attitude in the use of nuclear weapons by Chinese leader Mao who made statements such as; “If the worst cam e to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while Imperialism would be raised to the ground and the whole world would become socialist.” 242 To the U.S. this made China seem un-deterrable and therefore more of a destabilising threat to worldwide security. China’s pursuit of nuclear weapons provided the United States and the Soviet Union with a common enemy. United in wanting to protect their positions as the world’s two nuclear superpowers, it was decided that measures needed to be undertaken to prevent further nuclear advancements by China and the long-term threat of nuclear proliferation from emerging states. Averell Harriman hoped that the newly signed NTBT would make nuclear development harder for the Chinese. “If Moscow and Wa shington reached an agreement. Together we could compel China to stop nuclear development threatening to take out facilities if necessary.” 243 The prospect of coordinated military strikes between the U.S. and USSR demonstrates a significant U-turn in the countries relations and is testament to how much nuclear tensions had faded in only a couple of years. It was decided that the most effective way to tackle the prospect of China and other unstable countries from challenging both the U.S. and the USSR as nuclear powers was to provide legislation limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Murry notes that by the mid-1960s the means to acquire nuclear material was becoming more accessible for smaller countries. 244 A list of less secure states including Brazil, Israel, Egypt, Argentina and Mexico were all candidates to start atomic weapons programs. Gavin builds upon this writing on the consequences this would have on U.S.- Soviet nuclear relations; “The dangerous but predictable nuclear stand -off between
242 Ibid. 243 Burr & Richelson, pp.68 244 Gavin, 2012, pp.79
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