Liberty’s ‘Terror’
certainly not unprecedented: in 1796, two members of the Oxford Militia were sentenced to death for food rioting, with Lord Sheffield insisting that in this instance an ‘example’ might inspire greater discipline. 25 Perhaps more frightening than punitive prosecution was the public ‘justice’ many r adicals faced. Loyalist violence was both frequent and fierce: in 1791, for example, a chemist sympathetic to the French Revolution had his Birmingham home burned down, 26 whilst in 1794 the Mayor of Nottingham encouraged anti-radical rioters and assisted them in searching the houses of suspected Jacobins. 27 Although less violent, the social ostracism experienced by alleged radicals was an equally sinister deterrent. At Jesus College, Cambridge, the unitarian William Frend was forced to live out of residence, and at Oxford Thomas Beddoes was denied a Chair of Chemistry for his political beliefs. 28 This climate of conformity was facilitated chiefly by the aforementioned loyalist clubs, which employed both intimidatory and violent tactics. At the extreme, members instigated riots in cities such as Manchester. Similarly threatening acts, though more subtle, occurred in smaller parishes like Kettering, Northamptonshire: in order to ‘discover the disaffected’, members went door -to-door seeking signatures for a loyalist declaration; naturally, all but three households obliged. 29 It is important to note however that Pitt and his ministers disapproved of these loyalist acts of violence; on the 1791 Priestly Riots in Birmingham, the Foreign Secretary commented: ‘I do n ot admire riots in favour of government much more than riots against it. ’ 30 Although it has been argued that the cabinet incited mobbish behaviour through a climate of repressive legislation and ‘exhortations to loyalists’, 31 much evidence suggests a genuine distaste for vigilantism on the part of central government. During the Priestly Riots, for example, troops were rushed swiftly into Birmingham to restore order 32 and ministers pressured magistrates to prosecute those loyalists responsible for instigating violence. 33 Loyalist publications were nevertheless vital in fuelling and aggravating the general disdain for radical thought. Again, the associations played no small part in this, printing and distributing thousands of periodicals and pamphlets. 34 Governmental involvement in the loyalist propaganda machine was, moreover, substantial. In the early 1790s, subsidies of £5000 per annum were set aside to finance alarmist publications like The Sun and True Briton , 35 and towards the end of the decade Pitt himself made several literary contributions to The Anti-Jacobin . Primarily, the loyalist point of attack was on the issue of property. Painite policies – for instance poor relief and progressive taxation on inheritance – were, it was argued, a threat to the British system of property which facilitated commercial growth. Inequality was natural and expected; opulence and disparity were indicative of an economically advanced society, and therefore not to be resisted, especially considering the alternative: if ‘equality of property’ was fully realized, loyalists claimed, no worker would be left available for specialized labour, resulting in a 25 Emsley, ‘An Aspect of Pitt’s ‘ Terror ’’, 165. 26 Reilly, 185. 27 Evans, 58. 28 Hilton, 73-74. 29 Mitchell, 61,64. 30 Jennifer Mori, ‘The Political Theory of William Pitt the Younger’, History, 83.270 (April, 1998), 234 – 48: 246.
31 Hilton, 73. 32 Duffy, 148. 33 R. B. Rose, ‘The Priestley Riots of 1791’, Past & Present , (November, 1960), 68-88: 82. 34 Mitchell, 72. 35 Hilton, 65.
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