team to inherit the ‘little Détente’, which followed the Cuban Missile Crisis.” 236 In 1963 State department official Robert Johnson filed a report on the future of the Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC) nuclear programme. In which Johnson concluded that China’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon would be a great threat not only to the U.S. but also to the wider Asian region. 237 On 16 th October 1964 this fear became a reality as the Communist state announced it had carried out its first successful nuclear detonation. China’s nuclear possession generated a new threat to the United States and its interests overseas, but more importantly it also greatly threatened the Soviet Union who despite being an ideological ally did not support China’s pursuit of joining the nuclear club. The USSR cut Beijing off from its nuclear program assistance in 1962 after a schism emerged between the two communist states. 238 Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, Beijing had been a substantial critic of the easing of tensions between The USSR and the U.S. Accusing Moscow of “capitulating to American Imperialism.” 239 For President Johnson in the U.S., a nuclear PRC’s support for North Vietnam against U.S. intervention made the prospect of a military escalation from a nuclear-armed country all the more real. 240 The initial concern the superpowers had over China’s nuclear weapons was that it accompanied an aggressive, expansive foreign policy. China had already fought the U.S. in Korea and had attacked India in 1962. 241 Paired with this volatile foreign policy was the reckless 236 John Dumbrell, LBJ and The Cold War , A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson, edt- Mitchell B. Lerner, (Wiley- Blackwell: Chichester) 2012, pp.423. 237 William Burr & Jeffrey T. Richelson, W hether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The U.S. and China’s N uclear Programme 1960-1964, International Security, Vol 25. Issue 3. pp.56. 238 Burr & Richelson, pp.68. 239 Ball, pp.106.
240 Gavin, 2012, pp.78. 241 Gavin, 2012, pp.75
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