also of the UN’s standing in the international community. Conversely, it is argued that states within the UN must share an element of self- interest in a potential intervention in order to justify the deployment of its forces at a significant cost, financially and potentially in human lives. 313 This was evident in the case of Rwanda, in which the distinct lack of national interests arguably led to a failure to intervene. Nevertheless, the ICISS accepts that in today’s world of realpolitik; “mixed motiv es, in international relations as everywhere else, are a fact of life” 314 , however; “the primary purpose of the intervention…must be to halt or avert human suffering.” 315 This argument is reflected within Aidin Hehir’s analogy of the charity dance;
“A person attends a fundraising dance in aid of a local homeless charity because they wish to meet their friends, and enjoy themselves, and because they know that doing so helps homeless people. The fact that this person’s motivation for attending the dance was not purely, or even primarily altruistic, does not mean, many would argue, that this was not a humane act, as it had positive humanitarian consequences.” 316
This addresses the question posed by Alex Bellamy; should we define the legitimacy of an intervention by the “ostensibly humanitarian outcome” or by the “humanitarian motivations of the interveners?” 317 I believe that although national interests can certainly be addressed 313 Nadège Sheehan, The Economics of UN Peacekeeping, (Routledge, 25 Jul 2011), pp. 24. 314 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect , (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), pp. xii. 315 Ibid, pp. 36. 316 Hehir, pp. 153. 317 Alex Bellamy, ‘Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention’, Journal of Military Ethics , 3(3), (2004), pp. 217.
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