreme political views and who are perhaps more motivated can outperform the fundamentals. Since the European Parliament still has a lot less power than national governments, this is not the thing to be most worried about. For the future of Europe, it is much more concerning if populist forces should take over governments in a number of national capitals over the next year or two. Because what we have seen in countries like Poland and Hungary is that once the government is elected, it is able to corrupt the other state institutions so much that it becomes essentially impossible to replace it by democratic means. The established parties need to show how we can radically reform some of the existing institutions while staying true to our values. This is not a matter of giving up on our values because somehow the populists have shown that they are inadequate. Our values are absolutely right; the reality does not conform to them as much as it could and we need to show that we are willing to fight for the re-imple- mentation of our values. Körber-Stiftung: In your book, you argue that Hungary is no longer a democracy

Yascha Mounk Lecturer on Government, Harvard University

Körber-Stiftung: Mr Mounk, are you concerned that the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019 will be the next occasion for populist parties to score a major victory? Mounk: A political earthquake in those elections is possible. It is likely that populist parties will do very well. First, they are currently very strong in opinion polls at the national level across Europe.

The Value of Europe

21

Poland and Hungary are being criticised for violating fundamental EU values such as the rule of law. Should Germany work to ensure that such EU member states are sanc- tioned, for example, by cutting the financial resources they receive from the EU budget?

74%

22% No

Yes

don’t know 3%, no answer provided 1%

and Poland is on the path to becoming undemo- cratic. Mounk: The EU now faces an existential threat from Poland and Hungary. Now that populist parties have managed to win there, they have been able to make vast changes that have done real institu- tional damage. If countries like Poland and Hungary continue their descent into authoritarianism and no longer respect the most basic liberal democratic rules and norms, I do not think they can be mem- bers of the EU . Otherwise, any pretence the EU has of standing for democratic values and trying to ensure peace in Europe is frankly a transparent sham. If we do not manage to act quickly, we can kiss goodbye to the EU as we know it. Either we put real pressure on Poland and Hungary and – with a little bit of luck – the oppo­ sition in Poland wins in the next elections, and perhaps there is enough of a popular movement to somehow oust Victor Orbán in Hungary or the membership of those countries in the EU will become untenable. But rather than asking what is so different about Poland and Hungary, we should see it is as a warning sign about what may be to come in other European countries as well. Körber-Stiftung: Could the EU have prevented the rise in populism and authoritarianism?

Mounk: I do not think that there is anything the EU could have done to stop this. Although it could have made it harder for these aspiring dictators to make fun of Brussels by paying closer attention to those European commissioners that pretend to act seriously, while continuing to cash in vast amounts of structural funds that boost their natio­ nal popularity. The EU has been feckless in the face of all of this and has failed its most fundamental values in a way for which the European Commission will be judged for decades to come. Körber-Stiftung: In the context of the Eurozone and debt crisis, populist parties argued that the EU was a tool of German dominance. Do you agree? Mounk: I don’t think that Germany takes any particular pleasure in dominating within Europe. Of course, a set of northern European countries were reluctant to bail out Greece in a more radical way. It was not just Germany. This is due to the underlying structure of the single currency zone. Without a major structural reform, which is not going to happen any time soon, the underlying dynamics are going to keep delivering the same results. This causes a lot of political resentment – not a sustainable state of affairs.

22

The Value of Europe

HowMigration is Seen by the “silent majority” Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš about the future of the EU and its role in tackling migration

the natural borders of Europe, and will be protected effectively by its own naval borders – as in the Gaulish village of Asterix and Obelix, where citizens can travel, work, trade and provide services freely. These four freedoms are not reality in the EU today. We do not need more European integration; we need strong positions of the member states and a de-politicized European Commission. Körber-Stiftung: There seems to be disagree- ment between Eastern and Western Europe about these reforms. Babiš: The significant difference is that some EU countries consider illegal migration as normal. I cannot agree with that. The EU member states should decide for themselves who works and lives in the EU . Neither the EU Commission nor the member states should be able to take that decision for us. The reason why we say we are not going to accept refugees is that the EU does not have a clear strategy. It is not clear who should hold talks. We need to conclude agreements with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Looking at all the prob- lems the EU faces, we need to be united in the EU – pull together, demonstrate strength and defend ourselves. We need a strategy. Körber-Stiftung: What is Germany’s role in this?

Andrej Babiš Prime Minister of the Czech Republic

Körber-Stiftung: Prime Minister Babiš, you regularly stress the importance of the EU return- ing to its foundations and upholding its own standards. What does this mean? Babiš: Europe must have a vision for the future. First, we must define the shape of the EU , especially the Schengen area by integrating Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia and setting up a strategy for the West Balkans. Then the Schengen area will match

The Value of Europe

23

Babiš: Germany is Europe’s economic super-power and its role is essential. Together, we need to find funds in the EU budget to solve the problems associated with immigration. More than anything, we need a clear scheme to fight and stop people smugglers. The European operation “ SOPHIA ”, which targets networks of people smugglers, is great as a project, but it remains limited. The main problem is Libya. Körber-Stiftung: What is the worst possible scenario for the EU and the Czech Republic in 2030? Babiš: The worst scenario is that more countries than just Britain will leave the EU . I am very disappointed about Brexit. It is crucial that we defend our beliefs. Our people are concerned about multi-cultural societies. The opinion on migration is shifting across Europe. The European elec-

The elections to the European Parliament will take place in May 2019. Do you think that Eurosceptic parties will make significant gains at the elections?

