minority non-attackers might reach social consensus to reject blocks proposed by the malicious majority attacker, reducing the attacker’s ability to engage in malicious activity, but there can be no assurance this would happen or that non-attackers would be able to coordinate effectively. • “>66% attack” where, if a validator or group of validators acting in concert were to gain control of more than 66% of the total staked SUI on the Sui Network, a malicious actor could permanently and irreversibly manipulate the Sui Network, including censorship, double-spending and fraudulent transaction propagation, both on a forward-and backward-looking basis. The attacker could unilaterally finalize their preferred chain without the votes of any other stakers, and could also reverse past finalized transactions. The Sui Network’s proof-of-stake consensus mechanism requires a 2/3 supermajority of validators who have staked SUI to vote in favor in order to finalize transactions and add transactions to the Sui Network. For example, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic Network was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic Network. The attack resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of over $5.0 million and $1.0 million. In addition, in May 2019, the Bitcoin Cash network experienced a >50% attack when two large mining pools reversed a series of transactions in order to stop an unknown miner from taking advantage of a flaw in a recent Bitcoin Cash protocol upgrade. Although this particular attack was arguably benevolent, the fact that such coordinated activity was able to occur may negatively impact perceptions of the Bitcoin Cash network. Although the two attacks described above took place on proof-of-work based networks, it is possible that a similar attack may occur on the Sui Network, which could negatively impact the value of SUI and the value of the Shares. Although there are no known reports of malicious control of the Sui Network, if groups of coordinating or connected SUI holders that together have a more than 50% of outstanding SUI, were to stake that SUI and run validators, they could exert authority over the validation of SUI transactions. This risk is heightened if such amount of the validating power on the network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority. If network participants, including the core developers and the administrators of validating pools, do not act to ensure greater decentralization of SUI, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the validating power on the Sui Network will increase, which may adversely affect the value of SUI and the value of the Shares. A malicious actor may also obtain control over the Sui Network through its influence over core developers by gaining direct control over a core developer or an otherwise influential programmer. To the extent that the SUI ecosystem does not grow, the possibility that a malicious actor may be able to maliciously influence the Sui Network in this manner will remain heightened. Moreover, it is possible that a group of SUI holders that together control more than 50% of outstanding SUI are in fact part of the initial or current core developer group, or are otherwise influential members of the SUI community. To the extent that the initial or current core developer groups also control more than 50% of outstanding SUI, as some believe, the risk of and arising from this particular group of users obtaining control of the validating power on the Sui Network will be even greater, and should this materialize, it may adversely affect the value of the Shares.
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