grantors (the “Moczygembas”) filed suit requesting a declaratory judgment that the grantors did not convey the disputed royalties. The successors to the grantees (the “Janyseks”) took the opposite position, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court determined that the based on the “subject- to” language of the 1977 Deed, it did not convey the Term Royalty Interests or the 1/24 Royalty Interests. [7] The Janyseks appealed. The San Antonio Court of Appeals first noted the familiar rule that when construing an unambiguous deed, it must attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties within the four corners of the instrument. This should be done without relying on mechanical rules of construction or the use of “magic words.” [8] The Court then cited to its two recent holdings in Jarzombek v. Marathon Oil Company [9] and Gonzalez v. Janssen . [10] In each of these cases, the San Antonio Court had found that disputed deeds did not include a reservation or exception to conveyance. However, the Court carefully noted that in a four-corners analysis it was not bound by a “mechanical” application of these precedential holdings, which were merely “instructive.” [11] The Court next opined that although clearly not dispositive in a four-corners inquiry, certain traditional canons of construction still provide a valuable framework for deed interpretation. First, the Court noted that deeds are construed to confer the greatest estate that the instrument will allow. Therefore, a deed will pass whatever estate a grantor owns, unless the deed contains language showing intent to grant a lesser estate. A reservation of minerals must be made by clear language and exceptions must identify the interest excepted with reasonable certainty (and are strictly construed against a grantor). [12] The Moczygembas focused on the deed language providing that “[t]his conveyance is subject, however, to all mineral conveyances, mineral reservations, oil, gas and other mineral leases, royalty conveyances or reservations, easements, ordinances and rights-of-way of record in the office
of the County Clerk of Karnes County, Texas.” They argued that the disputed royalties were excluded from the conveyance, pursuant to this language, because the interests had been established in other records that had been recorded with the county clerk. For further support, the Moczygembas cited the clause at the end of the 1977 Deed, which states that the warranty is “subject to the above-mentioned exceptions and reservation.” In rejecting the Moczygembas arguments, the Court reasoned that the 1977 Deed did not state with any certainty that the disputed royalties were reserved. It did not mention the Term Royalty Interests, the 1/24 Royalty Interests, or the deeds that had conveyed those interests. Rather, the only interest that was specifically mentioned was the 1/4 royalty interest to Susan Janysek. The Court also noted that the “subject to the above-mentioned exceptions” language was insufficient as it did not express a clear intention to reserve the interest. [13] Finally, the Appellate Court reasoned that a plain reading of the “subject to” clause serves its principal function, which is to protect the grantor against a claim for breach of warranty when a mineral interest is outstanding. Therefore, the Appellate Court found that the 1977 Deed lacked a clear intent of the grantors to reserve or except the disputed royalties or reversionary interest. [14] To convince the Court that surrounding circumstances should be considered, the Moczygembas also argued for the admission of extrinsic evidence. In particular, the Moczygembas pointed to evidence that Susan Janysek intended to treat all nine or her children equally (by vesting each child with a 1/24 royalty). The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that because the language in the 1977 Deed is clear and conveyed all of the grantor’s interest – other than the one specific interest reserved to Susan Janysek – extraneous evidence is inadmissible to contradict the deed’s plain language. [15] Therefore, the language in the 1977 Deed conveyed all of the grantors interest in the Term Royalty Interests and the 1/24 Royalty Interests.
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G rowth T hrough E ducat i on - J uly / A ugus t / S ept ember 2022
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