lesson; they had, b ut they needed to ‘climb down the tree’ without losing face and Soviet prestige.” 227 Sources such as these unveil the relaxation in tensions by moving away from using the threat of nuclear weapons to bolster foreign policy. The Cuban Missile Crisis undoubtedly startled both U.S. President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev by just how close the countries had come to all out nuclear war, “There seemed to be a new understanding between the two leaders which could point to a significant reduction in Cold War tensions.” 228 One such outcome was the establishment of a ‘hotline’ between The White House and the Kremlin, so that in any future crisis, direct communication could be established between the two leaders. 229 This was not merely a symbolic gesture designed to alleviate public tension. It would also have the practical benefits of reducing the time of communication between Washington and Moscow, which could prove vital in the event of a real world crisis. As the world stepped back from the brink of destruction it was hoped that East and West could find peaceful negotiations to their differences, many more liberal leaders in Washington and Moscow saw this as an opportunity to begin negotiating for nuclear test bans, non-proliferation and disarmament treaties. Khrushchev urged a beginning of negotiations to resolve the Berlin crisis and calls for the prospect of disarmament, in response President Kennedy wrote- “I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament (…) and to the gr eat effort for a nuclear test ban.” 230 Peter G. Boyle notes that from late 1962 to 1963 Kennedy changed his focus from military build up to 227 Yuri Pavlov, Soviet-Cuba Relations, 1959- 1991, (North-South Centre Press: University of Miami) pp.57. 228 Josephine W. Pomerance, The Cuban Crisis and the Test Ban negotiations, The Journal of Conflict and Resolution (pre 1986) Vol. 7. Issue. 3. 1 Sept 1963. 229 Andrey A. Kokoshin, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Context of Strategic stability. Working Paper, 2012. 230 Pomerance, 1963.
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