paradigmatic case for a successful UN intervention in Bosnia in 1995, working with local actors and complying with UN legitimacy, President Clinton has not consequently had the intervention attached to his name. Whereas an unsuccessful intervention would carry a much heavier burden on the leading military officials involved. 3. Legal and Theoretical Perspectives 3.1 Legal framework The United Nation’s new found intolerance to human suffering and human atrocities began to reflect the norm of the post- Cold War policy towards intervention. This was expressed through both legal and moral reforms and reflected by the considerable increase of military-led operations. As James Pattison records, the UN issued the use of military force 56 times between the years 1990 and 2000, compared to just 22 times throughout the entirety of the Cold War. 285 This can be attributed to the reconceptualization of security threats when referring to the relevant chapters of the UN Charter. In this case, the key article prohibiting the deployment of military interventions is Chapter 1: Article 2(7) in which it states; “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” 286 Nevertheless, it then makes clear of the exception for anything that can be defined as a matter of “international peace and security” under Chapter Vll. 287 As previously discussed, threats to ‘international peace and security’ were revolutionised from the early 1990’s, thus justi fying considerably more military interventions 285 James Pattinson, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 286 The United Nations, ‘The UN Charter’, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/> [accessed 08/04/2016] 287 Ibid.
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