during the 1960s in other aspects of the Cold War obstructed further advancement in reducing nuclear tensions. The Cuban Missile Crisis is often remembered in the public mind as the culmination of early Cold War tensions in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union directly faced each other in a standoff that had the potential for worldwide catastrophe. However, little attention is given to the outcomes of the two-week stand off and what it meant for international nuclear policy. Experts such as Francis J. Gavin suggest that Cuba single handily changed the course of nuclear politics. Gavin states that before Cuba, nuclear strikes seemed a viable option to resolve a crisis, such as those threatened over the Berlin crisis a year before. 224 However, he follows on to say it became evident after Cuba that in a crisis nuclear superiority was of limited value, “The crisis is more likely to be determined by the balance of resolve.” 225 Cuba was a watershed moment mainly because it demonstrated that diplomacy and composed reasoning was a more progressive alternative to brinksmanship politics, which had so much to lose. Furthermore, both the Berlin and Cuban crisis demonstrated that neither side were willing to implement their commitment to protect allies with nuclear force. This is revealed in a State Department report by Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, head of the National Security Council, which states- “It should also demonstrate that the Soviets are not prepared to risk a decisive military show down with the U.S. over issues involving the extension of Soviet Power.” 226 Yuri Pavlov, Khrushchev’s interpreter throughout the crisis, agrees by suggesting that Soviet reassurance to Havana that in the event of U.S. invasion the USSR would provide a nuclear response was made without conviction. Pavlov writes, “It was no proof that Khrushchev had not learnt his 224 Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age, (Cornell University Press: London) 2012, pp.66. 225 Ibid, pp.60. 226 Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, Cuban Missile Crisis, Doc. 80, 29 th Oct 1962.
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