during the intervention, humanitarian motives should ultimately be placed at the forefr ont of the UN’s objectives, with any additional benefits, as experienced in Bosnia, providing further motivation to commit to a peaceful resolve when the operation proves difficult. This, I believe, was followed accordingly by the UN throughout the 1990’s in order to commit to the ever increasing responsibility to the response and protection against threats to human security. This is accurately summarised by Hehir in his introduction to humanitarian intervention; “if an intervention is motivated by non -humanitarian reasons, it can still count as humanitarian provided that the motives and the means do not undermine a positive humanitarian outcome. 318 4.3 Means by which the United Nations intervened during the 1990’s Similarly, to the motives of UN interventions d uring the 1990’s, the means by which their objectives are pursued can also be examined to determine its legality. As examined within Chapter 2, the UN’s ‘paradigm shift’ regarding security threats is observed in many different ways, thus creating a complex classification system for the appropriate and proportionate use of military force. Put into an applicable perspective, what is considered a threat to human security and thus moderating a military intervention to one person, may not be the same to another, making the use of force unlawful. However, the Just War doctrine can again offer some consideration to the required aspects contributing to the legitimacy of UN interventions, thus Jus in Bello can be applied to relevant UN interventions of the 1990’s. Th e first condition outlines the need for discrimination between aggressors and non- combatants when directing military operations. The UN’s willingness to take “appropriate and necessary means” 319 combined
318 Hehir, pp. 172. 319 United Nations General Assembly, ‘ World Summit Outcome Document’, (2005), pp. 31,
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