71%

24% No

Yes

don’t know 4%, no answer provided 1%

tions next year will demonstrate how migration is seen by the “silent majority”.

24

The Value of Europe

In Different Leagues EU - UK defence relations: how the UK strives to maintain a balance of power in Europe after Brexit, and what Germany can do

Alan Mendoza Founder and Executive Director, Henry Jackson Society

James Rogers   Director, Global Britain Programme, Henry Jackson Society

© private

© Henry Jackson Society

W hen comparing the UK and EU as strategic actors, the two powers sit very much in different leagues. One is a nuclear-armed state, which is rapidly regenerating its naval strike capability in the form of two vast aircraft carriers, armed with fifth-generation stealth combat jets. The other is an international organisation, without any recourse to military instruments of its own. Indeed, the UK is by some margin the leading military power in Europe. It has the largest military budget in NATO after the US ; a navy with a gross tonnage that exceeds the navies of France and Germany combined; intelligence-gathering capa­ bilities unmatched in Europe; and a strategic culture unrivalled by any European country, with the partial exception of France. The UK also guards the entrances and exits of the Mediterranean Sea, with its military bases in Gibraltar and Cyprus, and is the only European country to maintain a truly global military presence. As the UK leaves the EU , these fundamental strategic facts will not change. British geostrategic objectives in Europe will also remain constant: to maintain a balance of power that favours a liberal Europe.

In supporting this, the UK has maintained an unbroken military presence on the continent since the end of the Second World War. With 5,000 troops in Germany, 850 in Estonia, 150 in Poland and RAF jet fighters periodically deployed to Romania, Lithuania and Iceland, it has more troops deployed in other NATO countries than any other ally, with the exception of the US . Also, unlike France, which is not part of NATO ’s nuclear planning group, the UK devotes its nuclear deterrent to cover the whole of NATO ‘in all instances’. Consequently, for the UK , NATO remains sacrosanct as the underwriter of European geopoli­ tics, and the general European peace. As such, the EU remains secondary in a wider Atlantic order created and underpinned by British and American strategic power. Many European countries seem convinced that they should develop EU “sover­ eignty” or “autonomy”, through what has been described by European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, as “defence union”. However, without really substantial increases in European defence spending, this aim seems unrealisable. After many years of military cuts, France lacks the resources – its defence budget is comparable to

The Value of Europe

25

Germany’s, despite operating nuclear weapons – and Germany lacks the full spectrum of military capa- bilities, as well as the political will to use them either actively (intervention) or passively (dissua- sion). This means Europeans will need to cooperate more with the UK if they are to retain existing military assets, let alone generate new ones. But Britishconcerns about the direction of the “defence union” potentially undermining NATO may make such partnerships difficult. Consequently, structures external to the EU but encompassing EU states may prove to be more fruitful avenues for UK -European defence cooper­ ation, such as the French President Emmanuel Macron’s Intervention Initiative and the UK -French Combined Expeditionary Force. Some countries in these initiatives are closer to sharing Britain’s more active strategic culture, which the EU lacks collectively. In the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the UK decided to withdraw the remainder of its military presence in Germany by 2020. Given Russia’s revisionist aggression, this decision has now been reversed: British troops will remain in Ger­ many. This renewed British strategic commitment forms the basis for potential cooperation between London and Berlin, particularly in relation to shared interests in keeping Russia at bay along the eastern flank of NATO . However, the UK – like the US – is likely to lose patience with Germany if additional defence spending increases are not forthcoming, not least because Berlin has previously committed to raising

How should the EU shape its future relationship with Britain after Brexit?

31% Britain should remain a privileged and special partner of the EU

65% Britain should be treated no differently from any other non- EU member state

don’t know 3%, no answer provided 1%

its defence spending levels towards 2% of GDP by 2024. A dim view will be taken if Europe’s economic powerhouse does not pull its weight, particularly when poorer European allies – like the Baltic states, Romania and Poland – have already managed to contribute at the agreed level. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that, in the event of antagonism between the EU and UK , the UK may grow increasingly hostile to any form of European strategic cooperation. This is an issue that the EU and European states must consider carefully. For Europeans, this issue may become increasingly important if the US grows tired of the unwillingness of many European countries to pull their weight, or chooses to focus more on East Asia. Old friends may therefore yet prove to be the best friends.

The challenges raised by Brexit have brought home to everyone the importance and benefits of the EU , particularly the Single Market – our ‘Heimatmarkt’. Given today's uncertain, changing world, it has shown us – once again – just how important it is to stick together, rather than to go off on one's own.

Michel Barnier Chief Negotiator, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom under Article 50 TEU

© Körber-Stiftung/Marc Darchinger

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