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(القاهرة: العربي 1 ) فرح يحيى زعاترة، التهديدات السيبرانية على الأمن القومي الأميركي، ط 24 ( . 166 )، ص 2024 للنشر والتوزيع، (25) Raymond L. Garthoff, Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1990). (26) Alexei Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997). (27) Paul R. Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 15–27. ، ” ) «أجهزة الاســتخبارات: الأدوار والمســؤوليات استنادًًا إلى الحكومة الرشيدة لقطاع الأمن 28 ( . 138 )، ص 2022 (قطر، 4 مجلة حكامة، المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات، العدد (29) Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, eds., The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: The New Press, 1993). (30) Christopher M. Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: HarperCollins, 1990). (31) Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2014). (32) Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), p. 47. (33) David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 75. (34) Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), pp. 45–47. (35) Ibid., pp. 45–47. (36) Richard A. Posner, “The 9/11 Commission Report and the Intelligence Failure,” The Yale Review of International Studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (2007), pp. 6–10.
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